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A Model for User-centric Information Security  
Risk Assessment and Response 
 
Manal Alohali 
Managing and assessing information security risks in organizations is a well understood and 
accepted approach, with literature providing a vast array of proposed tools, methods and techniques. 
They are, however, tailored for organizations, with little literature supporting how these can be 
achieved more generally for end-users, i.e. users, who are solely responsible for their devices, data 
and for making their own security decisions. To protect against them, technical countermeasures alone 
has been found insufficient as it can be misused by users and become vulnerable to various threats. 
This research focuses on better understanding of human behavior which is vital for ensuring an 
efficient information security environment. Motivated by the fact that different users react differently 
to the same stimuli, identifying the reasons behind variations in security behavior and why certain 
users could be “at risk” more than others is a step towards developing techniques that can enhance 
user’s behavior and protect them against security attacks. 
 A user survey was undertaken to explore users security behavior in several domains and to 
investigate the correlation between users characteristics and their risk taking behavior. Analysis of the 
results demonstrated that user’s characteristics do play a significant role in affecting their security 
behavior risk levels. Based upon these findings, this study proposed a user-centric model that is 
intended to provide a comprehensive framework for assessing and communicating information 
security risks for users of the general public with the aim of monitoring, assessing and responding to 
user’s behavior in a continuous, individualized and timely manner. The proposed approach is built 
upon two components: assessing risks and communicating them. Aside from the traditional risk 
assessment formula, three risk estimation models are proposed: a user-centric, system-based and an 
aggregated model to create an individualized risk profile. As part of its novelty, both user-centric and 
behavioral-related factors are considered in the assessment. This resulted in an individualized and 
timely risk assessment in granular form. Aside from the traditional risk communication approach of 
one message/one-size-fits-all, a gradual response mechanism is proposed to individually and 
persuasively respond to risk and educate the user of his risk-taking behavior. 
Two experiments and a scenario-based simulation of users with varying user-centric factors has 
been implemented to simulate the proposed model, how it works and to evaluate its effectiveness and 
usefulness. The proposed approach worked in the way it was expected to. The analysis of the 
experiments results provided an indication that risk could be assessed differently for the same 
behavior based upon a number of user-centric and behavioral-related factors resulting in an 
individualized granular risk score/level. This granular risk assessment, away from high, medium and 
low, provided a more insightful evaluation of both risk and response. The analysis of results was also 
useful in demonstrating how risk is not the same for all users and how the proposed model is effective 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
With the rapid growth of technology and the wide range of 24/7 e-services provided by different 
devices such as laptops, smartphones, smart TVs, game consoles and wearable technology, the 
number of users is growing every day. The availability, and to some extent the ease of use of these 
technologies and services make it increasingly appealing to users who range from novices to 
technology-savvy users. Users can store, access and process all kinds of information such as business, 
personal, financial and medical data on a range of devices and infrastructure where each device has its 
own security requirements (Ledermuller and Clarke 2011; Allam et al. 2014). However, many risks 
are associated with these kinds of technologies/services such as privacy and information security 
risks. Users, who are solely responsible for their devices, data and for making their own security 
decisions,  are arguably not well aware of such risks associated with the use of these devices 
(Mylonas et al. 2013; Jing et al. 2014).  
The growth and popularity of the Internet has transformed our lives where Internet access is now 
considered as a necessity rather than a luxury. The number of Internet users increased from 2.94 
billion users in 2014 to 3.8 billion users in 2017 where most homes have one or more devices 
connected to the Internet whether through wired or wireless communication through services offered 
by ISPs (InternetLiveStats 2017). Users spend time on the Internet performing many online activities 
such as online chatting, sending emails, browsing the web and socializing on social networks (Hasan 
and Hussin 2010; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013). With this wide spread use of Internet, comes an 
increase in information security threats. This is evident as the number of created malware grew from 
274 million in 2014 to almost 670 million in 2017 with a rate of 1.8 million threats introduced 
everyday (Symantec 2018) and an email malware rate of 1 in 131in 2016  compared to 1 in 244 and 1 
in 220 in 2014 and 2015 respectively (Symantec 2017). During 2017, 29.4% of user computers 
around the world were subjected to at least one attack (Kaspersky 2017). 
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However, the presence of an uneducated or ill-informed user makes them an easy and attractive 
target for attackers. This is evident as employees mistakes are considered as one of the top threats to 
information security in organizations (Aloul 2010; Rao and Pati 2012; Hansch and Benenson 2014). 
With this continuously evolving threat landscape and the increased number of Internet users, the need 
for a security-aware user is expanded into a wider population to include everyone. This need is 
significant as they both pose and face risks. On the one hand, they pose risks as they are considered 
risk to others. On the other hand, they face risks as they are considered risk to themselves (Aloul 
2010; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013).  
 Although they are solely responsible for the protection of their own devices and information, 
little evidence is found demonstrating that they are knowledgeable of information security threats and 
protection, and actually practicing it (Talib et al. 2010; Rao and Pati 2012; Kritzinger and Von Solms 
2013). Indeed, it has been found that they are less willing to perform money-related and sensitive data 
tasks on some of these devices such as smartphones due to issues related to security, privacy, trust and 
usability (Zabaa et al. 2011; Mylonas et al. 2013). Furthermore, they have difficulties in using, 
understanding and reacting to security-related threats (Mensch and Wilkie 2011; Zabaa et al. 2011; 
Komatsu et al. 2013). Additionally, they have been found to feel they do not have the skills or 
knowledge to protect themselves, as a result, they often try to avoid security and depend on others to 
provide it for them. Users often view information security as complicated and not well understood 
which makes them rarely interested in learning about information security and how information 
security software works (Furnell et al. 2008; Wash and Rader 2011; Rao and Pati 2012). As security is 
considered a secondary task and not a primary task for users (Furnell and Clarke 2012; Harbach et al. 
2014), educating them about information security threats is a challenging but a must to fight against 
these threats. Although this is a well-established and accepted approach in organizations where 
resources are, arguably, allocated to achieve the organizations’ goals, it is a challenge in the case of 
users of the general public (Furnell and Clarke 2012).  
Thus, considering the human aspects of security are vital for ensuring an efficient Information 
security environment that cannot depend on technology only. This implies the need to understand 
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users' perception of adopted Information security (Furnell et al. 2008; Wash and Rader 2011; Furnell 
and Clarke 2012; Metalidou et al. 2014). One cannot assume that users are always motivated to learn 
about Information security and practice it. Actually, there are situations of an aware user who knows 
how to protect himself but, simply, chooses not to, perhaps because they do not care, usability 
problems related to the used security control or simply because they do not consider themselves as 
targets (Albrechtsen 2007; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Shropshire et al. 2015). Further to that, the slow 
adoption of security controls is not only related to usability but also to the fact that users will only try 
to protect themselves from risks that are salient to them (Wash and Rader 2011; Harbach et al. 2014). 
Maintaining information security generally focuses on the protection of Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability (CIA) of information. Therefore, an information security attack is affecting the CIA 
of assets (Kaur and Mustafa 2013). Managing and assessing information security risks in 
organizations is a well understood and an accepted approach used widely by enterprise organizations 
to provide a safe environment to carry out their business using  the most cost-efficient and effective 
means (Tiganoaia 2012; ENISA 2014).  
As risk is a common problem in many fields, many information security risk management 
methodologies were issued by national and international organizations such as The National Institute 
of Standards and Technologies (NIST) Special Publication 800-series (NIST 2012) and The 
International Standards Organization ISO/IEC 27000 (ISO 2011) or issued by professional 
organizations such as CORAS(CORAS 2014), Magerit (Magerit 2006), Mehari (Mehari  2007), 
OCTAVE (OCTAVE 2014) and CRAMM (Yazar 2011) or as research projects (Karabacak and 
Sogukpinar 2005). Unfortunately, these tools and methodologies are designed for organizations and 
not members of the public. Traditional Risk Assessment (RA) methods either treat devices as a 
business information system asset or as a single entity where vulnerability and threat assessment is 
made on the asset as a whole rather than the services that are used within the device (Komatsu et al. 
2013). By focusing on the user not the device, increased security awareness through understanding 
and effectively communicating risk would arguably improve security behavior and lead to reduced 
security risks (Jing et al. 2014).  
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Further to that, although a number of risk assessment methodologies have contributed 
significantly to current knowledge and aimed at assessing risks for the general public, they are either 
too difficult to be used or understood by users or they could be used as an awareness tool with no 
guidance offered to users to make informed decisions. Moreover, most RA methodologies are static, 
i.e. time is not included explicitly in calculating risk. They are found to be ambiguous, imprecise and 
cannot effectively communicate the system's dynamic behavior, adversaries and actors to system 
stakeholders. Threats and vulnerabilities that vary overtime are identified using horizontal data with 
static time frame (Sadiq 2010). Additionally, they are platform dependent. Thus, there is a need for a 
platform independent and dynamic information security RA model that continuously assess and 
adaptively communicate risks in timely manner on both system and user behavior level. This implies 
that a structured approach tailored for users of the general public is needed to help them assess, 
analyze and make an informed decision regarding the risks they are exposed to. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
The research builds upon existing research on Information Security Risk Management and 
Communication in which the issues of awareness and risk communication will be considered. It will 
seek to develop a comprehensive and continuous User-Centric Risk Assessment and Response model. 
Further research will be made to understand how users from the general public make risk informed 
decisions and the relation between different users’ characteristics, i.e. user-centric factors and their 
security behavior. A novel approach to individually and adaptively assess and communicate risks will 
be developed that focuses specifically on factors such as user behavior, awareness, and timeliness. 
Key to this work will also be the development of a number of risk estimation models from which this 
framework will operate. The effectiveness and reliability of the proposed models will also be 
evaluated.  
In order to achieve this, the research objectives are established as follows: 
1. To develop a current state of the art understanding of Information Security Risk Assessment 
methods. 
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2. To investigate the current approaches in security awareness, usability and human aspects of 
information security. 
3. To identify the factors that influence user’s risk taking behavior. 
4. To explore the extent in which users are making risk informed decisions. 
5. To analyze the relationship between differences in users’ characteristics (user-centric 
factors)  and their risk-taking behavior. 
6. To propose a novel model for User-centric Risk Assessment and Response that assesses 
risks on both user and system level and generate an individualized risk profile accordingly. 
7. To develop a novel approach in security awareness and usability to communicate risks 
effectively to users by designing a communication that efficiently and individually interacts 
with users. 
8. To propose novel risk models that adapt to user’s-centric factors when calculating risk of  
both system and user level risks and generate an aggregated risk score/level.  
9. To design a scenario based simulation from which the models will operate. In this scenario 
based simulation, various users with different combinations of user-centric factors are 
involved to evaluate the effectiveness, reliability and feasibility of the proposed model. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
To address the aforementioned objectives, this thesis is organized into eight chapters. The 
research problem, aims and objectives are introduced in Chapter 1.  
The second chapter presents a literature review of Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM) methodologies. It provides an overview of the ISRM process with a focus on Information 
Security Risk Assessment (ISRA). To develop a better understanding, it discusses and analyzes 
various ISRA approaches and methodologies whether those tailored for organizations or those 
intended for users of the general public. Not limited to that, enhancements to such methodologies are 
presented discussing both their advantages and disadvantages. This gives an overview of some of the 
current issues and challenges related to ISRA. 
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The third chapter investigates the current approaches in security awareness, usability and human 
aspects of information security using a systematic literature review. It discusses security awareness, 
training and education, gives a closer look at the current end-users’, i.e. users, classifications and 
suggests another one. Additionally, current methods used to raise security awareness of users from the 
general public are presented. Risk communication, learning styles and delivery methods are also 
discussed. From this review, several key behavioral influencers are identified to be essential when 
educating and directing user’s security behavior. This chapter concludes by outlining that risk is not 
the same for all users and that a number of factors play a role in shaping his risk-taking behavior. 
Unlike other surveys that are limited in their scope, the fourth chapter presents a user survey 
study that explores user’s security behavior from a holistic perspective including security behaviors 
from multiple domains such as data management and authentication. The study goes further to 
investigate the relationship between various user-centric factors and user’s risk-taking behavior. A 
more complete set of analysis provides a more applicable understanding of what significant relations 
exist. Therefore, being identified the reasons behind variations in user’s security behavior and why 
certain users are at-risk more than others is a step towards protecting and defending users against 
security attacks. 
Capitalizing on the previous findings, the fifth chapter proposes a novel User-centric Risk 
Assessment and Response (UCRAR) model that goes beyond the traditional one-size-fits-all 
approach. The model intends to provide a comprehensive framework for individually and 
continuously assessing and communicating information security risks in a timely manner. The novelty 
of the proposed model depends upon four significant aspects: the continuous monitoring of user’s 
behaviors, an aggregated risk score/level based upon risk assessment on both the user and system 
level, an individualized risk profile and a gradual, persuasive and individualized response mechanism. 
These aspects are utilized to enhance user’s risk taking behavior and transform him from being ill-
informed to a security minded user who is able to make a risk informed decision. This chapter 
provides detailed explanation of the proposed model with regards to its components, processes and its 
operational flow. 
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As UCRAR provides a mechanism for understanding both system and user/behavior risk and how 
to respond to them, the sixth chapter presents a novel proposed mechanism for estimating/calculating 
such risks. As part of the novelty of the proposed approach and aside from the traditional risk 
calculation formula, three risk estimation models are proposed: a user-centric, a system-based and an 
aggregated risk estimation model. These models are utilized within the functionality of the Risk 
Assessment component of UCRAR. The novelty of these models depend upon a suggested 
categorization of behaviors and the consideration of significant correlations between user-centric 
factors and user’s behavior among other factors when estimating risk.  
The seventh chapter discusses and analyzes the evaluation process of the proposed model through 
the design and implementation of a scenario based simulation from which the models will operate. 
This involved various users with different combinations of user-centric factors to evaluate the 
effectiveness, reliability and feasibility of the proposed approach. According to the proposed model, 
risks were assessed and results analyzed for each user/behavior. The analysis of simulation results is 
useful in demonstrating how risk is not the same for all users and how the proposed model is effective 
in adapting to differences between users. Furthermore, it provides an indication that risk could be 
assessed differently for the same behavior based upon a number of user-centric and behavioral related 
factors resulting in an individualized and more realistic risk score/level. 
The final chapter presents the main conclusions derived from this research. It also highlights the 
achievements, limitations and opportunities for future work.  
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Information security is to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability of information through 
the protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, disclosure, use, 
modification, disruption, modification or destruction (NIST 2012). The security threat landscape is 
complex and rapidly evolving as almost 2 million pieces of threats are introduced daily (Symantec 
2018). Organizations, for example, major security concerns are about the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of their IT systems. The risk of sensitive information leakage and modification, for 
example, through social networking, cloud computing or Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
technologies may result in significant damage to organization's revenue, reputation and competitive 
advantage (Bojanc 2013; Webb et al. 2014). Actually, this is not limited to organizations and include 
users from the general public. 
Traditionally, information security was a technical discipline to provide the maximum security 
level in which threats were prevented by a technical solution only (Bojanc 2013). It was later realized 
that information security is a problem that cannot be resolved by technology only, but there are other 
aspects to it such as processes and economics (AlAwawdeh and Tubaishat 2014). Moreover, users are 
frequently identified as the weakest link in information security. The high rate of advancement in 
technology and the increasing number of developed and updated Information Technology (IT) 
systems for various sensitive and critical applications such as e-Government, e-Health and e-Banking 
forces a challenge in managing and assessing the risks faced by these systems especially information 
security risks (Sulaman et al. 2013; Webb et al. 2014). Indeed, this assessment is highly required as a 
step towards mitigating these risks. Managing and assessing information security risks is a well 
understood and accepted approach. It is usually expensive, time consuming and done by experts and 
professional risk assessors (Bojanc and Blazic 2013).  
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This chapter begins with an explanation of the ISRM process in section 2.  The current RA 
methodologies are reviewed in section 3 and enhancements to these methodologies are discussed in 
the following section. ISRA for the general public is reviewed in section 5 followed by a discussion in 
section 6. Finally, a conclusion is presented. 
2. 2 The ISRM Process 
To better describe the process of ISRM, two definitions are given by two international 
standardized organizations, ISO and NIST. As defined by The International Standards Organization 
(ISO 2011), Risk Management (RM) is the coordinated activities to control and direct the 
organization with respect to risk. The activities of ISRM are as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure ‎2.1: The Risk Management Process (ISO 2011) 
This definition is close to that of The National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST 
2012) who defines ISRM as the program and supporting processes to manage information security 
risks to organizational operations, individuals, assets, other organizations and the Nation. It includes 
the following activities: 
1- Establishing the context of risk-related activities. 
2- Risk Assessment 
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3- Responding to risk 
4- Risk monitoring over time. 
Thus, the classification of ISRM activities is not final and maybe used to describe a process that 
includes some of the other activities (Sulaman et al. 2013). Regardless of how ISRM activities are 
classified, the main goal is for organizations to determine if they are safeguarding their information 
assets by using the most cost effective and efficient means. An organization has to determine the 
needed and accepted level of security, where this level is determined by RM (Shedden et al. 2011; 
Bojanc and Blazic 2013; Webb et al. 2014). Therefore, ISRM establishes the basic security elements 
that are assets and their owners, vulnerabilities, threats, risks and measures (Bojanc and Blazic 2013). 
In principle, risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO 2011). In the context of 
information security, risk is associated with the potential that a vulnerability(ies) of an information 
asset or group of information assets being exploited by a threat(s) thereby causing harm to an 
organization (ISO 2011). This implies that risks can only exist with the existence of an exploitable 
vulnerability. A further definition is given by NIST (NIST 2012)  who defines risk as the measure of 
the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and as a function of 
the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs and the likelihood of 
occurrence. In this static risk model, time is not incorporated as a variable, so no description is 
included to describe consequences. However, a more dynamic risk model is required that considers 
time. This will result in different types of actions taken based on the different phases of risk scenario. 
As the consideration of security risks is an important component of RM, many factors relate to 
information security risks whether managerial, human and/or technical (Van Cleef 2010). Moreover, 
risk components that should be considered during the process of risk identification are threats, 
vulnerabilities, assets, impacts and likelihood. 
In the literature, threats tend to be used to refer to the potential cause of undesired incidents that 
may cause damage to the system or organization. It can range from natural disasters to innocent and 
simple employees mistakes (ISO 2011; NIST 2012; Bergomi et al. 2013; Bojanc and Blazic 2013). 
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Whilst assets, whether tangible or intangible, are defined as anything of value to an organization, 
threats have either direct or indirect impacts on assets (Yazar 2011). Furthermore, threats impacts on 
information assets include the destruction, modification, theft, disclosure and/or the denial of service 
i.e. service interruption (NIST 2012; Sulaman et al. 2013). However, threats could be categorized as 
physical damage, natural events, loss of essential services and technical failures (ISO 2011). Whereas 
a vulnerability, is the weakness in an information asset that can be exploited by a threat, the likelihood 
or probability is the chance that a threat can exploit a vulnerability or a set of vulnerabilities (ISO 
2011; NIST 2012).  Although the vulnerability in software is the major cause of security incidents, it 
is found that many incidents were related to humans such as the use of weak passwords, 
misunderstanding of security policies and visits to suspicious websites (Van Cleef 2010; Bojanc and 
Blazic 2013; Sulaman et al. 2013; AlAwawdeh and Tubaishat 2014). 
After establishing the context, the process of ISRM starts by identifying and determining a list of 
possible risks, these risks are analyzed by combining the expected impact and the probability of each 
risk. Based on risk analysis results, risks are prioritized. Finally, the identified risks are mitigated or 
treated by reducing their consequences or probability of occurrence through the selection and 
implementation of appropriate controls and measures or by transferring these risks to another 
organization by outsourcing or insurance company. Another way of treating the identified risks is by 
avoiding or eliminating the risk’s source or asset's exposure to it, i.e. risk avoidance. This is done 
when the severity of the risk impact outweighs the benefits of using or having a particular asset such 
as open connectivity to the Internet. However, if the cost of insuring or investment against the risks 
are greater over time than the sustained losses or asset value, then an organization may simply choose 
to accept the risk as part of its business operations (Yazar 2011; Bojanc and Blazic 2013; Sulaman et 
al. 2013; Webb et al. 2014). 
2.2.1 Risk Assessment (RA) 
RA has been discussed in the literature as a critical step in the risk management cycle. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO 2011) defines RA as the overall process of risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation. In this process, information assets are identified and risks to 
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these assets are identified and evaluated. Threats, vulnerabilities and harmful incidents that may affect 
information's confidentiality, integrity and availability are systematically identified by performing a 
methodical analysis of organization’s assets. The National Institute of standards and Technology 
(NIST 2012) states that RA is synonymous to risk analysis where it incorporates threat and 
vulnerability analysis and considers the planned or in place security controls to mitigate the risks. It is 
worth noting that RA is a discrete non-continuous activity. Thus, it is initiated either when needed or 
at regular time intervals. However, a prior step to RA is risk identification. Various techniques could 
be used to improve risk identification's accuracy and completeness such as Delphi methodology and 
brainstorming (ISO 2009). 
There are various information security standards by organizations such as ISO/IEC 
27005:2011(ISO 2011) and NIST SP 800-30 (NIST 2012). Additionally, various RA methodologies 
were developed by professional organizations to meet specific requirements and therefore incorporate 
different steps, objectives, level of application and structure. Examples of such methodologies are 
CRAMM (Yazar 2011), CORAS (CORAS 2014), OCTAVE  (OCTAVE 2014), Magerit (Magertit 
2006) and Mehari (Mehari 2007) that have been fully or partially adopted by organizations to identify, 
analyze and treat their information security risks. 
These methods are either quantitative, qualitative or semi-quantitative in nature. In quantitative 
methods, the identified risks probability and consequences are expressed numerically. Even when risk 
is quantified in scalar values, there is no exact risk value because of the uncertainty and subjectivity in 
defining likelihood and severity of consequences (Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). While in qualitative 
methods, the probability and consequences of identified risks are expressed through a qualitative 
subjective rating scheme using varying scales such as "high", "medium" and "low". However, a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, semi-quantitative, could be used. To reveal 
major risks and to get a general indication of the risk level, a qualitative estimation could be used first. 
Then a quantitative analysis could be used later. Consequences and probability are specified using 
numerical rating scales and used in a formula to produce risk level (Samy et al. 2010; Ledermuller 
and Clarke 2011; Yazaar 2011; Sulaman et al. 2013).  
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Although qualitative methods are subjective, they are descriptive and easier to understand by all 
related personnel. They could be used to identify risks that need further analysis (ISO 2011). 
However, these methods are subjective since they rely on expert's security background, not efficient 
since two risks that are classified at the same ranking scale level are difficult to compare and are 
expensive since they require human expertise. Furthermore, a major disadvantage of qualitative 
methods is that the results achieved are general and during the process of appropriate security 
measures selection, cost benefit analysis is more difficult (Bergomi et al. 2013; Bhattacharjee et al. 
2013). 
On the other hand, quantitative methods give a more accurate risk image and could be linked 
directly to the organization's information security objectives and concerns. They allow more accurate 
risk events analysis where parameters are used in the RA process can be designed in many theoretical 
and mathematical models where results are in number forms which can be easily compared. Since it 
relies on historical data, then the lack of such data on new vulnerabilities and threats may affect the 
accuracy of such an assessment (Saleh and Alfantookh 2011; NIST 2012; Paintsil 2012). 
Samy et al. (2010) and Webb et al. (2014) argue that most of existing RA methods rely mainly on 
rough estimations or guesswork of skilled risk assessors to estimate the probability and consequences 
associated with each risk. This is due to the lack of availability of security incidents data due to 
several reasons such as financial constraints, unreported cases or the inability to identify emerging 
indications of threat types that change over time. This results in wrong decisions with regards to the 
appropriate information security measures taken and to the time and effort wasted in controlling the 
wrong things (Shedden et al. 2011). 
Given that almost 90% of reported security incidents resulted from exploits against software 
vulnerabilities whereas human-error was considered as one of the top threats to information security 
and almost two million pieces of malware introduced every day (Aloul 2010; Wu and Wang 2011;  
Rao and Pati 2012; Hansch and Benenson 2014; Symantec 2018) the need for a usable security tool 
that calculates and assesses risk on both system and user level in a timely manner is essential to 
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protecting users from threats and vulnerabilities and, thus, reducing the overall information security 
risks. 
Information Security Management System (ISMS) represents framework design as an area of 
information security research to calculate information system’s risks using various security 
techniques.  Among those techniques is Vulnerability Management that is represented by The 
Security Content Automation Protocol SCAP (Waltermire et al. 2011; Takahashi et al. 2013(. To 
communicate security information, SCAP provides several standard specifications, including Open 
Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) (oval.mitre.org) which is “ an international, 
information security, community standard to promote open and publicly available security content, 
and to standardize the transfer of this information across the entire spectrum of security tools and 
services”  (Oval.mitre.org)  ,Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) which is “ a dictionary of 
common names (i.e., CVE Identifiers) for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities” 
(cve.mitre.org) and Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) which is “ A structured naming scheme for 
information technology systems, software and packages” (nvd.nist.gov/cpe.cfm).  
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a scoring system that provides a standard 
specification that measures the severity of software vulnerabilities (Mell et al. 2007) and a widely 
used cybersecurity model (Wu and Wang 2011; Spanos et al. 2013; Takahashi et al. 2013;  Wright et 
al. 2013; Allodi and Massacci 2014; Alsaleh and Alshaer 2014; Holm and Afridi 2015). In this 
scoring system, currently in its third version, three metrics are used to quantify the severity of 
vulnerabilities as follows: 
1. Base metrics: They measure the fundamental and intrinsic vulnerabilities characteristics that 
do not change over time or different environments. 
2. Temporal metrics: They measure vulnerabilities attributes that do not change among 
environments but over time. 
3. Environmental metrics: They measure vulnerabilities characteristics that are unique and 
relevant to a particular environment. 
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The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is “The U.S Government repository of standards 
based vulnerability management data using SCAP”. It is a valuable source of security knowledge and 
publically available online (nvd.nist.gov). Each NVD record contains CVE-id, vulnerable software 
list, vulnerability published date and time , CVSS base metrics and scores and so on. NVD uses CVSS 
to measure vulnerabilities severity which provides evidence of the wide and accepted adoption of 
CVSS by the security community (Spanos et al. 2013). Moreover, it is often used as a metric for risk 
(Allodi and Massacci 2014).  
As Base and Temporal scores are scored by security professionals, system users such as system 
administrators are the ones to provide Environmental scores. However, this is rarely done in practice 
especially that Temporal scores do not have search fields in NVD. Consequently, the Base score, from 
the point of view of many users, is actually considered as the CVSS (Holm and Afridi 2015). NVD 
offers a publically available online calculator to calculate the CVSS score in both Version 2 and 
Version 3. Vulnerabilities severity is measured on a 0-10 scale of three severity states, High, Medium 
and Low. As a matter of fact, this metric is an aggregation of two other metrics, Exploitability and 
Impact (Mell et al. 2007; Alsaleh and Alshaer 2014). Although many researchers examined the 
accuracy and validity of the CVSS scoring algorithm (Liu and Zahng 2011; Holm et al. 2012; Allodi 
and Massacci 2012; Allodi et al. 2013), it is suggested not to use it as a sole risk factor to determine 
the security risk level and that additional risk factors to be used.  
2.3 RA Methodologies 
There are a number of different ISRM methodologies and guidelines around the world that differ 
in their approach, level of detail, usage complexity and applicability to different-sized organizations 
(Paul and Davillier 2014). Among them are as follows: 
1. International organizations: 
1.a. NIST SP 800-30 
1.b. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
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3.  Research project: 
3.a. ISRAM 
 
These methodologies are selected based on ENISA (2014) that consists of seventeen methods.  Of 
these methods, four are as far the most commonly used, i.e. have acceptance in the market, with 
geographical spread and are well documented, i.e. provide publically available information. The 
remaining methodologies may be considered as extensions or derivatives of the other selected 
methodologies. However, since the list by (ENISA 2014) is none-exhaustive and is an open list, two 
methodologies were added. First, CORAS is added to this list as an example of a model-based RA 
methodology, i.e. the system is conceptually modeled before risk is estimated and evaluated, whilst 
the remaining methods are list-based, i.e. risk findings are documented in structured lists and risk is 
estimated based on best practices, standards or checklists. On one hand, structured lists are easier to 
create but require a lot of time to communicate security risk findings. On the other hand, model-based 
approaches facilitate early risk elements discovery because no information is hidden among irrelevant 
details (Paintsil 2012). Second, ISRAM is added to this list as an example of a research project with a 
quantitative RA methodology from Turkey. Furthermore, these methodologies have different analysis 
approaches towards risk. As stated by (NIST 2012), these approaches could be divided into:  
- Threat-oriented where the method starts with the identification of threat sources and events. 
- Asset/Impact oriented where the method starts with the identification of high-level assets or 
impacts. 
- Vulnerability-oriented where the method starts with the identification of a set of predisposing 
conditions or vulnerabilities. 
Although the same risk factors are considered in all methods resulting in the same RA activities, 
difference in RA starting point may cause some bias in the RA result. This is because some risks not 
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being identified. Therefore, the analysis effectiveness can be improved by complementing one 
analysis approach with another (NIST 2012; Paintsil 2012; Sulaman et al. 2013). 
The classification approach of ISRM methodologies is shown in Figure 2.2. The reviewed 
methodologies are classified according to origin, assessment approach, analysis approach, the way the 
targeted system is documented and tool support. 
 
Figure ‎2.2: Classification approach of ISRM methodologies 
2.3.1 NIST SP 800-30 
The National Institute of Standard and Technology of the US Department of Commerce issued a 
special publication of the report NIST SP 800-3- in 2012. This report provides detailed identification 
and guidance of the issues to be considered when implementing ISRM and ISRA which are mainly 
based on US regularity issues (NIST 2012). 
RA is used to " Identify, estimate and prioritize risk to organizational operations, assets, 
individuals, other organizations and the Nation resulting from the operation and use of information 
systems". It is conducted at Tier1 organizational level, Tier2 mission/business process level and Tier3 
information system level of the risk management hierarchy. At Tiers 1 and 2, RA is used to evaluate 
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information security risks related to management activities, organizational governance and 
information security programs funding. At Tier3, RA is used to support risk management framework 
implementation of security categorization, selection of security controls, implementation, assessment, 
authorization of controls and monitoring. RA process is carried out in four basic steps as shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure ‎2.3: NIST Risk Assessment Process (NIST 2012) 
Step 1: Preparing for the Assessment 
The objective of this step is to establish the RA context by identifying the assessment purpose, 
scope, threats, vulnerability and impact that will be used in the process of RA. Moreover, the risk 
model, assessment approach whether quantitative, qualitative or semi-quantitative and the analysis 
approach whether threat-oriented, asset/impact-oriented or vulnerability-oriented are also identified.  
 Step 2: Conducting the Risk Assessment 
The objective of this step is to produce an information security list of prioritized risks that could 
be used to make risk response decisions (Rajabhandari 2013). This is achieved by identifying 
vulnerabilities, threat sources, potential threat events and their likelihood and impact.  
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Step 3: The Communication and Sharing of RA information 
The objective of this step is to ensure that appropriate risk related information is made available to 
decision makers from across the organization to guide and inform risk decisions.  
Step 4: Maintaining the Risk Assessment 
The objective of this step is to support the ongoing review of risk management decisions and the 
monitoring of the identified risk factors on an ongoing basis and understand changes to them. 
 
NIST SP 800-30 has a qualitative approach to RA where it depends on narrative risk descriptions. 
The main goal is to help organizations in managing risks by providing a basis to develop an effective 
program for risk management. Furthermore, definitions and the necessary guidance to assess and 
mitigate risks are provided. Moreover, it provides requirements and general rules for system 
characterization but no specific model is provided to characterize assets and interrelation between 
them. It provides a high-level view of RM with a one-size-fits-all methodology. Thus, there is a lack 
of recommendations and guidelines on how it could be tailored for small, medium and large 
organizations. Therefore, there is no reference to other risk management techniques and methods. 
However, NIST SP 800-30 is publically available and has been reviewed by industry professionals 
and Government (NIST 2012). 
2.3.2 ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
This is a conceptual international standard issued by the International Standards Organization 
(ISO) to provide ISRM guidelines in an organization. However, this standard does not offer a specific 
ISRM methodology where an organization has to adopt any of the existing methodologies depending, 
for example, on the industry sector or risk management context (ISO 2011). Risk management 
process is as shown in Figure 2.1. 
The activities of RA and Risk Treatment (RT) could be iterative resulting in increasing the 
assessment details and depth at each iteration. This provides balance between time and effort in 
identifying controls while high risks are still appropriately assessed. The first iteration is a high level 
RA, where the business values of information assets and the organization's business point of view of 
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risks are considered. This is followed by in-depth processes of assets identification and valuation and 
threat and vulnerability assessment (Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). RA is carried out in the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Risk Identification 
The objective of this step is to identify what could happen to cause a potential loss and how, 
where and why this loss might happen. In this step, assets, threats and their sources, existing controls, 
vulnerabilities and impacts on assets are identified. 
Step 2: Risk Analysis 
The used RA methodology maybe quantitative, qualitative or semi quantitative. In this step, the 
consequences and incident likelihood are assessed in order to determine the level of each identified 
risk. 
 Step 3: Risk Evaluation 
The objective of this step is to prioritize each of the identified risks according to the risk 
evaluation criteria. As a result, decisions about future actions are made such as whether to undertake 
an activity or not. The used criteria should consider organizational objectives, stakeholder views and 
be consistent with the defined ISRM context. 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 is a standard approach towards RA. Thus, it gives an outline of a systematic 
and structured approach towards RA taking into account the organizational aspects of processes, 
people and technology. It merely gives recommendations on the scope and applicability of either a 
quantitative or a qualitative approach to RA. However, the process of RA is described at an abstract 
level where a third-party method for RA is needed to carry out a more comprehensive RA. Thus, it is 
flexible in choosing such method where some advice is given on how to choose and use such a 
method. 
2.3.3 CRAMM 
The CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) was issued by the Central 
Computer and Telecommunication Agency in 1985 by the United Kingdom Government. It has gone 
under major revisions and currently in version 5.00. This RA and management method utilizes both 
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quantitative and qualitative measures. CRAMM provides guidance for compliance with the British 
Standard for Information Security BS7799 (Yazaar 2011).  It is supported by a tool with the same 
name that comes in three versions, CRAMM Expert, CRAMM Express and BS7799 Review 
(Tiganoaia 2012).  CRAMM is divided into three main steps that relate to technical and non-technical 
aspects of security. Each step is supposed to answer a specific question. 
Step 1: Identification and Valuation of Assets: 
This step is concerned with answering the question of  "Is there a need for security?". For data 
collection, interviews, meetings and structured questionnaires are used to set security objectives, 
boundaries, scope of study and to identify and estimate the value of assets. Data assets values are 
derived from the impacts of  Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) on them by describing 
the worst-case scenarios and the possible consequences of data not being available, destroyed, 
disclosed or modified. Physical assets and application software are valued by interviewing the 
"support personnel" in terms of their reconstruction or replacement cost. All these values are 
quantified on a scale of 1-10. 
Step 2: Threat and Vulnerability Assessment: 
This step is concerned with answering the question of "What and Where is Security Needed?". 
Threats and vulnerabilities are identified by asking questions to related stakeholders. CRAMM 
quantifies threat/asset levels on a five point scale from "very low" to "very high" and 
vulnerability/threat levels on a scale of "low, medium, high". Finally, for each asset group, risk is 
calculated by using a predefined value risk matrix to compare threat and vulnerability levels to asset 
values.  
 Step 3: Selection of Countermeasures and recommendations: 
This step is concerned with answering the question of " How can security needs be met?". Based 
on the findings of step2, a set of applicable countermeasures are produced to manage the identified 
risks. They are compared against existing (if any) countermeasures in order to identify weakness or 
over-protected areas. 
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CRAMM is best for large organizations such as Governmental Departments (Feng et al. 2014). It 
is a qualitative RA methodology that has an asset-centric Risk analysis approach with no steps for 
implementation of security controls or follow up. The process of RA is mostly automated where 
CRAMM has an extensive free tool support and a database of more than 300 security controls and 
certification tools. Thus, it can only be used with this dedicated tool. However, the assessment process 
using CRAMM could be complex and lengthy where expert knowledge is needed. Regardless of its 
complexity, the assessment could be set according to needs.  
2.3.4 OCTAVE 
"Operationally, Critical, Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation" OCTAVE is a process-
driven methodology developed by the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI), USA to assess the information security needs of an organization. One major advantage of 
OCTAVE is its ability to link its organizational objectives and goals to information security goals and 
objectives (Panda 2009).  It focuses on security practices, strategic issues and organizational 
evaluation rather than system evaluation, tactical issues and technology. Threats are categorized as 
human using network access, human using physical access, system problems and problems that 
cannot be controlled by organization such as earthquakes and floods (Rajabhandari 2013). SEI 
developed three OCTAVE methodologies (OCATVE 2014): 
2.3.4.1 OCTAVE Method 
This method is designed for large multi layered hierarchy organizations to maintain their own 
computational infrastructure in 1999. It uses a three-phase approach, organizational view, 
technological view and risk analysis, with eight processes to create a comprehensive view  of the 
organizations security needs by examining both organizational and technological issues. As a result, a 
security protection strategy and plan to address the identified risks is produced. The phases and 
processes of OCTAVE are as shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure ‎2.4:The OCTAVE Method (Panda 2009) 
2.3.4.2 OCTAVE-S Method 
This method is designed for small with flat hierarchical structures and less than 100 employees 
organizations in 2003. It uses the same three-phased approach of the OCTAVE method except that the 
processes are streamlined to four processes that meets the limited means and constraints of small 
organizations. It only requires a team of 3-5 organizational personnel who understand the 
organization's depth and breadth. The processes of OCTAVE-S are as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure ‎2.5: The OCTAVE-S (Panda 2009) 
2.3.4.3 OCTAVE-Allegro Method 
This method was designed to streamline ISRA so that sufficient results could be obtained with a 
little investment in people, time and other resources. It can be performed in a workshop-collaborative 
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setting. It is a streamlined variation of the above two methods. This method is easier to use, improves 
repeatability and reduce the technology view and the required training and knowledge. Although most 
organizations use OCTAVE-Allegro successfully, the two older methods are still available. The 
phases of OCTAVE-Allegro are as shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure ‎2.6: The OCTAVE-Allegro (Panda 2009) 
Regardless of the chosen method, they are all self-directed where security needs are addressed by 
teams of organizational personnel, evolved where technology is addressed in a business context and 
builds an operational risk-based view of security and flexible where it is easy to tailor each method to 
the organization's needs. 
OCTAVE is a qualitative methodology with threat-oriented analysis approach. It is a simple 
method where no mathematical computations are used. Just like CRAMM, OCTAVE does not include 
any steps regarding the implementation of security controls or follow up. Although OCTAVE is a 
lengthy method with many volumes, processes and worksheets, it is still yet flexible and has several 
methods designed for specific organizations. A major advantage of OCTAVE is that it is self-directed 
where it could be carried out by forming small teams from the organization’s personnel. Regardless of 
OCTAVE being a heavyweight methodology, it is widely used and has a lot of compatible third-party 
tools and supporting documentation (Panda 2009; OCTAVE 2014). 
2.3.5 CORAS 
"Construct a Platform for Risk Analysis of Security Critical Systems" is a methodology for ISRA 
developed under the European Information Society Technologies (IST) program (CORAS 2014). It is 
a self-contained model-based RA methodology that uses special diagrams inspired by Unified 
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Modelling Language (UML) to document intermediate results and to present the overall conclusions. 
The analysis is conducted in eight steps as follows: 
Step 1: Preparation for The Analysis 
The objective of this step is to get a general idea about the target and size of the analysis. 
Step 2: Customer's Presentation of The Target 
The objective of this step is to get an understanding of the customer's (organization) overall goals 
of the analysis and issues to be considered through introductory meetings with the required 
organization personnel.  
Step 3: Refining The Target Description Using Asset Diagrams 
The objective of this step is to ensure a common understanding of the analysis target, focus, scope 
and main assets to be protected through direct interaction with the customer (Rajabhandari 2013). 
Step 4: Approval of The Target Description 
The objective of this step is to ensure that the target, focus, scope and rest of the analysis are 
documented and are complete, correct and approved from the customer. A refined description of the 
analyzed target is described using the UML notation and a risk evaluation criteria is decided for each 
asset. 
Step 5: Risk Identification Using Threat Diagrams 
Risks are identified through structured brainstorming workshops of personnel from different 
organizational levels led by the analyst. In this step, threats, threat scenarios, undesirable incidents 
and vulnerabilities to the identified assets are systematically identified and documented through 
CORAS Threat Diagrams. 
 Step 6: Risk Estimation Using Threat Diagrams 
The likelihood and consequences of undesirable incidents are estimated through brainstorming 
workshops of organizational personnel with different backgrounds. As a result, the risk level for each 




Step 7: Risk Evaluation Using Risk Diagrams 
Using the defined risk evaluation criteria and risk estimation results, all of the identified risks to 
assets or indirect assets are decided to be either acceptable or requires further evaluation for possible 
treatment. 
 Step 8: Risk Treatment Using Treatment Diagrams 
Risk treatments to reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of undesirable incidents are 
evaluated and analyzed with respect to their cost-benefit. Finally, a plan for risk treatment is made. 
CORAS is a model-based qualitative methodology with an asset/impact analysis approach. 
Furthermore, it has no steps for implementation of security controls and follow up. It is worth noting 
that CORAS can easily be implemented in organizations due to its simplicity. However, loss is not 
calculated using any mathematical functions but estimated by multiplying the probability of threat 
occurrence by impact. Thus, its risk analysis results cannot be precise (Bahattacharjee et al. 2012). 
CORAS is somehow a lengthy method where the first four steps are dedicated to defining and 
reaching an agreement among stakeholders on the target, context and goals of the RA. Whereas the 
actual RA is performed in steps 5 to 8. Although CORAS is no longer developed, it is comprehensive 
and has a free dedicated tool. One of the advantages of CORAS is that it facilitates continuous 
collaboration and communication between stakeholders. Nevertheless, it does require some expert 
knowledge. 
2.3.6 ISRAM 
Information Security Risk Analysis Method is developed by (Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2005). It 
is a poll-based quantitative RA method where the organization's staff and director participate in the 
analysis process. ISRAM established two separate investigation surveys for the risk attributes 
probability and consequence. To provide well-defined risks, the surveys flow and preparation are 
done in seven steps as shown in Figure 2.7.  
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Figure ‎2.7: ISRAM Flow Diagram (Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2005) 
ISRAM is a quantitative methodology with an analysis approach that can be set according to the 
type of given survey questions. It can be described as a “survey preparation and conduction process” 
for assessing organizations security risks. However, ISRAM relies on using public opinion of the 
information security problem by conducting a survey to make an as-is analysis. Furthermore, ISRAM 
is lengthy, where the first four out of seven steps are for the survey preparation phase. Although 
ISRAM is a quantitative methodology, there is no need to use complicated statistical and 
mathematical instruments. Organization’s managers and staff could participate effectively in the RA 
process.  
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In conclusion, it can be seen that many methods have been proposed for ISRM in the literature. 
Although RA methodologies differ in their activities order and depth, they generally follow three 
distinct phases (Saleh and Alfantookh 2011; Shedden et al. 2011): 
1- Context establishment: All the required information about the organization such as 
organization's strategy, structure, goals and current security status  is gathered to ensure 
optimal RA results and that all related risks are identified. 
2- Risk identification: Assets, threats to these assets and vulnerabilities that may be exploited 
by these threats are identified systematically. 
3- Risk analysis: The probability of a threat (attack) occurring and its impact (cost) on assets 
are determined whether quantitatively, qualitatively or a combination of both. This will 
result in representing the risk level. 
However, these methods are not equal. Some of these methods could be used as stand-alone RA 
methods while others need a low-level technical method to support the process of RA. Some of these 
methods are very generic and maybe used as guidelines to manage information security risks such as 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011. Furthermore, other standards provide an exemplary sequence of activities to 
conduct RA with a specific method for the determination of risk such as NIST SP800-30. Moreover, 
some methods such as CRAMM, OCTAVE and ISRAM do describe the process of RA at a high-level 
of granularity but do not suggest any steps regarding the implementation of required security 
measures or for follow up that should be considered. By contrast, some of these methods are designed 
for RM which incorporates RA. Thus, most methods follow a common process towards RA. 
Furthermore, more details are added after the analysis phase. A summary of the reviewed ISRM 







Table ‎2.1: Historical ISRM methodologies 
According to reviews/surveys done by Wangen (2017), Gritzalis et al. (2018) and Yalcin and 
Kilic (2018), Table 2.2 represents the current status. Although HTRA was released in 2007, it has not 
been updated since. In 2011, CORAS was updated by adding up-to-date vulnerabilities, threats and 
safeguards. Since CRAMM’s last update was in 2011, it is considered outdated. However, it is more 
up-to-date than HTRA. Similarly, EBIOS is considered outdated since it was released in 1995 and last 
updated in 2010. However, it is actively supported by a big organization, ANSSI. Compared to 
CRAMM and EBIOS, IT-Grundschutz is considered obsolete since it was released in 1997 and last 
updated in 2005. Many tools support  IT-Grundschutz, but have not been updated since 2005. 
MEHARI is the most updated method since it was released in 1996 and last updated in 2017 
(meharipedia 2019). The second most updated method is MAGERIT since it was released in 1997 and 
last updated in 2013. Furthermore, its supporting tools are continuously updated to comply with 
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current security demands and requirements. Although RiskSafe was released in 2012, it has not been 
updated. OCTAVE was first released in 1999 and last updated in 2005, whereas OCTAVE Allegro 
was released in 2007. To this end, MEHARI, MAGERIT, RiskSafe and CRAMM are methods which 
have been recently updated. Amongst them, CRAMM is considered as the most obsolete. However, 
CRAMM and its supporting tools have not received the same amount of updates in comparison with 
the other aforementioned methods. The ISO/IEC 27005:2011 was first released in 2011 but now it is 
withdrawn and revised as ISO/IEC 27005:2018 (International Organization for Standardization 2018). 
In terms of standards, ISO/IEC 27005:2018 is the most updated followed by NIST SP800-30. 
However, NIST SP800-30 is considered outdated since it was last updated in 2012. 
 
Table ‎2.2: ISRM Methodologies Current Status….. *As Discussed in Section 2.6 
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2.4 Enhancements to RA Methodologies 
The main advantages of traditional RA methodologies (Tiganoaia 2012; Bergomi et al. 2013; Paul 
and Davillier 2014) are: 
- Its compliance to standards allowing organizations to certify their risk management process. 
- The ability to make informed decisions by comparing options and issues having 
measurements based on a systematic analysis of the problem. 
- The existence of tools that could provide interfaces to other engineering tools. 
- The seamless integration of risk management process with legacy engineering processes. 
However, they do suffer from a number of disadvantages such as: 
- Textual reports. 
- Significant expertise 
- Some issues of cognitive scalability. 
- Different security experts can contribute over the years to the process in the case of long lived 
large systems. 
Thus, there is a number of different proposed RA methodologies in the literature that are built on 
those methodologies where each method has its own objectives, steps, structure and level of 
application. 
Moyo et al. (2013) performed an ISRM study to educate management and users of a computer 
information system (CIS) in secondary schools on how to protect their information assets and reduce 
risks to their information systems through risk management. Due to the lack of risk management 
experts within these schools, flat layered hierarchal structure and ease of use, the OCATVE-S 
methodology was adopted. It has been customized to fit the secondary schools risk environment and 
skill level. Risks were assessed using a qualitative risk matrix and treatment strategies were developed 
and implemented. It was found that an essential component of organizational ISRM is the security 
awareness and training of CIS users. The OCTAVE-s has been successfully applied in this study to 
identify an easy to use and simple RM methodology that can be used by Secondary Schools non-
technical personnel. The authors have systematically collected data on information security controls 
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and critical assets in secondary Schools. Thus, they succeeded in defining general guidelines that 
could be easily followed during ISRM process having in mind that CIS users are not RM experts. 
Although the study was conducted in only three Secondary Schools (small sample size), the authors 
findings could be generalized to include CIS users of Elementary and Intermediate Schools due to the 
similarities in school’s organizational architectures. However, given the conservative environment of 
schools, the observed behavior of the selected sample members maybe inaccurate with the presence of 
the researcher and may not reflect their actual normal behavior. 
Bhattacharjee et al. (2013) proposed a two phase quantitative ISRA methodology for 
organizations that comply with the requirements of ISO/IEC 27005:2011. Two approaches, a 
consolidated and a detailed, were proposed to risk identification. In the consolidated approach, which 
should be carried out first,  an asset is in a high, medium or low risk zone depending on its computed 
risk factor value that is between 1 and 5. 
Risk factor = f (asset value, security concern), 
where the asset value is a function of security in terms of CIA, authentication and non-repudiation, 
legal and business (in terms of loss impact)  requirements associated with an asset. The Security 
concern is defined to be a function of threats and vulnerabilities of an asset. 
A detailed risk analysis, the detailed approach, will be carried out for assets that are in the high or 
medium risk zone to identify threats and vulnerabilities that cause these threats. The risk value will be 
computed as: 
Risk = f (security requirement, threat, vulnerability, risk value), 
where risk value is computed in terms of the security requirements value, the likelihood of a threat 
and severity of a vulnerability. As a result, assets are classified into High risk assets (danger zone) 
which has to be mitigated, Medium risk assets (warning zone) that should be controlled by applying 
security policies and guidelines and implementation of security tools. Low risk assets (safe zone) are 
accepted risks where no investments are made. This proposed methodology is threat-based, the same 
as the OCTAVE methodology. However, it is better than the OCTAVE method because the asset 
value is formally computed with regards to security, business and legal requirements. 
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Theoharidou et al. (2012)  proposed a RA methodology for smartphones that has an ISO/IEC 
27005:2011 compatible theoretical basis. Current RA methods are not for users but for businesses and 
treats smartphones as a single entity without any consideration of the smartphone security model 
vulnerabilities and smartphone specific threats. The proposed RA method divides the smartphone into 
a number of sub assets, then smartphone specific threats are assessed. The authors classified 
smartphone assets as Device, applications, connectivity channels and data. The data asset is classified 
according to two dimensions, information type and source. First, asset impact is assessed then 
smartphone assets are related to different smartphone specific threat scenarios. The user is involved in 
the initial process of impact valuation. The overall risk is calculated by the risk analyst. To calculate 
the total impact valuation, the maximum impact from all smartphone-identified assets is the overall 
smartphone impact. Risk assessment is calculated on the basis of a risk matrix as Low, Medium or 
High. The authors demonstrated the proposed RA method in the Android platform. The proposed risk 
assessment method provides "fined-grained" valuation. The authors proposed risk triplets where they 
use application permissions as the attack vector, associating assets to threats and permissions 
combinations. Risk is, then, assessed as a combination of asset impact and threat likelihood. User 
input for (sub)asset impact is based on a two-dimensional data taxonomy. This user involvement, 
leads to a ‘personalized’ risk assessment, where other smartphone oriented methods mainly use  
expert opinion. However, user input details vary according to user skill which may affect the quality 
of results. Also, users assessing the asset impact of application is complex where the number of 
applications maybe numerous and the user is assumed to know the applications significance. The 
proposed method has been tested in a hypothetical case study, so no strong indications on its 
effectiveness. 
 Gros (2011) argues that RA relies on the risk assessors expertise which results in an error prone 
and tedious process that may not reflect the real situation. By treating information systems as complex 
systems that has interconnecting components, a risk management methodology was proposed based 
on NIST SP 800-30 risk management guide. Complex systems are systems that have an internal 
structure, uncertainty, evolves and adapts to inputs and has a non-observed behavior in its basic parts. 
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Supply chains, The Internet, traffic systems are all examples of complex systems. In the proposed 
method, all resources are enumerated and connections are built between them, where resources values 
are measured independently of any subjective opinion. Two methods are used to get the final values 
of all other resources depending on it. Then, threats, vulnerabilities and controls for all resources are 
added. Security risks are analyzed where they are by analyzing how threats can spread through the 
system. Depending on decisions by management, controls are added to accept or lower the highest 
risks. The model is improved by adding more details to it, i.e. connections, resources and controls. RA 
is done by evaluating probabilities and ways that threat sources get to each information system 
component. However, the proposed methodology does not determine the exact interaction between 
controls and resource dependency nor evaluate the way in which threats spread through the system. 
Samy et al. (2010) were motivated by some facts about most existing risk management methods 
such as: 
- The estimation of the probability of an identified vulnerability mainly on "guesswork or 
rough estimation" due to unreported cases or missing (censored) information. 
- Identification of threats by using horizontal data with a static timeframe. 
As a result of this inaccurate information, decision makers will make wrong decisions on 
information security and waste their time and effort on controlling the wrong things. Thus, the authors 
adopted the survival analysis approach, namely the Cox Proportional Hazards PH Model, to identify 
potential information security threats. The authors proposed integrated framework is as in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure ‎2.8: Adoptions of Survival Analysis approach in Risk Management process framework (Samy et al. 2010) 
The authors used a qualitative approach, structured interviews, to identify potential threats then a 
quantitative approach, survival analysis, to analyze the risks. Then, the authors adopted a follow-up 
study to analyze and collect the lifetime of the systems i.e.  start and failure time according to 
predefined analysis periods. The proposed framework can be used in organizations that suffer from a 
lack of appropriate data to undertake ISRA. A particular strength of this framework is that it considers 
the time dimension in identifying threats that vary over time. The study highlights some of the 
deficiencies that were mentioned in (Webb et al. 2014). The proposed framework is built on the 
standard AS/NZS 4360:1999, the authors offered no explanation why. There could be difficulties with 
applying this framework in practice since it has not been tested yet, so no indications of its 
effectiveness and reliability. 
Regardless of the various published risk management methods and standards, organizations either 
fully or partially adopt such standards and methods to manage risks in their IT activities. It is more 
convenient to have a well-designed comprehensive method that supports ISRM compatibility among 
organizations and accommodates the different requirements of such methods. Saleh and Alfantookh 
(2011) proposed a comprehensive framework for enterprise ISRM. The frameworks is composed of 
two parts, structural and procedural:  
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- The Structural view: The scope dimension is based on the five STOPE domains of Strategy, 
Technology, Organization, People and Environment.  
- The procedural view: the process dimension has the five cyclic phase of six-sigma model 
DMAIC, Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control.  
The authors use of STOPE in their framework makes it able to accommodate different current or 
emerging ISRM issues. The use of six-sigma DMAIC processes allows the proposed framework to 
accommodate processes of other ISRM methods in one unified process. However, the proposed 
framework has not been validated or tested yet. It is theoretically considered to be of flexible nature 
which makes it an "open-reference" for ISRM that can be used by enterprises. 
Bergomi et al. (2013) used the CORAS methodology to integrate a model based ISRA view to the 
mainstream engineering views of complex software-intensive information systems architecture 
description. This was done to maintain traceability, implementation and use of relationships between 
design artifacts and security artifacts. As risks are identified, they are documented using CORAS 
threat diagrams that build up the risk model. These threat diagrams model threats, vulnerabilities, 
threat scenarios, harmed information assets and unwanted incidents. CORAS supports traceability 
techniques to maintain consistency between the risk model and the system model. The Risk Monitor 
of the CORAS tool is used to continuously update risk estimation by monitoring key risk indicators 
i.e. threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios etc. 
Nevertheless, various RA techniques whether qualitative, quantitative or semi quantitative have 
been used in the literature to assess and analyze information security risks such as HAZOP, fault tree 
analysis, cause and effect analysis, Bayesian networks and decision trees (Alguliev et al. 2009; Sadiq 
et al. 2010; Tao et al. 2010; Pirzadeh and Jonsson 2011; Poolsappasit et al. 2012; Imamverdiyev 2013; 
Tamjidyamcholo et al. 2013;). The chosen risk technique should meet the study objectives, decision 
maker’s needs, the analyzed risk types and consequences magnitude. However, the selection of such 
technique depends on several factors such as resource availability, degree of uncertainty and 
complexity of analyzed system (ISO 2009). 
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However, despite the increased attention on Information Security Risk Management (ISRM), 
there is a lack of research on the effectiveness of RA practices and implementations in organizations 
compared to research on ISRM theory, method and concepts. This was due to the reluctant behavior 
of organizations to discuss their Information security practices and that such investigations require 
knowledge of information systems and risk management. This lead to the following deficiencies in the 
practice of ISRA: 
1- The identification of information security risks is perfunctory, where significant risk 
sources such as risks related to intangible assets, early indications of malicious threats and 
vulnerabilities found in relationships between information assets were not considered during 
the Risk Management (RM) process. 
2- Little reference is given to the organization's situation when Information security risks are 
estimated. 
3- ISRA is done on a non-historical,  intermittent basis where information gathered at any 
time represents a "snapshot" of the organization's Information security environment (Webb et 
al. 2014).  
In addition, there exists some problems in the current ISRA approaches such as: 
1- How uncertainty in risk estimation is handled and the lack of estimation data.   
2- The extensive focus on the protection of physical assets. 
3- Lack of appropriate risk identification and communication methods (Paintsil 2012). 
2.5 ISRM for the general public 
The high cost of information security is not only in the price of the application itself, but in 
convincing users to adopt security measures (Jain and Clarke 2010; Alawadeh and Tubaishat 2014; 
Webb et al. 2014). Even when these measures are applied, it is found that users have great difficulties 
in using, understanding and reacting to these applications and potential threats. Users awareness of 
information security risks is fundamental to effective information systems security (Zabaa et al. 2011; 
Komatsu et al. 2013). 
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According to Jain and Clarke (2010), there are some websites that provide information and advice 
on how to protect yourself in the cyber world such as Getsafeonline.org and Staysafeonline.org. 
However, these could be used as awareness tools that provide advice and guidance to users regarding 
their security behavior. They do not provide the expected level of RA that users are exposed to. 
Hence, we can conclude from the above that there is a lack of tools and methods for Information 
Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) in the literature that are tailored for the general public. This is in 
contrast to the increased attention on ISRA in enterprise organizations (Sulaman et al. 2013; Webb et 
al. 2014). 
 
With the increase use of broadband Internet by home users, this exposes them to potential security 
threats and unauthorized access to information, systems and resources. Many of these home users are 
not aware of these risks and/or do not have the necessary knowledge to use the available websites to 
analyze these risks and overcome security risks problem. Jain and Clarke (2010) proposed a web-
based risk analysis tool for home users based on the ISO 17799 standard, where only sections that are 
relevant to home users were used. The proposed tool followed a three-process risk management 
strategy to analyze, mitigate and evaluate the risks. The authors used a quantitative approach to 
analyze the risks. In the analysis process, assets and threats to these assets are identified. In this 
quantitative approach, risk level is calculated as high, medium and low which is fairly understood by 
home users regardless of their information security background. The ISO 17799 controls that are 
applicable to the home user were used by the authors to assess the risks by allowing the user to answer 
some proposed questions. The authors identified a number of threats to home users and quantified 
their probability and potential impact. At the end of the risk assessment, the risk level value of each of 
the seven ISO 17799 derived categories is displayed to the user as HIGH (100), MEDIUM (50) and 
LOW (10) with the required support. However, the tool was tested with only 20 participants (a very 
small number of participants) without any information given on their information security 
background. Thus, the performance of the tool was evaluated with means of the interface design 
described as user-friendly, easy to use and accessible. No evaluation regarding the way the tool 
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assessed the different security levels and the provided support, maybe because it has not been tested 
by users with a certain level of security background.  
  Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) proposed a Mobile Device Risk Assessment (MDRA) risk 
assessment method based on a 6-step risk calculation scheme where risk levels are determined using 
the standard risk calculation formula 
Risk score = asset * threat * vulnerability 
  Due to the increasing number of available apps, bespoke apps that might exist and lack of 
research on threats and vulnerabilities in the mobile context, the authors proposed categorization to 
determine the asset value and threat. Categorization of asset values was based on trends of mobile 
phone usage and market offers (Apple App store, Blackberry App World … etc). Threat categories 
were developed from literature. However, vulnerability level was determined by answering a list of 
proposed T/F questions based on the SANS top software errors.  
The proposed MDRA operates in private, corporate and hybrid contexts and consists of three 
main stages, operator, corporate and private. To define the default risk scores, the network operator 
has to perform the RA process for each category. The second stage is performed by the organization 
only if the device is used to access or store company information. The organization can store their RA 
settings after conducting their RA. In the third stage, the user has to choose his knowledge level when 
using MDRA for the first time. All other steps are automated. The authors developed a prototype of 
the proposed methodology and the prototype screens were used to conduct a preliminary physical trial 
of thirteen participants with different knowledge levels. The authors found that most participants 
knew that there is valuable information stored on their devices. However, the whole risk calculation 
process was challenging for novice users which resulted in them using the application in a passive 
way as an information source with no intention of changing values. Other users tend to use it in a 
more active way (changing values). The proposed approach is clear and easy to use by different 
stakeholders other than novice users. However, the approach is mainly based on the assumption that 
network operators will provide the default values by performing first instance Risk assessment. 
Allowing other stakeholders such as security vendors to provide such values then having a mechanism 
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to calculate the default scores based on values provided by network operators and other interested 
stakeholders might result in more realistic default value scores. The approach has not been really 
tested, participants judged the application according to screenshots of what an application might look 
like which may have resulted in weak indications. Due to the small number of participants, 13 only, 
and them not having the ability to test the prototype on their mobile devices, the obtained results may 
not actually reflect the usability, friendliness and robustness of this application to suit the general 
public. 
To help general users understand mobile applications security risks and to provide a technique 
that continuously and automatically assess information security risks of Android mobile applications, 
Jing et al. (2014) proposed a continuous and automated risk assessment framework for Android 
mobile applications called RiskMon. The main idea of RiskMon is to use machine-learned ranking to 
assess risks. RiskMon creates a baseline from users expectations and behavior of trusted applications. 
Then, baseline assigns a risk score to an application whenever it attempts to access sensitive 
information through assessing API calls. Applications are ranked based on their accumulative risk 
score. The proposed framework represents a technique to reveal suspicious behaviors of Android 
mobile applications. It is different in a way that it provides continuous and automated risk assessment 
based on the installed application's behavior. Although, users specifying security requirements for 
security tools is a challenging task, the framework design allows for user's expected behavior rather 
than developers practices. However, it is subjective since it relies on user's input of relevancy levels 
for permission groups (user's expectations) and their understanding of these permission groups for 
each trusted application. This may result in biased choices. It also uses information from the 
applications market which is an advantage of this framework. However, the use of number of reviews 
regardless of what they are and who wrote them is a major drawback. Users may simply choose not to 
use this RiskMon, due to the long time required to set relevancy levels – set by authors as 5 to 10 
minutes for 10 applications. This may be considered as a usability overhead. 
Users are facing difficulties in adequately securing themselves (Van Cleef 2010; Mensch and 
Wilkie 2011; , Zabaa et al. 2011; Komatsu et al. 2013; Mylonas et al. 2013; Webb et al. 2014). Even 
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with the mix of awareness programs and legal and technical measures, users can not well-protect their 
privacy on social network sites (Van Cleef 2010; Mensch and Wilkie 2011; Mylonas et al. 2013; Li et 
al. 2016; Mendel et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2018). Users use social media for many purposes such as using 
Facebook to share posts with family and friends, Instagram to share pictures and Twitter for 
microblogging. Unfortunately, some users are less concerned about information privacy; therefore, 
they post more sensitive information without specifying appropriate privacy settings. This could be 
due to them not being aware of how to do it or simply because they do not see their personal data, 
such as sharing their locations, as an attractive target to compromise (Adelola et al. 2015; Yu et al. 
2018). Therefore, over-sharing and disclosing of personal information, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, may result in exposing them to security risks they are not arguably well-aware of 
such as social engineering and phishing (Tayouri 2015; Laleh et al. 2018).  With regards to privacy 
protection of social networks users, most privacy protection techniques focus on mechanisms such as 
access control (Pang et al. 2014; Daud et al. 2016) and anonymization (Fard et al. 2015; Liu et al. 
2018) and assuming that they can be adopted by users. However, the growing number of security 
incidents and vast amounts of disclosed personal information raises the question on how to best 
motivate/educate users to protect themselves. Actually, as a reaction to some data breaches, media 
attention and privacy awareness campaigns may have resulted in users being alerted to the term 
“privacy”. One recent incident, early 2018, is the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data breach. This 
happened when Facebook allowed its data mining partner, Cambridge Analytica, to harvest the 
personal data of millions of Facbeook users without user’s express consent and used it for political 
purposes urging the need for greater user protection and the right to privacy (The Cambridge 
Analytica Files 2019).   
 
Motivated by the fact that users need a security process to deal with security risks they face, Van 
Cleef (2010) suggests that users should be held responsible and in control of their own devices, data 
and services. He proposed a Personal Chief Security Officer (PCSO) tool to help users in managing 
Info Sec risks. PCSO has four components: 
 43 
- Personal user interface that gathers information from all systems and applications used by the 
user and displays it on the dashboard along with information about risk exposure. Also, 
information about CIA and residual risk are displayed. A wizard configures the user's security 
process. Information about ISRM is stored in a personal database along with user's goals, 
owned IT systems, performed tasks and tasks that has to be performed by the user to manage 
risks. The user is contacted at regular intervals, through a scheduler, to assess any changes 
that need to be considered. 
- Shared risk repository where frequently used data that users do not have to enter themselves 
such as security goals, software categories and attacks are stored. It is maintained 
collaboratively by security researchers, users and enterprises. 
- Interoperability module that links other tools and applications to PSCO to make the risk 
management process easier and faster. 
- Risk communication module that shares the ISRA results between users. 
Although many parts of this tool already exist and can be adapted by users, no indications on the 
efficiency, feasibility and ease of use of this tool. However, the idea of making the user assess risks 
for all his devices and data in one tool is interesting and maybe appealing to him. This may have a 
positive impact on his security behavior since it saves the time and effort by securing all his devices 
form one tool. Thus, this tool may act as an awareness precondition. 
2.6 Discussion 
Most RA methodologies analyze risk based on an asset/threat relationship where risk is 
determined using the classic interpretation of risk 
Risk = Asset * Threat * Vulnerability 
Although RA methodologies differ in the RA starting point, how risks are treated in similar threat 
scenarios and assessment detail, this asset/threat relationship can be analyzed in many ways. Thus, a 
similar list of critical assets may be found in many organizations whereas threats to these assets may 
vary according to the organization's Information security scope (Shamala et al. 2013).   
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Based on whether risk is evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively, which factors are considered 
when impact is evaluated and how these factors are combined to calculate risk, Zambon and Etalle 
(2011) presented five types of risk models as follows: 
Type 1:  
Risk (Threat, Asset) = Likelihood (Threat) * Vulnerability (Threat, Asset) * Impact (Threat, Asset) 
Type 2:  
Risk (Threat, Asset, Security Requirements) = Impact (Threat, Security Requirements) * Vulnerability 
(Threat, Asset) 
Type 3:  
Risk (Threat, Asset) = Annual Loss Expectancy (Threat, Asset) = Probability (Threat, Asset) * 
Average Loss (Threat, Asset) 
Type 4:  
Risk (Threat, Critical Asset) = Impact (Threat, Critical Asset) * Vulnerability (Critical Asset) 
Type 5:  
Risk (Incident, Asset) = Likelihood (Incident) * Consequences (Incident, Asset) 
 
In RA methodologies that use Type 1 risk model, such as CRAMM, ISO 27005:2011 and NIST 
SP 800-30, risk is evaluated as the combination of the likelihood that a certain threat will attack on an 
asset, the vulnerability (exploitability) of an asset to the threat and the potential impact of that threat 
on the asset. This is the classic interpretation of risk that is used in most general-purpose RA 
methodologies. In these RA methodologies, risk is computed as the likelihood of a threat attacking an 
asset(s) and the impact that successful attack (threat) has on an asset(s). The vulnerability level of an 
asset(s) to the threat is considered implicitly as one of the likelihood factors. 
In organizations where security requirements have to be defined before-hand, RA methodologies 
that use Type 2 risk model could be used where risk is analyzed with respect to both asset/threat 
relationship and security requirements. Risk is assessed basically on the impact that a threat has on 
assets security requirements and the vulnerability of these assets to threats. These kinds of 
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methodologies follow the top-bottom approach represented by (Paintsil 2012), where the security 
needs of an organization are based on the security requirements for CIA and risk to legal, 
infrastructure and regulatory requirements. The required security level of an organization is 
determined by the security needs. Accordingly, risk is interpreted as a violation of a security 
requirement. Whereas other RA methodologies follow the bottom-top approach where risk is assessed 
by identifying asset, asset value, the likelihood of an incident and its consequences. However, the 
likelihood of a threat attacking an asset is not considered in type2 RA methodologies. This type is 
most suitable if the purpose of RA is for certification. 
For some quantitative RA methodologies that require quantitative data, risk is interpreted 
financially (in monetary value). It is calculated for each asset/threat as the annual loss expectancy. In 
these Type 3 risk model RA methodologies, a time frame (yearly) is used explicitly in analyzing risk. 
Furthermore, risk is calculated as the probability of a threat affecting an asset in a one-year time frame 
and the resulting average loss. These RA methodologies are most applicable in cases where decisions 
are made based on cost/benefit analysis. 
RA methodologies that use Type 4 risk model, such as OCTAVE, a variation to the classic risk 
model is used. In these methodologies, critical assets are identified. These assets should be totally 
protected at all times against all kinds of threats. Hence, the likelihood of a threat attacking an asset is 
irrelevant in computing risk. Therefore, the impact of a threat successfully exploiting a vulnerability 
in an asset is combined with the vulnerability of this critical asset in order to compute risk. These 
kinds of methodologies could be used in assessing risks of security-critical systems such as in air 
traffic control systems, medical systems and utility network infrastructure. 
Type 5 risk model RA methodologies, such as CORAS and ISRAM, do not take into account 
specific threats and focus only on system's weaknesses. Hence, risk is analyzed with respect to an 
incident, i.e. a threat exploiting a vulnerability, and an asset. The consequences of such incidents are 
combined with their likelihood in order to evaluate risk. Therefore, risk can only exist if a threat 
exploits a vulnerability or a set of vulnerabilities. These RA methodologies are more fine-grained and 
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different from Type 1 because they focus on system's weaknesses rather than a threat attacking an 
asset even without the case of an existing vulnerability. 
It can be implied that variations and differences in RA methodologies and how risk is calculated 
are due to several reasons: 
1. The meaning of risk to an organization and how it is interpreted. 
2. The relationship between risk factors and their meaning. 
3. The way risk factors are measured and computed in order to calculate (whether 
quantitatively or qualitatively) risk.  
However, despite the different names that are used for the same factor or concept, the factors 
Asset, Threat and Vulnerability are found in all RA methodologies. Furthermore, most RA 
methodologies determine the risk level by multiplying Impact by Likelihood. The difference is in how 
they are decomposed and estimated. Moreover, there is no explicit differentiation between probability, 
i.e. 'how likely' an event to occur, and frequency of occurrence, i.e. 'how often' an event occurs, when 
analyzing risks. Furthermore, the vulnerability of an asset to a threat is not considered explicitly but 
implicitly as one of the likelihood factors. Vulnerability aspects, such as level of exploitability, the 
severity and propagation of a vulnerability over time are arguably not adequately considered. For 
example, the likelihood (probability) factor may be estimated by comparing the system with a known 
standard or based on empirical data found in similar context or on the subjective assessor's 
experience.  Thus, there might be a big difference between a correct probability and an estimated 
probability, i.e. uncertainty in estimated risk, due to the lack of data on future events, new risks and 
vulnerabilities. This uncertainty about specific risk factors values may result in uncertainty in RA 
results. To our knowledge, little research has been made on how to compute this uncertainty. 
However, the degree of this uncertainty may be represented by expressing RA results qualitatively 
where a range of values are provided for identified risks rather than a single value or by using fuzzy 
regions to represent these results (ISO 2012).  
One of the problems of current RA methodologies is that there are no fixed standards on how to 
develop lists of threats, vulnerabilities and risk levels. This may result in subjective unsatisfactory RA 
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results due to the reliance on stakeholder or risk assessor's experience. Thus, one way to reduce 
personal experience differences and work and analysis time is by using automated RA tools such as 
CRAMM, CORAS and OCTAVE (Panda 2009; Yazar 2011; CORAS 2014). 
Furthermore, it is difficult to value assets accurately. Assets could be tangible, intangible and 
located in distributed environments. Due to the fact that risk occurs in a continuously evolving 
distributed and dynamic environment, it is difficult to determine the completeness and correctness of 
identified assets, threats and vulnerabilities. However, risk estimation maybe simplified by isolating 
interconnected events which may have a negative effect on the RA results reliability (Zambon and 
Etalle 2011; Bhattacharjee et al. 2013).  
Current RA methodologies fail to comprehensively identify inter-asset relationships, relationships 
between threats and vulnerabilities and dependencies among vulnerabilities. The dependencies among 
risk elements are not properly addressed where each method is suited to a particular enterprise. 
Eventually, this results in an inaccurate and incomplete RA results that either over or under estimate 
risks. Bhattacharjee et al. (2013) proposed an asset-based RA methodology that considers these 
aspects when risk is computed. They reformulated their methodology in (Bhattacharjee et al. 2012)  to 
formally model dependencies between assets, threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, all risk 
elements are formally modeled including vulnerability severity and exploitability. Considering the 
fact that a vulnerability could propagate through risk factors casual chains resulting in different risks, 
Feng et al. (2014) proposed a risk analysis model that identifies the casual relationships among risk 
factors using a Bayesian Network. Then, to determine the highest probability and the highest 
estimated value of risk, an analysis of vulnerability propagation is performed. Although these methods 
present, to some extent, a way of handling the uncertainty in assessing risks and relationships among 
risk factors, they are found to be complex, lengthy, require certain experience to implement them and 
lack tool support. However, the organization's actual risk scenario nor the uncertainty in risk factors 
are not properly represented.  
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Most RA methodologies are static, i.e. time is not included explicitly in calculating risk. They are 
found to be ambiguous, imprecise and cannot effectively communicate the system's dynamic 
behavior, adversaries and actors to system stakeholders. Threats and vulnerabilities that vary overtime 
are identified using horizontal data with static time frame (Sadiq et al. 2010). There is a need for a 
dynamic Information security RA model that considers the time dimension and continuously provide 
an updated probability. Although the risk model presented by Jing et al. (2014) provides a continuous 
and automated RA, it is considered as low (machine)-level and limited to Android Mobile Apps. 
 Moreover, current RA methodologies do not consider relationships among risks where if one 
risk occurs, then another risk is less or more likely to occur. These relationships might decrease or 
increase the likelihood of a specific risk occurring. In this case, these risks can be coupled so that 
several low-level risks may be combined into a higher-level risk. Hence, these relationships can be 
realized if several risks occur concurrently or when the same risk occurs repeatedly over a certain 
period of time. 
Since the scope of this research is to develop a novel RA methodology for users of the general 
public and from the discussion above, it can be implied that there is a need for a well-structured and 
systematic process that can: 
- Properly and explicitly identify important risk factors and contributors to security risks and 
thus reduce the impact of the important contributors. Relationships and dependencies between 
assets, threats, vulnerabilities and risks should be considered. 
- Perform a dynamic RA of the risks the users are exposed to. Hence, it has to provide, to some 
extent,  a continuously updated impact/probability and their deriving factors. Thus, whenever 
there is an available new information such as additional assets and changes in 
threats\vulnerabilities, it should be incorporated to update previous estimations. This 
information could be obtained from a real-time community based database. 
- Consider if any security controls are taken into account in advance. If so, then the 
effectiveness of such controls should be assessed. 
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- Adapt to the user's level of security background and communicate RA results accordingly in a 
simplified and understood way.  Furthermore, users are encouraged to make informed 
decisions by giving recommendations on what to do. 
- Employ a requirement-oriented approach to RA instead of the classic asset-oriented approach 
used by most current RA methodologies. The user's security requirements are established 
before-hand and therefore the required security level will be determined accordingly.  
- Reduce the uncertainty in the process of RA.  
2.7 Conclusion 
There are various ISRM methodologies whether quantitative, qualitative or semi quantitative. 
They all have the same goal which is to estimate the overall risk value. The majority of such tools and 
methodologies are tailored for organizations. ISRM is expensive, time consuming and depends on the 
expertise of risk assessors. There is no exact risk value. Although Risk maybe quantified, the 
uncertainty in defining severity of consequences and likelihood makes RA complex and subjective. 
To overcome this, a number of techniques were recommended to analyze risks and to make the ISRM 
to some extent error prone.  
Although these methodologies have contributed significantly to current knowledge, little attempt 
has been made to assess risks for the general public. Thus, those tools and methodologies either are 
too difficult to be used or understood by users or they could be used as an awareness tool with no 
guidance offered to users to make informed decisions. Moreover, a gap is found in the literature in 
assessing risks for users of the general public where little research is found about tools and 
methodologies tailored for them. This implies that a structured approach tailored for users of the 
general public is needed.  Additionally, user’s awareness of such security risks and what influences 




Chapter 3 : Information Security Awareness for the General Public 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A decade ago, information security literature overlooked the human aspect and focused upon the 
technological aspects and that security technology will provide the required level of protection against 
information security threats (Ophoff and Robinson  2014; Alotaibi et al. 2017). However, technology 
alone have been found not enough to ensure the CIA of assets as it can be misused by users and 
become vulnerable to various threats and, thus, losing its usefulness (Furnell and Clarke  2012; Kaur 
and Mustafa  2013). Indeed, users have problems in understanding both basic and advanced security 
options of some security technologies and standard tools (Furnell and Moore 2014). However, there is 
no security technology that is free from user-centric flaws such as opening an email attachment 
without checking and usability problems with security software interface (Bostan and Akman 2013). 
The protection of various information assets, in an organizational context for example, mainly 
depends on several aspects such as the successful development and application of security plans, 
procedures and guidelines where the implementation of various information security controls as well 
as the consideration of the human aspect of information security are parts of it. This human aspect is 
directly related to knowledge, i.e. what users know, attitude, i.e. what users think, and behavior, i.e. 
what users do (Alarifi et al. 2012; Kaur and Mustafa 2013). However, before the implementation of 
such plans, guidelines and good practices, there has to be an appropriate level of Information Security 
Awareness (ISA) among users where they are aware of the potential information security risks and 
appreciate the need for protection against information security threats. Information security threats 
can be classified, broadly, to: 
 Physical threats: These are mainly caused by threats such as natural disasters and physical 
theft of device. These threats could be mitigated by making multiple copies of information on 
a regular basis and storing them in widely dispersed locations or by using remote data wipe as 
in the case of smart phone theft (Mylonas et al. 2013; Ophoff and Robinson 2014). 
 Non-Physical threats: These are mainly caused by humans such as malware, social 
engineering and phishing attacks. These are considered to pose the greatest risk due to the 
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changing and sophisticated mechanisms in conducting such attacks. Whereas, to allow such 
an attack, they usually target the weakest link in information security and exploit user ISA 
vulnerability. Indeed, most of these attacks cannot be detected by technology only and 
requires a level of awareness of what they look like and how to protect against them.  
Attackers are continuously increasing their efforts to develop advanced and sophisticated hacking 
methods and malware that can be used to steal information and money from users (Aloul  2010; 
Hasan and Hussin 2010; Sheng et al. 2010). During  2017, 29.4% of user computers around the world 
were subjected to at least one attack compared to 31.9% in 2016 (Kaspersky 2017). While the Internet 
is still the main source of malware in most countries, this decrease may be due to several reasons such 
as Federal laws introduced and enforced by Governments worldwide to fight against cybercrime 
(Aloul 2010), search engines and web browsers are becoming more secure against malicious sites 
(Kaspersky 2017) or simply because Internet use in some countries, such as South Africa, is not 
highly developed (Ophoff and Robinson 2014). Nevertheless, attacks still occur. This could be due to 
lack or limited enforcement of cybercrime laws in some countries especially in the Middle East, lack 
of the existence of such laws among residents of such countries  and the arguably limited ISA among 
users (Aloul 2010; Al-Hadadi and Al Shihani 2013). Further to that, security experts are issuing 
warnings of the emergence of newly designed malware that avoids detection and removal (Martin and 
Rice 2011). Attackers have a guaranteed chance to infect the user's computer with malware if it has at 
least one vulnerable, not updated and popular installed application (Kaspersky 2017). However, one 
way to mitigate these attacks and reduce their severity is by raising the Information Security 
Awareness (ISA) level of users (Aloul 2010; Alarifi et al. 2012; Furnell and Rajendran 2012; Al-
Hadadi and Al Shihani 2013). 
ISA is regarded as one of the significant defense lines against the continuously evolving 
information security threat landscape where a high level of ISA and practice can increase the 
performance efficiency of information security controls and, accordingly, decrease information 
security risks (Alarifi et al. 2012; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Furnell and Moore 2014). This implies 
that whenever humans are involved in an information security process, then users need to understand 
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their responsibility in the need to gain the required level of awareness of their information security 
related role and how to protect themselves (Kritzinger and von Solms 2010; Kritzinger and Von 
Solms 2013).  
Home Users (HU) are citizens with varying technical knowledge and age who use Information 
and Computer Technology (ICT) outside their work environment for personal use (ENISA 2010). The 
terms HU, users or users of the general public will be used interchangeably to refer to this kind of 
users. Those users are solely responsible for the protection of their own devices and information. 
However, little evidence is found that they are knowledgeable of information security threats, how to 
protect against them and actually practicing it (Talib et al. 2010; Rao and Pati 2012; Kritzinger and 
Von Solms 2013). This is evident as they lack ISA in general, do not keep up to date with knowledge 
about new security related technologies and risks and use inadequate or incorrect security protection, 
if any. This explains why they tend to use weak passwords, do not set correct security settings and 
forget to update their software (Alarifi et al. 2012; Rao and Pati 2012; Kritzinger and Von Solms 
2013). This ill-informed behavior makes them vulnerable to an increasing number of security threats 
such as Operating System vulnerabilities, Virus (malware) attacks, privacy violation and identity theft 
and spyware (Alarifi et al. 2012; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013; Furnell and Moore 2014). Further 
to that, they perceive their lack of knowledge as one of the obstacles in achieving protection (Furnell 
et al. 2008; Wash and Rader 2011; Rao and Pati 2012). As a result, they try to delegate this security 
responsibility to technology such as Firewalls and Anti-Virus software, to another person or IT staff, 
to some institution like a Bank or simply ask for advice from family and friends rather than asking for 
formal support from official websites and experts (Furnell et al. 2008; Wash and Rader 2011; Furnell 
and Moore 2014). Nevertheless, they are still needed to make some security related decisions on a 
regular basis (Furnell and Clarke 2012; Harbach et al. 2014).  
Educating users about information security threats is a challenging but a must to fight against 
these threats especially that security is considered a secondary task and not a primary task for them. 
Actually, reading technical material or playing an educational security game to increase their 
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information security knowledge may not be what they like to do in their spare time. This may be due 
to lack of resources, time, motivation and learning capabilities (Talib et al. 2010; Maurer et al. 2011). 
Although there is a growing number of ISA initiatives targeting the general public to provide them 
with the appropriate knowledge to be aware of such threats and be able to make informed security 
decisions when required, but the awareness of their existence between users is relatively low (Furnell 
and Moore 2014). Even though, the information presented is general, does not include proper user 
guidance and fails to follow up.  
One of the goals of ISA is to increase users' knowledge and change their behavior accordingly, 
hence, human security behavior is vital for ensuring an efficient information security environment that 
cannot depend on technology only. Actually, there are situations of an aware user who knows how to 
protect himself but, simply, chooses not to. To understand and assess these behaviors, a number of 
security related theories were used such as The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) or the extended 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Khan et al. 2011), General Deterrence Theory (GDT) (Lebek et 
al. 2013), Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)  (Komatsu et al. 2013; Shillair et al. 2015) and 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Shropshire et al. 2015). 
As the need for ISA among users have been established, the goal is not only limited to having a 
user who is aware of information security risks. Actually, it is to redefine what is meant by an aware 
user and go beyond simply giving knowledge, to guiding his behavior to become a security minded 
user that is able to make an informed decision in detecting and removing information security threats 
when required. Therefore, a number of research questions  and sub questions, in the context of ISA 
for HU, could be asked as follows: 
Q1: How to best define ISA for HU? 
Q2: How does ISA relate to information security education and training? 
Q3: Is there a difference between ISA of HU and none-home users (NHU)? 
Q3.1: What is the relationship between knowledge and practice gained at workplace and home 
environment? 
Q4: Do demographics and cultural factors in different countries have an influence on ISA? 
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Q5: What is currently done to raise ISA of HU? 
Q6: How HU behave online? 
Q6.1: What are the factors that influence these behaviors? 
Q7: How to motivate HU to protect themselves? 
Q7.1: How to best communicate risk to them? 
Q8: What are users' preferences of ISA delivery methods? 
This chapter is structured as follows: the research methodology is described in the next section 
followed by some definitions of ISA, education and training. A global study of ISA levels is discussed 
in section 4. End-user classification, ISA for Home users and how to communicate risks are explained 
in sections 5, 6  and 7 respectively. A discussion is presented in section 8, and finally a conclusion in 
section 9. 
3.2 Methodology 
Since people are always referred to in the security literature as the weakest link, the role of using 
ISA in reducing information security risks is getting increased attention over the last few years. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide an up-to-date overview of ISA among members of the general public 
by answering the above mentioned research questions. To accomplish that, a systematic literature 
review was conducted where relevant literature was sought  in four academic digital databases, 
IEEExplore, ScienceDirect, ACM and Google Scholar. A list of search terms was used to conduct the 
search including: ' information security', 'information security awareness' and 'information security 
behavior'. As the aim of this chapter to present an up-to-date overview of the selected topics and 
answer the research questions, deemed that papers from 2010 will be suitable, thus, publications 
before the year 2010 were not considered. Further to that, relevant literature in the field of ISA and 
behavior was selected using an inclusion/exclusion criteria. Only conferences and journals related to 
the selected topics were included and non-academic articles were excluded. This resulted in an initial 
list of 1884 articles. Then, articles that do not mainly deal with ISA and user behavior were excluded. 
This was done by reading the articles' titles, abstracts, keywords and a quick scan of the full text. 
 55 
Additionally, reference checking for relevant articles and citations was done. Finally, 5 technical and 
statistical reports, 8 websites and 2 books were added as relevant. This resulted in a final list of 74 
articles as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure ‎3.1: Review Research Methodology 
3.3 Information Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) 
The intensive sharing of information among users through emails, social networks along with lack 
of ISA to protect themselves make them an easy target for attackers. Users both pose and face risks 
and their devices may be used with or without their knowledge as attack vectors such as botnets (Al 
Sabbagh et al. 2012). This implies that users require SETA, to increase their knowledge, self-
confidence and accept personal responsibility to protect themselves and, eventually, others. In order to 
help understand when to train, educate and/or aware users, the differences between these concepts 
should be understood. However, the definitions of these non-technical aspects may not be clear and 
complete as one would think and sometimes used interchangeably in the literature (Hansch and 
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Benenson 2014). For example, Amankwa et al. (2014) performed a conceptual analysis of information 
security literature and found that ISA, education and training are different concepts with regards to 
their focus, purpose and delivery method as in Table 3.1. 
 
Table ‎3.1: Definitions of SETA (Amankawa et al. 2014) 
ENISA (2010) defines ISA as " Awareness tries to change the behavior and patterns in how 
targeted audience (e.g. employees, general public, etc.) use technology and the Internet and it is a 
distinct element from training. It consists of a set of activities which turn users into organizations' first 
line of defense. This is why the awareness activities occur on an ongoing basis, using a variety of 
delivery methods and are less formal and shorter than training". NIST SP 800-16 (1998) define ISA 
as " Awareness is not training. The purpose of awareness presentations is simply to focus attention on 
security. Awareness presentations are intended to allow individuals to recognize IT security concerns 
and respond accordingly". Whereas Stewart and Lacey (2012) define ISA as " The broadcast of facts 
to an audience in the hope that their behavior improves". 
Information security training is an important concept in information security. A number of 
definitions of information security training are found in the literature. Wilson and Hash (2003) define 
it  as " Training seeks to teach skills that allow a person to perform a specific function".  According to 
NIST SP 800-16 (1998) "Training strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and 
competencies". While ENISA (2010) define and differentiate between training and awareness as 
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"Training seeks to teach skills which allow a person to perform a specific function, while awareness 
seeks to focus an individual’s attention on an issue or set of issues". 
Information security education may seem closely related to training. It is everything done to help 
users perform their roles successfully and appreciate the need for information security (Sedinic et al. 
2014). NIST SP 800-16 (1998) points out to education as " integrates all of the security skills and 
competencies of the various functional specialties into a common body of knowledge".  Wilson and 
Hash (2003) suggest that information security education "focus on developing people's ability and 
vision to perform complex multi-disciplinary activities and the skills needed to further the information 
security profession and to keep pace with threats and technology changes". 
However, these definitions mainly focus on the broadcast of facts which is what is suggested by 
IT experts. This may make these definitions limited.  This view may have stemmed from the fact that 
IT experts assume that users possess far too much knowledge than they actually do and build their 
expectations on this (Furnell and Clarke 2012). Additionally, focus is on technical aspects and 
performed tasks where factors such as culture and learning styles are overlooked. Hence, to avoid 
overwhelming the user with information already known to them, there has to be a focus on what they 
do not know and need to know. As a result, ISA could be defined as the attempts to raise user's 
information security knowledge according to their needs to be able to properly detect and remove 
information security threats and direct the change of their behavior to correctly implement security 
measures. Whereas, training could be defined as the attempts to develop user's skills and ability to 
detect and remove information security threats and direct the change of their behavior to correctly 
implement security measures. Finally, education can be defined as developing user's ability to 
understand and appreciate the need for various activities d to detect and remove information security 
threats and direct the change of their behavior to correctly implement security measures. 
Thus, ISA can be described as an ongoing process to reflect the evolving threat landscape and can 
be perceived as the 'What to' learn component. Whereas training and education could be perceived as 
the 'How to' and 'Why to' learn components respectively. Although they share a common goal which 
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is to change user's behavior, but education is more generic and uses theoretical delivery methods 
whereas training is more specific and uses practical delivery methods. 
As these are well-established disciplines in organizational context, it is a challenge to include a 
more general population, HU, due to their lack of time, motivation and varying levels of prior 
knowledge and expertise. Additionally, it is hard to determine if they are well equipped to go online 
(Furnell et al. 2008). This implies a joint effort approach to create a security minded user that is aware 
of the information security threats, why to protect form them and , and finally, how to make a proper 
informed decision in reacting to them. For example, in the case of a non-updated Anti-Virus software, 
instead of just prompting the user that his software is out of date and needs to be updated, a more 
informed and understood approach could be used (Furnell and Moore 2014). The user could be 
informed, roughly, as follows: 
Your Computer is AT RISK due to out-of-date Anti-Virus software (raising Knowledge through 
ISA) 
11367 new viruses cannot be detected by your Anti-Virus software   (Appreciate the need for an 
update through education) 
To update your Anti-Virus software click the ….   (How to do it through training) 
 
An attempt has been made by (Hansch and Benenson 2014) to reach a common definition of ISA. 
They analyzed the literature to find what ISA means implicitly and explicitly to researchers. They 
found that ISA could be defined as perception or knowledge where they need to be aware of threats, 
as protection or attitude and a change in how they think and belief of them and what they are, and 
finally, as behavior or change in behavior. Accordingly, knowledge of information security concepts 
enable users to realize the relationship between information security elements and , therefore, help 
ensure that the given knowledge is used or implemented. This may enable users to understand the 
necessity of applying this knowledge and reason in choosing the best way to applying it. So, users 
need to be aware of a threat and then realize that this threat or risk needs to be dealt with (Harbach et 
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al.  2014). Therefore, a mapping of ISA, training and education to Knowledge, attitude and behavior 
(KAB) could be as shown in Figure 3.2. However, to maximize behavioral change, SETA has to be 
performed together. 
 
Figure ‎3.2: Suggested Mapping of SETA to KAB 
3.4 ISA in Countries 
Although the importance of the need for ISA and the devastating risks of information security 
threats are generally well understood, it has been found in the literature that there is a digital divide 
within countries. In a study by Kaspersky Lab, 44.51% of web attacks in 2017 were carried out from 
malicious web resources located in the United States and Germany (Kaspersky 2017). A statistics 
about the top 10 countries where users face the greatest risk of online infection is as in Table 3.2. 
According to Kaspersky Labs, these statistics show unique users whose computers have been targeted 
by Malware-class web attacks as a percentage of all unique users of certain Kaspersky Lab products 
in the country (Kaspersky 2016; Kasperskay 2017). 
 
 
Table ‎3.2: Top 10 countries of online infection 
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One might ask if there is a relationship between socio-demographic and country-based differences 
and the level of ISA of users? To answer this question, a review of several country-specific studies 
have been undertaken and presented in Table 3.3. 
From the these studies, it is apparent that there is a challenging general low level of ISA among 
users whether in the contexts of generally using the Internet, in smartphones or in social networks. 
Further to that, it is evident that there is a relationship between some socio-demographic factors and 
the level of ISA among users that makes them vulnerable to information security threats. The key 
socio-demographic factors that were found to have an influence on ISA are as follows: 
1) Language, i.e. Mother Tongue: This factor has an effect on users comprehension of 
technical terms they may face when they are online. As a result, it is recommended to use 
more than one language when designing ISA materials. However, it is not necessary to 
translate the term itself, but explain the concept and related risks in the appropriate language. 
2) Age: In most of the ISA literature, the age distribution that showed a high percentage of 
user group with ages less than 30 years old, mostly college students. This may be considered 
normal as young people are more interested in voluntarily responding to surveys related to 
ICT usage as they are more familiar with the technology than other groups. Thus, they are not 
good users of it (Furnell and Moore 2014). Another reason is because this age could be linked 
to risky behavior such as their preference of pirated (jail broken) smartphone applications 
where users of this age group tend to engage in risky behaviors may be as part of their 
learning journey (Ophoff and Robinson 2014). 
3) Percentage of daily online activity: As risks materialize with increased online exposure 
(Rughiniş and Rughiniş 2014), it has been found that in countries where online activity is 
widely spread, users engage in more diverse and intense use than daily users of Internet in 
countries with less Internet popularity.  
4) IT expertise: It has been found that the higher the level of IT expertise or security 
education the more they are cautious in their online behavior as they are more aware of 
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information security threats and tend to adopt security controls to protect themselves. 
Moreover, the more a community is high-tech, the more they are concerned about privacy and 
security (Harbach et al. 2014) 
5) Gender: Females were found to be more vulnerable to information security threats such as 
phishing more than males. This may be due to several reasons which accounts for this 
susceptibility and less security control adoption. Reasons such as they arguably have less IT 
expertise and security knowledge than males and the differences in the way males and 
females use the Internet or make trust decisions. 
6) Culture: It was evident that cultural factors play a role in the level of ISA among users 
especially in multi-cultural and/or developing countries such Saudi Arabia and South Africa. 
This implies that these country-specific cultural differences should be considered when 
designing materials to increase the level of ISA among users especially that there are common 









- United Arab Emirates 
- Sample population of 
students and staff in 
American University in 
Sharjah. 
- The controlled phishing experiment demonstrated low levels of ISA regarding 
phishing attacks 
- The wireless network security assessment revealed a lack of wireless network 
security awareness with weak encryption mechanisms or no encryption at all. 
- Study was limited to one University only. 
- Results generalized carefully as it may not be 





- Sample population of 
119 college students 
who responded to a 
closed-end survey 
- Most of Social Networks (SN) users are not fully aware of what information to 
be released on SN and what are the consequences if such sensitive and personal 
information is revealed such as their physical location, when gone away for a 
vacation or email password. 
- Findings are Consistent with the literature that 
no high appreciation of security and privacy in 
this age group (college students). 
- More enhanced results if a more comprehensive 
sample was used such as high school students and 
working adults  
Sheng et al. 
(2010) 
- United States of 
America 
- Sample population of 
the general public 
 
- Gender and age can be used to predict susceptibility to phishing.  
- Users with age group 18-25 and Females are more vulnerable to phishing 
attacks than males 
 
- Results could be more generalized than those of 
(Aloul, 2010) as they reflect direct relationship 
between demographics and phishing susceptibility 
- Studied the effectiveness of some anti-phishing 
education delivery methods (an online game and a 
comic) 
Kruger et al.  
(2011) 
- South Africa 
- Sample population of 
180 students in two 
universities that 
answered an online 
two-section 
questionnaire of a 
vocabulary knowledge 
test and scenario-type 
questions. 
- Cultural factors such as area where you grew up and language have an impact 
on ISA whereas gender, field of study and how long the participant had used a 
computer do not have a significant effect on ISA 
- The need for ISA programs with a focus on social engineering 
- Low response rate 
- The use of a knowledge test is a major 
advantage of this study as it is an acceptable way 
for assessing user's level of comprehension and 
security knowledge background 
Alarifi et al. 
(2012) 
- Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
- Sample of 462 online 
survey respondents 
- Due to Saudi tribal and patriarchal culture, and high levels of censorship low 
level of ISA among the Saudi general public was found in general especially in 
password practices, DDos attacks, phishing, how to report a security incident 
and use of Anti-Spam and Anti-Spyware mechanisms. 
- High ISA levels of viruses and Anti-Virus software use. 
- Use of protection is lower than the awareness of Information security threats. 
- Used an Arabic online survey to ensure 
respondents comprehension of questions. This 
may be a drawback because English is the 
dominant language of the Internet 
- No indication of demographics in the survey 
such as age, gender and level of education as 








- Sample of 433 survey 
participants of the 
general public 
The existence of important relationships between frequency of use, reason for 
ICT usage and email security and several factors related to socio-demographics 
such as gender, age and education. 
- Sample did not represent different groups of the 
society such as IT experts. 
- More interesting to include other socio-
demographic factors such as income and effect of 




- South Africa 
- Sample population of 
619 respondents to an 
online survey to assess 
their level of 
smartphone ISA 
- In general, low level of smartphone ISA especially in highly trusting 
application repositories, pay little attention to security and privacy measures and 
low level of security control adoption 
- Users with IT knowledge have "Deterministic views" on testing smartphone 
applications which affects their trust in application repositories 
- No evidence that cultural factors or language have a significant effect on ISA 
- Contradicts findings of (Kruger et al.2011) that 
language has an effect on ISA. This context of 
study, smartphones, and its relatively high 
purchasing cost may have limited the sample to 
users of higher economic means with a good 
command of the English language. This resulted 
in biased results, where 70% of respondents 
English language was their mother tongue. This 









- Countries in the EU with higher percentage of daily Internet users foster cyber 
security cultures. 
- High ecological correlation among daily Internet users between country level 
frequency of Internet use and occurrence of security incidents where security 
behavior was found to be high 
- Correlation is weaker between Internet use and cybercrime exposure. 
- Relatively low social stratification of password hygiene and cybercrime 
exposure along age and educational achievement 
- More detailed investigation of security and 
online activity may have resulted in deeper 




- Sample population of 
University students 
- Although students were aware of information security issues, they have 
limited knowledge in the adoption of security tools and techniques. 
- Study program and educational level have a positive impact on the level of 
information security awareness and computer ethics 
- No evidence that gender has an impact/role  on the level of information 
security awareness and computer ethics 
 
- Findings are consistent with most of literature 
on the role of gender, study program and 
educational level on ISA 
- The study is somehow limited in terms that the 
sample population was from a single university. 
- A good advantage of this study is that it 
highlighted the importance of adopting open/free 
software in education especially with the found 
high rate of phishing, social engineering and spam 
among students against each other. 
 
Table ‎3.3: A review of ISA in countries
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3.5 End-users' Classification 
One of the ways to better understand Internet users and help create more effective ways in 
communicating information security risks to them is by classifying them (Blythe et al. 2011; 
Kruger et al. 2011; Martin and Rice 2011; Stewart and Lacey 2012; Shillair et al. 2015). 
However, different classifications of users could be obtained depending on the used 
classification criteria. 
 Rughiniş and Rughiniş (2014) classified Internet users theoretically based on their 
behavior as security actors into three models. They claim that user's behavior could be 
interpreted, for analytical purposes only and not empirical, with regards to each of the specified 
theoretical perspectives. However, each of these models include both risk-seeking and risk-
averse behaviors. An explanation of each model is found in Table 3.4. 
 
Table ‎3.4: Theoretical model of end-users as security actors (Rughinis and Rughinis 2014) 
It is apparent that differences in the above mentioned users' security behavior depend on 
user's experience of loss, reasons behind their taken security behavior and on the resources they 
can access to obtain technical expertise to devise an economical solution. Later, they used K-
means cluster analysis to classify users based on survey data obtained from the Eurobarometer 
77.2/2012 dataset. The resulting classification is as in Table 3.5 with a mapping to their 





  Behavioral Indicators 





Use of Security 
Measures 
Social user 
Explorer High High High 
Reactive Average High High 
Economically rational Prudent Average Low Low 
Cognitively lazy 
Lucky High Low Low 
Occasional Low Very low Very low 
Table ‎3.5: User Types  
This survey based classification of users is a valuable resource for the design of public 
security policies, public interventions and a meaningful interpretation of users' actions and in 
linking them to social contexts. However, such classification could have been improved if 
additional measures were included. Examples of such measures are security knowledge, 
estimations of cybercrime personal loss in terms of reputation, money or time and whether 
these losses resulted from work or from personal online activities. Furthermore, more detailed 
investigation of security and online activity may have resulted in deeper analysis of users' 
online behavior. 
Another criteria for classifying users is presented by Kritzinger and von Solms (2010) as 
they classified users according to the source used for Internet access and whether it is through a 
personal device or through devices within the work environments. Accordingly, this resulted in 
the following classification: 
 Home Users (HU): These are users who access the Internet through their home 
environments using their own personal computers and are responsible to secure these 
computers. They are not essentially forced to obtain information security knowledge in 
any form. 
 Non Home Users (NHU): These are users who access the Internet through their work 
environments such as Governments, Universities and Private sector enterprises. This 
kind of users sit under the administrative umbrella of their organization. They gain 
Information security knowledge through their working environments in the form of 
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ISA, training and education which are governed by procedures, policies, guidelines and 
best practices. These are enforced and implemented under a watchful eye of their 
organizations to ensure compliance with such regulations.  
Furnell and Thomson (2009) classified NHU according to their security behavior in terms 
of compliance and commitment to security as shown in Table 3.6. 
 
Table ‎3.6: Levels of security compliance based on security behavior (Furnell and Thomson 2009) 
Whereas one of the goals of ISA of HU is to ensure that they comply to guidelines and best 
practices and to create a sense of responsibility in which users promote security oriented 
behavior without the need for a watchful eye, then this classification could be generalized to 
include HU. However, describing users' behavior using words like ignorant or lazy may by a 
narrow and limited view as some limitations may be placed on them are ignored in terms of 
resources, time and learning capabilities.  
Another user classification criteria is used by Furnell et al. (2007) as they classified users 
according to their security knowledge in terms of how long they have been using the Internet 
to:  
 Novice users: These are users who have been using the Internet for a average of 4 
years 
 Intermediate users: These are users who have been using the Internet for an average 
of 8 years 
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 Advanced users: These are users who have been using the Internet for an average of 
10 years 
However, it is worth noting that this period of using the Internet does not reflect the user's 
ability to protect himself nor his ISA level. Shillair et al. (2015) Classified users according to 
their prior knowledge of online protection to Naïve and experienced users. As no criteria was 
specified for measuring this knowledge, thus, it is important to ensure how knowledgeable they 
are especially with the evolving online threats. 
From an analysis of user’s classification, Figure 3.3 represents a taxonomy of end users. 
Understanding how to classify users is a key factor to better ISA. Nevertheless, none is right or 
wrong but it is an attempt to better understand the users. 
 





































































As one of the objectives of  this research is to investigate and develop a novel approach to 
ISRA and communication for the general public, additional aspects could be included together 
with the already used classifications, users could be classified, as in Figure 3.4, according to: 
 Online activity such as low and high. 
 User’s age such as children, teen agers and seniors. 
 Type of used technology (infrastructure or platform) such as smart phones and WiFi. 
 
Figure ‎3.4: End users classification 
3.6 ISA for Home Users (HU) 
Given that HU are mostly untrained in information security protection, they are likely to be 
vulnerable to information security attacks (Furnell and Vasileiou 2017) . One of the reasons 
behind HU arguably lack of ISA is that ISA is not enforced by a third party to ensure that HU 
ISA is up-to date-or at least they use the Internet securely (Kritzinger and von Solms 2010; 
Talib et al. 2010; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013).  
To understand the difficulties that HU face and their attitudes towards online security, 
Furnell et al. (2008) conducted interviews with an indicative sample of 20 novice users. Their 
findings suggest that their online security practices are due to weakly formed technical 
knowledge or difficulties posed by security tools such as being annoyed by too many warnings 
and pop ups that results in them disabling the features that are the causes of these disturbing 
messages. On the basis of their findings, they suggest that to overcome this ill-informed 
behavior, security decision making should be removed from the user by either removing the 
user's choice or reliance on him in matters related to security protection. Even though the used 
data collection method is considered as an effective method of allowing users to discuss their 




Age  Technology 
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participants may feel obligated to pretend a more cautious behavior just to not seem careless or 
ashamed . However, more depth could have been given to these findings if the reasons behind  
why users where found to be less motivated to protect themselves were further investigated and 
analyzed. This may have resulted in an in-depth understanding about their security behavior.  
A similar study was conducted by Albrechtsen (2007) but in an organizational context to 
investigate users' experience of information security and their role in the work of information 
security. The author conducted qualitative interviews with employees of a Norwegian bank and 
an IT-company. Later, a summary of these interviews where sent by email to participants for 
acceptance and control. The interviews revealed that ISA campaigns had little effect on 
employees security behavior and a preference for group discussions as an effective method for 
influencing their behavior. Although this is an important study that highlights the information 
security concerns of employees in organizations and their understanding of information security 
processes, but users' views may be biased as a result of face-to-face interviews for the reasons 
stated earlier. Thus, the results would have been more indicative and less-biased if participants 
were presented by a list of security actions for example.  
The findings of  Harbach et al.( 2014) give stronger indications about users' awareness of 
risks while using the Internet as they used an online survey to reach users' in their familiar 
settings and a population in two continents to explore the differences in risk awareness between 
them. This is evident as they found some cultural-specific risks. A good aspect of the used data 
collection method is that the authors used a two section questionnaire. In the first section, 
participants were given five scenarios and asked them to list which risks they were aware of. 
The second section was a precompiled list of 22 common risks in which participants were 
asked to identify the ones they were aware of and how relevant they are to them. Later, to 
minimize bias in results, the authors compared between participants' answers to both sections.  
Their findings suggest that end-user security could be improved by addressing risks which are 
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salient to them and already aware of or by changing risk perception through education and risk 
communication.  
 Martin and Rice (2011) collected the views of 66 computer users and organization 
employees to identify their major concerns and provide advice accordingly. Their findings 
suggest that the treatment and handling of users' personal information such as what personal 
information to be revealed in social networks is a key element in addressing cybercrime 
concerns. However, despite the small number of individuals input, most input came from large 
to medium sized organizations in both public and private sectors. Thus, one might think that 
these results are biased or represent employees views but this is not the case as it is consistent 
with members of the general public concerns found in  Furnell et al. (2008) and  Harbach et al. 
( 2014).  
These studies were selected and reviewed  to have a comparison between information 
security concerns of both employees and users from the general public. It was found that there 
is a difference between them as employees concerns were mainly focused about their role as 
employees in the information security process of their organizations. Whereas users from the 
general public concerns were about information security risks, cybercrime and how to well 
protect themselves from them. A summary of these studies is in Table 3.7. 
 Albrechtsen (2007) Furnell et al.( 2008) Martin and Rice (2011) Harbach et al.( 2014) 
Sample 
population 
Employees of an IT 





Government, public and 
private companies, and 
individuals 
University Students and 





Face to face 
interviews 
Face to face 
interviews 
Parliament of Australia 






Germany and United 
states 
Analysis Not specified Not specified 
Concept analysis and 
mapping techniques 




 Albrechtsen (2007) Furnell et al.( 2008) Martin and Rice (2011) Harbach et al.( 2014) 
Findings 
Concerns for their 
role in Information 
security in general: 
- Aware of their 
Information security 
responsibility, but do 
not perform many 
Information security 
actions. 





approach is the best 
way to influence 




- Aware of existence 
of information 
security threats but 
less aware of 
appropriate 
safeguards 
- Aware of their 
responsibility of 
protecting 
themselves but less 
concerned about 
impacts 
- Lack of technical 
knowledge and 
usability problems 
are obstacles in 
achieving protection 
Concerns for cybercrime 
in general: 
- Concerns for Identity 
theft, financial fraud, 
spam, phishing and 
botnet attacks 
- Frequency of 
Information security 
incidents and malware 
threats 
- Need ISA and 
education  
- Role of Laws in 
preventing cyber crimes 
- Installation and use of 
security software 
- Cyber bullying 
Concerns for risks and 
consequences in 
general: 
- Privacy (loss of 
privacy, theft of private 
information) 
- Account abuse 




- Financial risks (theft 
of credit card details) 
Table ‎3.7: A Comparison between End-users' Information Security Concerns 
However, as some users could be part of both environments, one could ask if ISA 
knowledge and practices gained at the workplace could be transferred to the home environment 
and actually practiced? This was explored by Talib et al.(2010) as an online survey was used as 
a data collection tool that attracted more than 300 respondents. Their findings suggest that 
respondents who took security training were found to be more aware of a variety of security 
issues than those who did not. Moreover, they appeared to be motivated to take a form of 
security education given some flexibility in what to learn, when and how. Surprisingly, 95% of 
respondents who had training stated that what they learnt in the workplace is key to what they 
actually practice at home. Although their findings addressed the need for ISA strategies that 
provides information security training and education to users regardless of their environment, 
but such results should be generalized into a wider population cautiously. This is because 
respondents had a good level of ISA and practices and may not represent the wider population 
as it is expected they have lower levels of ISA and in IT in general. 
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3.6.1 Solutions to Protect Home Users 
Since the lack of awareness of online risks is one of the reasons behind HU becoming 
vulnerable to information security threats and an attractive target for attackers, Kritzinger and 
von Solms (2010) proposed an E-Awareness Model (E-AM) to improve ISA among HU by 
presenting some information security content and enforcing the users to understand this 
content. This proposed model is composed of two components: 
 E-Awareness portal or a "what a user should know" component.  
 The enforcement component or the "how the content absorption can be enforced" 
component.  
This proposed model, as in Figure 3.5,  is a theoretical model with no implementation, so it 
has not been tested or evaluated yet. Further to that, the viability of this enforcement approach 
is  questionable especially in terms of user’s acceptance. However, authors claim that a 
prototype is currently under implementation and will be tested in a school environment.  
 
Figure ‎3.5: The E-AM model (Kritzinger and Von Solms 2010) 
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A next extended version of this proposed model is presented by Kritzinger and Von Solms 
(2013) where most of the security responsibility such as patching and Anti-Virus protection are 
moved away from the HU and hosted by the regulating body. In this sense, they proposed a 
migration approach of three steps to help users become more secure by increasing the security 
responsibility of ISPs and decreasing it for HU. The approach is as depicted in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure ‎3.6: The Three steps Framework (Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013) 
Assuming that ISPs will accept this expanded type of this responsibility, this technically 
oriented approach is a way of enforcing security protection on the user that is consistent with 
the security literature that suggests to remove the security responsibility away from the user 
(Furnell et al. 2008; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Rao and Pati 2012). However, an extra effort will 
be placed on the ISP in terms of software, processing and management. Furthermore, this effort 
has to be paid for which may place a cost overhead on the HU. This may result in him simply 
rejecting this approach especially if he does not appreciate the need for it. Nevertheless, ISPs 
are not the guarding angels of users and may not have the legal or ethical position to make such 
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decisions on behalf of the user. Additionally, some users may perceive this ISP intervention as 
a violation to their privacy and may hold ISPs responsible if something bad happens. This 
implies that a trust relation has to be established between HU and ISP beforehand. 
Nevertheless, ISPs can play an important role in providing users with awareness on internet 
security issues and assisting them to protect themselves from online threats such as with using 
anti-spam and anti-virus software (Adelola et al 2015). Not limited to ISPs, but outsourcing 
security in general as in security-as-a-service (SECaaS) that includes security software that is 
delivered on the cloud and in-house security management offered by a third party (Chaisiri et 
al. 2015). In this manner, internet-connected applications can use security services such as 
spam filtering and anti-malware to protect applications and data against various online threats. 
Instead of installing such security tools and managing them by the user, these services are 
utilized using a web browser which makes it direct and affordable (Wenge et al. 2014). Some 
examples of the offerings of SECaaS as outlined by the Cloud Security Alliance (Cloud 
Security Alliance 2018) include data loss prevention, encryption, email security, web security 
and Identity Access Management (IAM). 
As security is a significant problem in many online services, many SECaaS solutions are 
offered by product vendors such as Cisco, Symantec, McAfee and Verisign or as 
methodologies in the literature such as Hussain and Abdulsalam (2011), Hasan and Moftah 
(2013), Sharma et al. (2016), Kim et al. (2017), Chen et al. (2018) and Chawla and Thamilarasu 
(2018). Unfortunately, most of these tools and methodologies are designed for organizations 
and lacking for home users.  
However, SECaaS is used in many aspects such as in storing authentication biometrics in 
the cloud (Yousif  2016). In a study by Erdim and Sandikkaya (2019), a cloud-based 
architecture is proposed for a one-time-password as a service to help users change their 
conventional authentication scheme of username/password to a more secured scheme. Since it 
is hard to prevent problems arising from users insecure behaviors, this architecture does not 
solve conventional username/password usage flaws such as vulnerability against guessing 
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attacks or memorization problem. Conversely, as a result of such problems, a second factor to 
conventional authentication is added. 
Some internet services request users to provide sensitive information such as ID and credit 
card numbers. However, the way in such sensitive information is used is determined by the 
service provider only and users have no other choice but to allow such usage. Takahashi et al. 
(2011) proposed a framework that allows users to choose the way in which their information is 
protected through the use of a policy that is offered as a SECaaS. This is achieved by 
incorporating the information protection type in a program, according to the policy, in which 
the service provider will use their sensitive information through this program. However, this is 
a theoretical framework that has not been tested in reality, hence its validity and applicability 
remains uncertain. 
Users are delegating service providers who run IAM management systems to manage their 
log in credentials among other sensitive information. However, only 23% of the population 
sample of the survey  conducted by Abdulwahid et al. (2015) were willing to pass this 
responsibility to a third party. This highlights a low preparedness rate and the need to have 
users understand such mechanism. Further to that, as the security environment is not controlled 
in an in-house manner, the concerns over SECaaS have the right to exist.  This could be 
because SECaaS user-provider relationships are distant as users access the offered security 
services remotely which may reduce the personal contact level and, as a result, exacerbate 
security threats. Hence, security in the context of SECaaS is related to trust (Goode et al. 2015). 
Additionally, users’ perceptions of SECaaS providers robustness can be affected. This is due to 
them serving many users over the same network infrastructure and at the same time having 
access to each user’s data (Kim et al. 2011). Security mechanisms are complex and users are 
only aware of those mechanisms that affect their service requirements. Although other security 
mechanisms offered by SECaaS providers are important, but their functionality is invisible to 
the users. As security relates to their own operations depending on the threats they face, this 
76 
 
raises users’ concerns over the perceived value of such mechanisms especially that security is 
subjectively perceived by the user ( Goode et al. 2015). 
A variety of resources are at the disposal of users to improve their awareness of 
information security threats. Many of the major Anti-Virus providers, Governments and 
Operating System vendors have some dedicated resources to increase users' knowledge about 
information security. An extensive online resource is offered by Microsoft (Microsoft Internet 
Safety and Security Center  2015) to teach users about information security and includes lists of 
advices for users to become secure. Moreover, McAfee (Home.mcaffee.com 2015), the well-
known Anti-Virus provider, has an online resource that gives security advice and tips to users 
on how to protect themselves. Even Governments are starting to recognize their role in 
satisfying the need for ISA. This is evident with the growing number of Government sponsored 
initiatives that are targeting the general public. Examples of such initiatives are the 
StaySafeOnline.org (USA) (Staysafeonline.org 2015), GetSafeOnline.org (UK) 
(Getsafeonline.org 2015), CyberStreetWise.com (UK) (Cyberstreetwise.com 2015) , The BBC 
Guide to using the Internet (UK) (BBC WebWise 2015),  ENISA's Guide on How To raise ISA 
(EU) (ENISA 2010) and the guide published by the German Federal Academy of Public 
Administration (Germany) (Hansch and Benenson 2014) to name a few.  
As these maybe considered as good guidance resources to those who realize they need it 
and look for answers, but they are not easy to find by users as they may lack the skills and 
knowledge to find them. Unfortunately, this was confirmed by (Furnell and Moore 2014) as 
they found that awareness of the existence of such resources is relatively low. Even if they are 
aware of them, they do not know which level of information security knowledge is relevant to 
them. However, they generally suffer from the following disadvantages: 
 Most of the information in these resources are presented in a text based fashion with 
some occasional video files aimed at providing assistance in informing and educating 
members of the general public to improve their online safety behavior.  
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 Most of these resources provide beginner's information with no dynamic user actions, 
such as examples and exercises, and may not contain regularly updated information.  
 They are generally not well structured where users may find it difficult to search and 
find certain information.  
 No proper guidance on the selection and implementation of security controls is 
provided.   
Further to these online resources, there are some Government sponsored activities such as 
the National Cyber Security Awareness Week by the Australian Government to promote safe 
computing practices (Martin and Rice 2011), The Get Safe Online Week and Safer Internet Day 
by the UK Government.  
Alotaibi et al. (2017) did an analysis of the efforts made in providing information security 
education and awareness for HU. Their analysis suggested that regardless of the significant 
efforts made, a focus upon a “one-size-fits-all” solution was apparent with no consideration of 
the needs, security priorities, prior knowledge and learning styles of users. This resulted in 
information overload and users spending lots of time reading web-based content that may have 
little relevance to them.  
3.7 Risk Communication 
Improved information security requires effective risk communication to users. This need 
for effectiveness is critical due to the evolving threat landscape and the need to adapt to new 
threats and their security countermeasures. Additionally, improved risk communication about 
information security risks is required to change user's behavior. Typically, risk communication 
consists of security expert designed messages to inform or educate non-expert users about risks 
(Asgharpor et al. 2007; Blythe et al. 2011; Blythe and Camp 2012; Stewart and Lacey 2012). 
Thus, it may be considered as the first step in enabling the users to make informed security 
decisions. Although these messages are designed by experts who know the risks, one may think 
that their way of thinking or mental model is the most reliable for designing risk 
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communication. As mental models of experts are not the same as of non-experts this implies 
that experts should understand the mental models of users (Asgharpor et al. 2007; Wash 2010; 
Wash and Rader 2011; Blythe and Camp 2012). To effectively communicate the information 
security risks, this requires both communicating the risk and motivating the user. Hence, the 
validity of user's decisions arguably depend on what, when and how information is provided by 
the messages (Wahlberg et al. 2013). 
Traditional techniques used to communicate offline risks may not be effective for online 
risks (Blythe et al. 2011). Many studies advice that the traditional 'one size fits all' approach to 
risk communication should be replaced by a targeted approach in which messages are 
engaging, contain the required technical and non-technical context and above all tested to 
ensure whether they have an effect on users or not (Blythe et al. 2011; Martin and Rice 2011; 
Maurer et al. 2011; Takahashi et al. 2013; Shillair et al. 2015).  
To effectively communicate risks, Shillair et al.(2015) suggest that users should be 
classified according to their IT knowledge as Naïve or novice and experienced users. In their 
study, they used two approaches, an inactive learning approach and a semantic descriptive 
approach, to explain online safety and change user's behavior. They found that for users who 
lack the required knowledge in handling online threats, risk should be communicated to them 
by stressing on their responsibility to protect themselves along with providing some 'vicarious 
experience' or 'show me how' about protection measures and how to behave safely online. 
However, this combination should be used cautiously to avoid overwhelming the user with 
information.  Whereas for those knowledgeable users, risk communication should focus on the 
technical aspects of risks as in protections that increase those that are offered by their ISPs. 
Hence, this is done to stress on the sense of shared responsibility and continued cautious 
behavior rather than just informing them of online risks. This study gives an understanding on 
how to best communicate risk to convince users to protect themselves. Risk is communicated 
by educating users to improve their self confidence in protecting themselves as well as stressing 
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on personal responsibility of their own protection. These two aspects were perceived in the 
literature as aspects that influence user's security behavior (Furnell et al. 2008; Furnell and 
Clarke 2012; Furnell and Moore 2014). However, the vicarious experience was offered to the 
participants as if an expert was sitting at the user's computer and the user watching him, thus, 
no guarantee that the user understood the safety tips that were given or not, or even if he at least 
read them. However, some thought should be given on how to enhance user’s engagement and 
perception such as using 3D environments delivery methods.  
Blythe et al. (2011) argue that warnings about information security threats are often and 
easily ignored due to the used terminology and timing of such warnings. They recommended 
that users are persuaded by risk communication messages that are tailored to particular threats 
they may be exposed to and delivered in a timely manner before the danger or risk takes place. 
Further to that, these messages must describe the danger by influencing user's mental models. 
This was also recommended by Asgharpor et al.( 2007) when they designed two card sorting 
experiments to understand the mental models of experts who communicate the risks and non-
experts who receive the risk communication. Their findings are consistent with the literature 
that experts think differently than non-experts and that risk should be communicated using 
users (non-expert) mental models (Wash 2010; Wash and Rader 2011; Stewart and Lacey 
2012).  
To best understand this aspect, its underlying concepts are explained in the following 
sections. 
3.7.1 Learning styles 
In order to achieve a good level of ISA among users, many learning mechanisms where 
developed such as video gaming, ISA initiatives and classroom style education (Cone et al. 
2007; Sheng et al. 2010; ENISA 2010; Abawajy 2012). As learning about security is not 
enough, where this learning should hopefully lead to a change in behavior and actually practice 
it to ensure its effectiveness (Talib et al. 2010; Abawajy 2012). Further to that, as the user is 
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solely responsible for the protection of his information and devices and not enforced to do so, 
he has the flexibility to choose which ever learning approach that is most convenient to him.  
Talib et al. (2010) and  Alarifi et al. (2012 ) found that the most preferred learning sources for 
users are by reading information security material on the web, knowledge gained at workplace 
and through reading news articles and advertisement in newspapers. This highlights that users 
are not the same and learn differently. The findings of (Talib et al. 2010) suggest that although 
users do not perform this learning at home on a regular basis, but almost two thirds of their 
sample population were found to be willing to learn about information security at home. 
However, each individual has his own way(s) of learning preferences and styles. 
Honey and Mumford define learning styles as " Descriptions of attitudes and behavior 
which determines an individual's preferred way of learning" (Coeffield et al. 2004). Vermont 
defines learning styles as "Coherent whole of learning activities that students usually employ 
their learning orientation and mental model of learning"  (Vermunt and Verloop 1999).  
Stewart and Felicetti (1992) define learning styles as " educational conditions under which a 
student is most likely to learn".  Hence, learning styles are not only about what individuals 
learn, but actually how they prefer to learn. Thus, learning styles could be defined as an 
individual's preferred means of learning and gaining knowledge.  
Coeffield et al. (2004) classified learning styles into five families, as in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure ‎3.7: Learning Styles Families (Coeffield et al. 2004) 
Many other learning styles and models exist and used by individuals to gain knowledge, 
where this knowledge is acquired through a number of human sensory related channels. The 
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most commonly used is the VAK/VARK Model represented by (Fleming 2001). According to 
this model, the learning styles are Visual, Auditory, Read/Write and Kinesthetic as in Figure 
3.8. 
 
Figure ‎3.8: VARK Learning Styles 
Individuals learn more effectively by using one of these modalities (Al Sabbagh et al. 
2012). Although learning styles, especially the VAK/VARK Model are the most commonly 
used at schools and universities on the one hand. On the other hand, many researchers have 
criticized learning styles theories and questioned their validity. Coeffield et al. (2004) found 
that no independent research was used to adequately validate any of the most popular learning 
styles resulting in a conclusion that their effect on individual's learning achievement is highly 
questionable. This was also supported by Hargreaves (2005) where they claim that the evidence 
for the effectiveness of learning styles is "highly variable". Similarly, Willingham (2009) states 
that not enough evidence is found to support a theory that describes the learning styles 
differences among students.  
However, as our concern is how to best raise ISA of users about information security risks 
and guide them to make an informed security decision , the concept of learning styles may be 




3.7.2 Mental models and personality traits 
As humans are the weakest link in information security, increased attention has been given 
to information security awareness and behavior in the last decade (Lebek et al. 2013). 
Behavioral information security focuses on human behavior to protect information systems, 
through awareness, from a human perspective (Lebek et al. 2013; Ophoff and Robinson 2014). 
This multi-disciplinary research domain, includes theories from sociology, psychology and 
criminology that were adapted or used by researchers to assess users' behavior and ISA (Lebek 
et al. 2013). These theories suggest that user's ISA of security threats influence his attitude and 
behavior towards these threats. However, these theories tend to assess user's intensions rather 
than actual behavior due to many difficulties in monitoring user's security behavior (Lebek et 
al. 2013). Nevertheless, a more holistic view of this challenge has to be considered to have a 
better understanding of how to best motivate and influence users' behavior to maximize their 
engagement and cooperation in the information security process. 
In an attempt to understand the factors that influence information security behavior, Badie 
and Lashkari (2012) categorized these factors into human and organizational factors where 
human factors are most significant than organizational factors. Human factors were divided into 
factors that belong to management, workload and inadequate staffing and factors that belong to 
the user, lack of awareness, behavior, belief, improper technology use and lack of motivation. 
Similarly, Furnell and Rajendran (2012) classified human factors as workplace dependent and 




Figure ‎3.9: Influences upon security behavior (Furnell and Rajendran 2012) 
Further to that, in their proposed model they assigned indicative weights to these factors. 
Although such weightings are subjective and may differ from one situation to another, but it 
can be used as a guide to the significance of such factor and its influence on users' security 
behavior. A positive aspect of this model is the consideration of a user's personality and that it 
contributes to information security behavior.  Hence, it is not guaranteed that the same person 
can make the same decision in all contexts, this was reflected as situational factors. This was 
confirmed by (Kajzer et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014). However, users do not respond to security 
threats in the same manner (Albrechtsen 2007; Furnell et al. 2008; Martin and Rice 2011; 
Kajzer et al. 2014) and that actual behavior may differ from intended behavior (Shropshire et 
al. 2015) due to various factors that are filtered through the user's personality. Hence, it is 
effective to further explore this aspect by considering the different personality traits and 
security mental models of users. 
The Big Five personality traits are a widely accepted personality model in several research 
domains (Kajzer et al. 2014;  Shropshire et al. 2015). In the information security literature, 
there is a trend to use the Big Five personality test to assess personality in order to understand 
user's behavior (Warkentin et al. 2012; Kajzer et al. 2014;  Shropshire et al. 2015). The 
84 
 
characteristics that describe the human personality traits ( Kajzer et al. 2014) are as shown in 
Table 3.8. 
 
Table ‎3.8: The Big Five Personality traits 
A number of studies investigated the relationship between personality traits and user’s 
online behavior. Halevi et al (2013) examined the correlation between the Big Five personality 
traits and responding to phishing emails and how they relate to user’s readiness to protect his 
privacy on Facebook. Their findings indicated that users with neuroticism personality have 
higher susceptibility to respond to phishing emails. Moreover, users with openness personality 
where found to be most vulnerable to privacy threats due to them posting more personal 
information on Facebook. This was confirmed by Bachrach et al. (2012) as their findings 
demonstrated a relationship between the Big Five and Facebook profile features. Egelman and 
Peer (2015a)  indicated that personality traits are a weak indicator of privacy preferences 
compared to risk taking behavior and decision making. Hence, they proposed a Security 
Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) to measure user’s security behavior intentions. However, the 
reliability and efficiency of this scale requires further validation.  
Kajzer et al. (2014) studied the effectiveness of some ISA message themes considering 
different types of individuals based on their personality traits. They used five message themes 
which are: 
1) Deterrence which focuses on sanctions for illicit behavior. 
2) Morality which focus on the user doing what is considered right. 
3) Regret where prior to making a decision, individuals anticipate the consequences of 
their choices such as encouraging them to back up their data. 
4) Incentive where rewards are given to individuals which affect choices they make. 
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5) Feedback received from an action, whether negative or positive, will affect individuals 
engagement in an action. 
They used an online survey to collect data and obtained  293 usable responses. Their 
findings suggest that personality plays a role in the effectiveness of ISA messages and 
accordingly in changing a user's behavior. This indicates that to increase the effectiveness of 
persuasive messages, they have to be tailored to the user. Further to that, message-person 
congruence is highly affected by user's personality. For example, conscientiousness individuals 
were found to be more receptive to feedback messages while openness individuals were found 
to be negatively affected by regret, feedback and incentive messages. An interesting result is 
that older users were found to be more receptive to morality, regret and feedback messages. 
Further to that, individuals with more than average security knowledge were found to be 
negatively affected by feedback messages. This suggests that age and security knowledge have 
an effect on user's behavior.  
In another study by Rakić-Bajić and Hedrih (2012) to explore relations between excessive 
use of Internet and personality traits, they found that several personality traits especially 
conscientiousness had a significant effect on excessive Internet use. Moreover, personality 
traits were used to explain the relation between user's intension and actual intensions to engage 
in protective behaviors and found that agreeableness and conscientiousness are conceptually 
linked to secure behaviors. Further to that , their findings suggest that the two constructs of the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) which are the ease of use and perceived usefulness of 
security measures are significant factors that affect user's behavior. This was, similarly, 
confirmed by (Furnell and Rajendran 2012; Shropshire et al. 2015). 
Even though some users avoid making security decisions due to lack of knowledge, skills 
and self-confidence, they are still required to make some decisions on a regular basis (Furnell 
and Clarke 2012). These decisions are arguably influenced by their mental models or how they 
think about information security whether these models are correct or not (Asgharpor et al. 
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2007; Wash and Rader 2011). Camp (2006) indicates that these mental models, as in Figure 
3.10, are widely used by security experts. 
 
Figure ‎3.10: Mental Models (Camp 2006) 
So, mental models could be interpreted as psychological representations of hypothetical, 
real or imaginary situations. They describe how an individual reason about a situation or a 
problem, make predictions about what might happen and provide guidelines on which 
behavioral choices are based. They develop and change over time adapting to new experiences 
and information (Asgharpor et al. 2007; Wash 2010; Wash and Rader 2011). Each mental 
model can result in a different user response such as physical mental model evokes lock-down 
and protection responses (Camp 2006). Accordingly, to understand user's behavior, one needs 
to understand how he thinks. 
 To better understand mental models used by HU to make security decisions, (Wash 2010) 
interviewed 33 non expert HU. By focusing on differences between users, he identified eight 
mental models that could be divided into two categories: 
 Models about spyware, adware, viruses and other forms malware as they did not 
distinguish between them (medical infections mental model) 
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 Models about attackers and the threat of breaking into computer where they used the 
term 'hacker' to describe anyone who does bad things on the Internet regardless of who 
they are and how they work (criminal behavior mental model). 
These findings come consistent with (Harbach et al. 2014) that user's top security concerns 
are about privacy, account abuse, malware, hackers and financial risks and fraud. However, 
their findings demonstrate that there is a difference between expert and non-expert mental 
models and how these models affect the HU security behavior. This was also confirmed by 
(Asgharpor et al. 2012).  
In a following study, Wash and Rader (2011) tried to explore the sources of information, 
where these models, whether correct or not, come from and how they impact these mental 
models and found that shared security stories and experiences are the main sources of 
information. As stories shared by people among the community, media, personal experience 
will lead to change the way users think about security and by focusing on models that lead to 
better decisions rather than which models are correct, they propose a new way of thinking 
about users' security. However, sharing stories is not enough, but sharing the right stories is 
needed.  This is achieved by having a community based story repository that is monitored by IT 
experts where only stories that lead to a positive information security behavior are included. A 
similar approach to create a community based risk repository was also recommended by (Van 
Cleef 2010).  
3.7.3 ISA Delivery methods 
Attackers often focus on the vulnerabilities created by human factors as it is considered the 
least resistant path (Abawajy 2012). Despite that ISA is considered to be one of the defense 
lines against information security threats (Aloul 2010; Abawajy 2012; Alarifi et al.  2012; Al-
Hadadi and Al Shihani  2013; Kaur and Mustafa  2013) it is not a final goal, but should go 
beyond to changing user's behavior towards information security. Some of the critical success 
factors of ISA is the delivered message to the user, why and how it is delivered (Sheng  et al. 
2010; Khan et al. 2011; Abawajy 2012; Sedinic et al. 2014). There are many types of ISA 
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delivery methods ranging from classroom-style workshops to web based training as in Table 
3.11. In reference to Table 3.9, several studies in the literature have discussed the effectiveness 
of such delivery methods, user's preference and how they are used. 
 
Table ‎3.9: Effective Delivery Methods 
For example, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) discussed and evaluated the effects of a 
training program that involves users directly to improve their ISA and behavior. Their findings 
suggest that behavior is a direct product of ISA and that it takes more time to change behavior 
than ISA and that information security dialogue and the sharing of security experiences is an 
effective approach to increasing ISA and behavioral change. This is confirmed by findings of 
Wash and Rader (2011). Nevertheless, this study fails to show how effective is this approach 
compared with other delivery methods.   
 Olusegun and Ithnin (2013) implemented a campus wide ISA program to educate staff, 
faculty members and university students about information security. For students, emails, 
monthly newsletters, advertisement in students' newspapers, presentations, posters and web 
based training delivery methods were used. Whereas for faculty and staff members,  they used 
in-person and web based training, posters, monthly newsletter, payroll stuffers and targeted 
emails. The only metric used to measure the success of the program was the increase in the 
number of reported incidents regarding threats to information assets and viruses which shows 
that the targeted audience were receptive to this program especially that the training part was 
not compulsory. However, no information was given about the existence of a university 
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security policy and whether students and non-students were aware of it. A good idea was to put 
the security policy in a poster or at least a link to it on the university's website.  
To study the relationship between phishing susceptibility and demographics as well as the 
effectiveness of several anti-phishing education material, Sheng et al. (2010) conducted an 
online study. Participants knowledge about phishing was assessed by them answering survey 
questions then engage in a role-playing game. Later, they received some education about 
phishing then finally played a second round of the role-playing game. Among their findings, 
participants fell for 47% of given phishing websites prior training that decreased to 28% after 
receiving the anti-phishing education. These findings suggest that awareness of phishing and 
how to avoid it could be learnt from training materials such as games and comics. As 
participants behavior was assessed before and after the training, their findings give strong 
indications on the effectiveness of the delivery methods used.  
Currently, social networks/media are becoming a useful platform for enabling knowledge 
sharing whether on personal or organizational level. Due to its increasing popularity, social 
networks could be utilized as an effective online learning community and a tool to educate 
users about information security (Tayouri 2015; Chan et al. 2016; Ahmed et al. 2018). To 
reflect on the preference of social networks as an ISA delivery method, Shillair (2016) 
conducted an online survey that attracted 800 participants. Among its findings is that the 
majority of participants saw social networks as a good source of security awareness and 
training that could help enhance online security and safety. Several studies have sought to 
explore the effectiveness of utilizing social networks in raising ISA and their findings are 
encouraging (Labuschange et al. 2011; Cetto et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2016; Karavaras et al. 
2016). Motivated by the massive use of social media, Sari and Prasetio (2017) for example, 
investigated the effectiveness of group discussion to share knowledge in social networks called 
electronic Word of Mouth (eWOM). In this method, users exchange knowledge through 
informal communication. They used an online survey for data collection. Among their findings 
was that on respondents Timeline, 82% believed the security articles shared by their friends and 
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72% will retweet/share these articles suggesting the popularity of this kind of delivery method. 
However, nothing was mentioned regarding the trusting of information source. 
Similar studies have shown user's preference of delivery methods such as web based 
training (Sedinic et al. 2014), video based training (Abawajy  2012; Al Sabbagh et al.  2012), 
group discussion and workshop (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; Khan et al. 2011) and web 
portals, newspapers and advertisement (Alarifi et al. 2012). 
In a study by Abawajy (2012) to compare the effectiveness of text based (short web 
articles), video based ("how to avoid phishing" video) and game based (Anti-phishing  phil) 
delivery methods, a qualitative experiment was conducted where participants of different 
demographics and varying levels of ISA were chosen. However the text based and video based 
methods where to found to better broaden the participants knowledge in their ISA compared to 
game based methods. Moreover, over 50% of participants preferred video based methods and 
over 33% preferred text based methods whereas only 5% preferred game based delivery 
methods. These findings may be surprising, but one could explain the high preference of video 
based methods due to the clear and easier to follow information. Additionally, this could be due 
to lack of interest in reading an author's predetermined structure article and to better 
understanding of concepts and ideas when presented in both visual and verbal form. The low 
preference of game based methods could be correlated with participants demographics which 
were not explained in this study. However, the effectiveness of each of the selected delivery 
methods varied.  This indicates that to maximize the benefits of an ISA effort, a joint approach 
should be used that utilizes a combination of delivery methods rather than focusing on one. 
This is consistent with findings of (Shaw et al. 2009; Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; Khan et 
al. 2011; Al Sabbagh et al. 2012). This is may be due to the use of more than one human 
sensory learning styles at the same time in presenting information. 
Khan et al. (2011) assessed the effectiveness of ISA delivery methods from a psychological 
perspective. Delivery methods effectiveness was evaluated on the basis of their proposed five 
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step ladder model. This model resulted from the integration of the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) and the Knowledge, Attitude, Behavior (KAB) model. They assessed seven ISA delivery 
methods according to the presence or absence of their model's components. Results are as 
shown in Table 3.10. 
 
Table ‎3.10: Effectiveness of ISA Methods (Khan et al. 2011) 
The most effective delivery method was the group discussion which is similar to 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010) findings. However, this is an ISA theoretical study based on 
awareness and behavior psychological theories. Although their findings are confirmed by 
literature (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010), but these findings would have been more 
comprehensive and indicative if backed up with experimental evidence.  
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 Delivery Method Comments Pros Cons 
Conventional  
Paper based 
Such as posters, brochures, and 
newsletters  
- Highlight timely sensitive issues 
- Periodic ISA enforcement 
- Targeted audience can be easily reached 
- Could be easily lost and overlooked 
- Needs proper distribution 
- Relevant to targeted audience only 
Trinkets 
Such as pens, notepads where a 
security message is attached to it 
- Cost effective to produce 
- Convey a single message 
- Message has to be well written 
Electronic based 
Security alert messages Such as 
screen savers and pre-logon messages 
- People are guaranteed to see it because it is placed on 
the computer 





Knowledge and experience is shared 
among participants under the 
monitoring role of the IT expert 
- Interactive with the engagement of all participants 
- Answers are provided in a timely manner 
- Fairly expensive 
- Boring if participants are not motivated to share their 




A formal approach to ISA where an 
IT expert is used to lecture users 
- Reach a large population  
- Face to face communication 
- Boring 
- Instructor has to have an ability to engage participants 
Online 
Email broadcasts 
Developed by organizations or by IT 
experts 
- Cheap 
- May convey more than one message 
- Directed at targeted audiences 
- Targeted audience email addresses have to be known 
- May be undermined due to spam 
Blogs and 
websites 
- Can be timely and updated 
- Users may not be aware of them 
- May not include the proper guidance. 
Web-based 
training 
Enable users to improve their 
knowledge at their own pace 
- User friendly 
- Can reach a wider audience regardless of their 
geographical location 
- More detailed content 
- Expensive to be developed 
- Requires some technical knowledge in advance 
- No interaction with trainee 




Catches the player's attention and 
engages him.  
A good way for motivating the user to 
adapt the desired behavior 
- Interactive 
- Appealing to certain groups such as the young 
- Has to be carefully designed to ensure its objectives  




Simulated phishing emails sent to 
users to test their vulnerability to 
phishing attacks followed by training 




Combine audio and visual learning 
- Easy to use 
- Users can start and stop it at anytime 
- Flexible, can be watched several times 
- Cannot guarantee content absorption 
- Expensive to develop 





Users should be equipped properly to be protected. It is not enough to know about threats and 
why they are significant, for example, but they should be able to know what to do to protect 
themselves from these threats and how to use the related safeguards. This implies that the approach 
to awareness needs to be changed from just informing users about security issues to actually 
helping them to develop the ability to deal with them, i.e. create an information security literacy 
among users by creating a baseline of information security culture (Kritzinger and von Solms 2010; 
Furnell and Clarke 2012; Furnell and Moore 2014; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013).  
Users, arguably, do not have the time or willingness to educate themselves about information 
security (Talib et al. 2010; Maurer et al. 2011). Additionally, they may be faced with difficulties in 
"how to do” things practically due to differences between devices, systems and platforms used 
(Furnell and Moore 2014).  Indeed,  users have problems in understanding the security 
functionality of some standard applications and tools such as web browsers and email software 
(Rao and Pati 2012). This could be due to the fact that information security software developers 
have assumed users possess too much prior knowledge and, thus, failed to assist and inform the 
user in making security related decisions (Aloul 2010; Furnell and Clarke 2012).  
If users lack the required knowledge or not prepared to make such decisions, this may result in 
weakening the performance of the proposed control (Furnell and Clarke 2012). Eventually, the 
successful operation of such tools depend on how the users' deploy, configure and operate them 
(Talib et al.2010). Even younger people who grew up with technology and are significant users of 
it were found to be not using it properly (Furnell and Moore 2014) which highlights the importance 
of an ISA approach that goes beyond informing the user, to convincing the user of his 




To overcome this challenge, a number of approaches could be used. These are automation, 
education, understand how the user think and a joint approach: 
As it is argued that users are not well equipped or "ill-informed" to make the proper security 
decisions when needed (Kritzinger and von Solms 2010; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Furnell and 
Moore 2014), then increasing the level of automation in security software maybe a solution.  This 
implies that the user is removed from the decision making process in security solutions that are 
targeted for HU and, thus, making the security software act more securely (Furnell et al. 2008; 
Wash and Rader 2011; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Rao and Pati 2012). This "Stupid User Approach" 
(Wash and Rader 2011) is quite successful. Many modern Firewalls operate securely without user 
intervention. Anti-Virus software, for example, has minimum interactivity with the user as it 
regularly and automatically scan the computer for known malware and remove it. Microsoft, in 
Windows 10, is replacing the scheduled monthly updates used in older versions of Windows to 
automatic  updates whenever needed (Microsoft.com 2017).  Moreover, a security software may 
integrate more than one functionality such as Norton Internet Security suite that provides Anti-
Virus protection, Intrusion Detection and warns the user about known unsafe websites before 
visiting them. Further to that, this approach has inspired the authors of (Rao and Pati 2012) to 
recommend the development of an intelligent software that automates the responses to some web 
browsers' features such as ActiveX controls and cookies. This is done by tracking the preinstalled 
software on the user's system and user's Internet behavior then this intelligent software is tuned 
accordingly to provide protection with little user intervention. As this Automation Approach may 
be attractive, but it has limited effectiveness where some modern threats are difficult to protect 
from by technology only. Good examples of such threats are phishing and social engineering 
threats (Aloul 2010; Hasan and Hussin 2010; Sheng et al. 2010). Furthermore, a software update 
for example, may not be compatible with a user's preinstalled favorite software or resource such as 
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RAM which may result in him simply rejecting this update. This is the case where ISA is crucially 
needed for the user to appreciate the nature of security threats and motivate him to make an 
informed decision.  An extension to this approach is the one recommended by (Furnell et al. 2008) 
where the user is required to have the appropriate security controls installed and updated before 
granting the system full functionality to operate online. However, this may not be feasible and less 
realistic as it would unfairly put demands that are arguably not understood by the average user as it 
requires major information security culture change. Another idea for enforcing users to protect 
themselves is by delegating the user's protection to an ISP  (Kritzinger and von Solms 2010; 
Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013). 
Another extreme to the former approach is to give the user the freedom to choose based upon 
appropriate information security training so he has the ability to make an informed decision, or the 
" The Education Approach" according to (Wash and Rader 2011).  Motivated by this approach, the 
authors of (Wahlberg et al. 2013) proposed a web browser Google Chrome Add On, named Kepler, 
to raise browser security awareness and help users find out what is actually happening during web 
browsing such as where resources are requested from and what kind of responses were returned in 
an appealing "eye-pleasant" format to satisfy as bigger audience as possible. Moreover, it provides 
information about the security of the request to non-technical users in a clear and understood way. 
This way users can make security decisions by themselves. As Kepler may be considered as a step 
forward in informing and educating the user by presenting detailed information about web 
browsing in a human, easily readable form, it is just a prototype. Thus, no real indications exist 
about its functionality yet. But it was worth reviewing due to its original concept in educating users 
about web browsing and giving them the freedom to choose. However, a drawback of this 
prototype is that when results are displayed to the user, no filtering of requests is made which 
might leave the user confused between harmful and non-harmful request. This education approach 
can be translated into information security training and education for organizational employees and 
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the different ISA initiatives made by Governments, Operating System vendors and Anti-Virus 
providers that were discussed earlier. However, for the general public this may arguably be 
challenging especially that little evidence is found that HU are knowledgeable of information 
security and actually practicing it (Talib et al. 2010). This confirms the need that users should gain 
ISA at a younger age by having schools integrate information security in their curriculum to teach 
them  about different information security issues and their responsibility in how to protect 
themselves against information security threats. Not limited to that, but also teach them about the 
ethical and legal aspects of online behavior (Hasan and Hussin 2010). Although this may not result 
in a perfectly aware population but will help in having individuals that are better aware of the 
current situation and how to respond to it. 
A recent approach is the "understand how the user think approach" (Wash and Rader 2011). 
This is a more complicated approach as it requires to understand how users think about information 
security and how they make security decisions. This approach may be inspired from facts that IT 
experts overestimate the net value of security and ignore users' efforts and time spent when giving 
advice to them. Moreover, users tend to ask family and friends for advice on security issues rather 
than formal support from experts and official online resources (Furnell et al. 2008; Furnell and 
Clarke 2012).  The authors of (Wash and Rader 2011) believe that one of the promising approaches 
to improve user's ISA and change his behavior accordingly is through changing his mental model, 
i.e. the way he thinks about security, by providing a mechanism for non-technical users to sharing 
security stories with each other. This may be a good approach to influence users' behavior as it is 
successful in other disciplines, i.e. the healthcare, but a major drawback of this approach is that 
users may not be willing to share highly personal and sensitive information about information 
security incidents. Further to that, they may not see such stories as beneficial to others or they may 
report more security behavior than reality just to give the impression that they are more secure than 
they really are. 
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A joint effort approach in which many groups work together to produce a security-minded 
individual.  Whereas home computers are used by attackers as platforms, , i.e. botnets, to launch 
attacks such as DDos attacks on a country's or other countries information infrastructure 
(Kritzinger and Von Solms 2013), cyber security laws should be produced and enforced by 
Governments. As these threats are not limited to one country, there has to be some form of 
collaboration between Governments around the world to fight against cybercrime. Additionally, 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) should be established to improve the ISA among 
users. Computer forensic teams should be established in police departments to aid in catching such 
attackers. Even Non-Government organizations should launch ISA and education campaigns to 
their employees and to users from the general public as a community service and assess its 
effectiveness. Advice on how to safely use the Internet should be provided by Internet Service 
Providers (ISP). The media also has its role in this joint effort by continuously publishing 
information about information security incidents together with the penalty put on attackers. Last 
but not least is the users themselves, by sensing the responsibility and their role in being part of the 
solution and continuously be aware of information security threats and how to combat them 
through educating themselves. 
Thus, when educating the user and directing his behavior several aspects should be considered 
to leverage the learning process. The following are found to be key behavioral influencers: 
1) Different learning styles should be considered to increase user's engagement into the 
learning process and, thus, increase the learning outcome. For example, in a visual /audio 
learning style, more images, color, pictures and other visual media could be incorporated 
along with some background sound to increase the visualization. 
2) Cultural differences is another aspect that has been found to affect user's behavior. Users 
come from different countries of different cultures. Hence, what sounds like a good 
learning mechanism for some users from a certain culture may not be suitable for another 
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user from another culture. Therefore, understanding how users from different countries and 
different cultural backgrounds perceive Information security and manage it accordingly 
affects the shaping of their behavior especially with the existence of culture-specific risks. 
3) Level of IT expertise has a significant effect on user's behavior whereas this expertise is 
obtained through formal information security education such as in IT experts. This should 
be highly considered especially when communicating risk to users to both persuade them 
and avoid overwhelming them with information already known to them. However, the 
higher the level of IT knowledge does not guarantee secure behavior. This is evident as in 
young people who are significant users of technology are not found to be good users of it 
especially regarding their behavior in Social Networks and their tendency to reveal 
sensitive information such as photos and location (Hasan and Hussin 2010; Furnell and 
Moore 2014). 
4) Awareness of information security risks, as users, who are found to be ill-informed, and 
their arguably lack of awareness is one of the reasons behind them becoming the weakest 
link in information security. Eventually, users can only pay attention to risks they are 
aware of and act accordingly (Albrechtsen 2007). Knowing which information security 
risks users want to be protected from is significant in convincing them to protect 
themselves. However, according to the KAB model, knowledge accumulation leads to a 
change in attitude and, therefore, a change in behavior (Khan et al. 2011). Thus, an 
increase of knowledge may not be the ultimate factor, alone, of behavioral change on the 
long term. This aspect could be more explained by focusing on the factors that cause a 
change in attitude and result in direct or indirect change in behavior. Subjective norms or 
the user's belief of what people think about him, is another factor that causes a change in 
behavior through the awareness component. According to Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB), behavioral change depends on individual's intensions. These two factors, attitude 
99 
 
and subjective norm, are correlated where a positive attitude and subjective norms have a 
positive influence on intentions to change a behavior (Khan et al. 2011). Moreover, 
stressing on personal responsibility and that users are solely responsible for the protection 
of their own information and devices along with the required guidance on how to protect 
themselves has an effect on their behavior. Lack of awareness is considered a vulnerability 
that can be exploited by attackers such as phishing attacks. As one of the goals of ISA is to 
reduce information security risks, a proposed way to assess such ISA is that after educating 
the user, he may be asked some questions to assess his material absorption. However, 
answering such questions correctly does not guarantee that the user is motivated to change 
his behavior according to the accumulated knowledge. One solution to that is to have an 
automatic security reporting incident database. The lower the number of unsolved reported 
incidents, the higher the ISA level.  
5) Usability (perceived benefit and ease of use). Since HU have no security policy to 
comply to, but have guidelines instead, negative consequences are the only punishment 
they may have to fear. Technology does help them in providing some level of protection 
but technology alone is no silver bullet. Accordingly, one way to motivate users to adopt 
positive security behavior is by convincing them to prevent such negative consequences by 
utilizing security countermeasures. Further to that, users find some difficulties in using 
security tools which may be an obstacle in them adopting such tools. As software 
developers assume way too much knowledge in users when designing their tools (Wash 
and Rader 2011; Furnell and Clarke 2012; Stewart and Lacey 2012) this may result in users 
having difficulties in understanding how these tools work. This misunderstanding may 
result in them degrading the tools performance or simply shutting it down especially if it 
continues to bother them with annoying messages, reduce their productivity or conflict 
with other favorite software. Another problem with security software is that the benefits of 
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using it may not be evident or noticed as other software that enhance user's performance 
and have a clear functionality such as word processors and spreadsheet applications. 
Therefore, users have to discover a security measure first, and then decide if it is worth the 
effort to use it or not (Harbach et al. 2014). 
6) Past experience. This experience, whether correct or not, of information security risks 
creates a level of ISA that is gained informally from several resources. Examples of such 
resources are security stories from family and friends, media coverage or previous security 
incidents.  
7) Risk communication. Effective risk communication attempts to change user's risk 
perception to elicit safe behavior. As risk is perceived differently among users 
(Albrechtsen 2007), it is important to have targeted risk communication to ensure its 
relevancy (Blythe et al. 2011; Maurer et al. 2011; Wash and Rader 2011; Al Sabbagh et al. 
2012; Stewart and Lacey 2012; Harbach et al. 2014). The problem with risk 
communication is that it is designed by experts who communicate facts about risks and 
them being experts in technology does not guarantee that they can best communicate the 
risk. The approach to risk communication should arguably be user focused and not fact 
focused (Stewart and Lacey 2012). That is, messages are tailored to user's needs and 
understanding. Ineffective risk communication may result in negative consequences that 
experts blame users for. Experts often use words like 'stupid' or 'lazy' (Wash and Rader 
2011; Abawajy 2012; Rughiniş and Rughiniş 2014) to explain users' behavior and overlook 
limitations that are placed on them such as time, resources, money and learning 
capabilities. However, when users respond to risk this does not imply they are guaranteed 
to make the right choice or do the best practice. This highlights the importance of 
considering limitations opposed on users who may not arguably look for a 'perfect choice' 
as modeled by experts, but for a choice that satisfy their needs and limitations. This is 
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evident when risk communication messages use technical terminology that may not be well 
understood by users, resulting in them choosing an option related to his understanding of 
the situation. The key to effective risk communication is to communicate the right 
information at the right time and framed in the right context. More effective risk 
communication and behavioral change can be developed by classifying users as discussed 
in section 3.5 or by considering personality traits of users (Kajzer et al. 2014). Instead of 
having traditional pop up boxes with words that are often too technical to comprehend by 
the user and to ensure the proper influence, risk communication has to be tailored to 
specific needs of users. To avoid overwhelming the user, the message should be proactive, 
simply worded where jargon and technical terminology is tailored to his IT level, state the 
risk, why it is relevant, what to do and finally how to protect from that risk. This is done to 
arguably ensure a long term outcome. Additionally, messages have to be relevant, timely, 
up-to-date to reflect the evolving threat landscape, guiding with an interesting delivery 
mechanism. However, the design of such messages has to be done carefully to avoid 
negative influences. This will arguably maximize message appeal and persuade users to 
change their behavior to take an informed action. 
8) Mental models. These are user's understanding of a situation and how they think about it 
and act accordingly. As experts' mental models are different form non-experts, it is 
significant to understand user's mental models and how they perceive the risk in order to 
motivate them to change their behavior. By understanding their mental models, it may be 
possible to identify and explain the reason(s) behind such behavior. Instead of just 
communicating general facts about risks, targeted communication that try to alter these 
behaviors or reasons behind such actions may arguably be more efficient and effective. 
This may play a role in designing messages that are within the arguably limited cognitive 
skills of the user. 
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9) Personality traits. These are factors that affect user's behavior and unethical computing 
practices. Different versions of the same message, by using the manipulation of words, 
could be used to have different effects on different personalities (Kajzer et al. 2014). Hence 
a change in behavior could be achieved if a message is framed towards the user's 
personality trait. By simply having a user undertake a personality test by answering some 
questions, his personality trait will be identified and the message will be framed 
accordingly.  
One of the objectives of this research is to raise user's ISA and change his behavior accordingly 
especially that users may be aware of risks but simply choose to do nothing about them. The above 
mentioned factors were found to be key influencers on user's security behavior. As in Figure 3.11, 
factors from 1-7 are all filtered through the user's personality then results in a change of user's 
behavior or reinforce good security practices. Given that users have limitations that affect their 
behavior and may not make the same security decisions in the same situations all the time resulting 
in some users being at risk more than others.  
3.9 Conclusion 
Attackers often choose the least resistant path of unintentional vulnerabilities created by the 
human factor but information security is as strong as its weakest link. As users are found to be 
lacking ISA in general due to many reasons, it is important to continuously raise their ISA to 
transform them from ill-informed users to security minded users. However, this transformation 
could be achieved through a number of identified critical success factors that influence users' 
behavior. A user needs to know the risk, understand the need to act against it and change his 
behavior accordingly to make an informed decision. Indeed, raising ISA and having a security 
minded user is not easy. This is evident as many ISA raising initiatives have been undertaken and 
many solutions and counter measures are proposed and users still show low levels of ISA. 
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However, there is no right or wrong  ISA as it is not a single step but a continuous journey to raise 
users' responsibility in protecting themselves and be capable of detecting, removing threats  and 
making informed decisions when required. As it is challenging to meet the needs of every user, this 
could be achieved through a structured approach to ISA by knowing how aware users are of 
security risks, the extent in which they make security informed decisions and why certain users are 





Figure ‎3.11:  Key Behavioral Influencers on User's Security Behavior 
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Chapter 4 : An Investigation into the Impact of Personality, 




Identifying the characteristics that may influence end-user’s security behavior and being highly 
vulnerable to security threats is an important step in protecting and defending such users against 
security attacks. Additionally, as end-users’ intentions may differ from their actual behavior and 
the fact that different users react differently to the same stimuli, it is imperative to understand the 
extent in which end-users are practicing good security behavior and the reasons behind these 
variations in security practices. Therefore, knowing how this behavior is influenced by user 
differences and to what extent, will help in designing solutions that adapt to the needs of those who 
are vulnerable.  
This chapter is structured as follows: related work is described in the next section followed by 
the Research Methodology. Findings of the survey are presented in Section 4. The significance 
testing on the relationship between user-centric factors and the risk taking behavior is examined in 
Section 5 followed by a discussion of the main findings of the study and a conclusion in sections 6 
and 7 respectively. 
4.2 Related Work 
Despite the interest of studying user’s security behavior and practices, correlating it to 
psychological factors, demographics and other characteristics has not been thoroughly explored 
yet. Demographics, include age, gender, education level, and occupation, are the most common 
characteristics that are often used to analyze behaviors. For example, the password is the most 
common protection method for end-users’ systems and data. Bonneau (2012) has demonstrated that 
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the strength of the password is associated with end-users’ age (i.e., older users tend to use more 
complex password) and their nationalities. Schuessler and Hite (2014) suggest that a user’s 
password strength is affected by their educational background and work ethic. Butler and Butler 
(2014) undertook a survey of 737 respondents to explore other factors have suggested that poor 
password behavior could be caused by the lack of user’s knowledge and motivation. From the 
attacking perspective, social engineering is a simple yet effective attack that is widely used to 
obtain end-users’ information, such as login credentials. Workman (2007) demonstrates that social 
engineering victims shared several common factors (e.g., age, education, and commitment). Also, 
Sheng et al. (2010) suggest that gender and age are two key indicators that can be used to predict 
end-users’ phishing susceptibility as they found that female participants aged 18-25 were more 
vulnerable to phishing attacks. From a training and education perspective, Jeske et al. (2014) 
suggest that a user’s IT proficiency was in line with their security decisions; and hence better 
security decisions can be made if user’s IT proficiency was improved. By studying the impact of 
cultural factors on user’s security awareness levels, Kruger et al. (2011) demonstrate that the user’s 
security awareness levels are related with their language, gender and fields of study. Further to that, 
the real time behavior and the ability to defend against real time threats in users who are either 
more aware of Internet risks or use the Internet more than others, depended on factors other than 
security awareness such as individual differences that needed further investigation (Halevi et al. 
2013).  
Moreover, empirical evidence, through personality psychology, was found that the study of 
personality explains differences in human behavior (Oliveira et al. 2013). The use of personality to 
understand user’s behavior is a well-established domain. In order to obtain a person’s personality 
characteristics, a number of test models can be utilized, such as the Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory (Costa and McCrae 1992), Five-Factor Model Rating Form (Lynam and Widiger 2001), 
and Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al. 2003). Amongst these models, John and 
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Srivastava’s (1999) 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI) model is one of the most widely accepted 
and used across several research domains. The BFI model contains 5 main set of personality traits: 
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience (Costa and 
McCrae 1992).  
The use of personality factors to predict and explain various IT security behavior was initially 
proposed by Shropshire et al. (2006). However, they only theoretically discussed the ability of two 
personalities (i.e., conscientiousness and agreeableness) to predict user’s IT security compliant 
behavior. Since then, several research works have been conducted in this area. Based upon 
empirical results, Gabriel and Furnell (2011) demonstrate that 8 personality facets show strong 
correlation with end-user’s generic security behavior, for example, imagination facet and user’s 
security behavior have positive correlation while the immoderation facet and user’s security 
behavior have a negative correlation. Schuessler and Hite (2014) suggest that both agreeableness 
and neuroticism are negatively related with user’s password strength while extroversion shows a 
positive correlation. Shropshire et al. (2015) claim that  the connection between user’s behavioral 
intent and use of security software can be moderated by agreeableness and conscientiousness; 
while Uffen et al. (2013) investigated the influence of personality upon smartphone users’ opinions 
upon the effectiveness of security mechanisms specifically. Their experimental results suggested 
that both openness and conscientiousness have positive correlation upon user’s intentions to utilize 
smartphone security controls while neuroticism has a negative one. Kajzer et al. (2014) suggest that 
a best fit security awareness theme can be introduced based upon user’s personality, hence, 
potentially improving the user’s IT security proficiency.  
For the attacking perspective, a couple of studies have investigated the impact of personality 
upon end-users’ behavior on phishing emails. Halevi et al. (2013) demonstrate that a high 
correlation was found between the neuroticism and responding to phishing attacks. Meanwhile, 
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Pattinson et al. (2012) show that openness, extraversion, and agreeableness were related with user’s 
actions when dealing with the same situation. From the Organizational point of view, a number of 
studies demonstrated some evidence that personalities can influence security policy compliance 
(Herath and Rao 2009; Hu et al. 2012; McBride et al. 2012; Johnston et al. 2016) and potential 
insider misuse (Warkentin et al. 2012). 
Prior work on investigating the relationship between various factors and user’s security 
behaviors is already established; and a summary of existing studies is presented in Table 4.1. 
Nonetheless, a number of limitations are observed from these studies, including the low number of 
participants (e.g., Kruger et al. 2011 and McBride et al. 2012) and factors being considered mainly 
focused on demographics (e.g., Workman 2007). Moreover, Gabriel and Furnell (2011) 
concentrated on personalities only while Hu et al. (2012) targeted on the impact of top management 
and organizational culture. Additional limitations are limited user security behaviors (e.g., phishing 
(Sheng et al. 2010) and password practice (Schuessler and Hite 2014)). This implies that individual 
variations in the process of risk taking behavior is influenced by a number of several factors that 
may give a deeper understanding of how users understand security risks and behave accordingly.  
Therefore, a study that investigates the effect of these variations on user’s information security 
behavior and the relationship between user’s security behavior and differentiating factors from a 
holistic perspective is required. This would provide a deeper insight into variety of affecting factors 
and risk taking behavior. It could be used to predict their security behavior risk level, i.e. more or 
less likely to engage in good security behavior than others, and design solutions that account for 
these individual differences instead of the traditional “one-size-fits-all” solution.  
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Studies Focus Outcomes Method No. of participants 
Workman  (2007) 
Investigates reasons why people may fall victim of 
social engineering attacks 
Results demonstrate social engineering victims share several 
common factors (including age, education, and trust)  
Regression 588 
Herath and Rao 
(2009) 
Assess the impact of organization’s commitment 
upon employee’s intentions with security 
compliance  
Suggest that self-efficacy is a strong indicator of user’s intentions 
regarding policy compliance 
Correlation and a 
component-based approach 
of Partial Least Square (PLS)  
312 
Sheng et al. 
(2010) 
Investigate the relationship between phishing 
susceptibility and demographics  
Both gender and age can be used to predict a user’s weakness in 
phishing  
Multivariate linear regression 1001 
Kruger et al. 
(2011) 
Study the impact of culture in user’s IT security 
awareness 
Mother tongue has an impact on security awareness level ANOVA test 180 
Gabriel and 
Furnell (2011) 
Investigate the connection between user’s security 
behavior and their personalities 
8 personality facets showing strong correlation with user’s security 
behavior 
Pearson correlation 20 
Hu et al. (2012) 
Investigate a number of factors on how to manage 
employee to comply with InfoSec policies 
Demonstrate that conscientiousness has a significantly positive effect 
on the user’s intention on InfoSec polices compliance 
A component-based 
approach of PLS 
148 
McBride et al. 
(2012) 
Investigate the impact of situational factors and 
personality traits upon policy violation within the 
InfoSec domain  
Confirms that users respond to same security scenarios different due 
to their personality traits 
General linear mixed model 
analysis 
150 
Pattinson et al. 
(2012 ) 
Study whether personalities have impact on how 
people mange phishing emails 
When dealing with phishing emails, openness and extraversion are 
associated with not-informed users while agreeableness is related 
with informed users. 
Spearman’s correlation 117 
Warkentin et al. 
(2012) 
An investigation of individual personalities on 
insider abuse intentions  
Their results confirm that personalities have impacts upon 
individual’s cybersecurity behavior 
Random Intercept Model 86 
Halevi et al. 
(2013) 
Study how user’s personality traits contributed to 
their cyber security and privacy practice  
The correlation between the neurosis trait and user’s responding to 




Uffen et al.  
(2013) 
Explore the influence of personality has upon 
smartphone users’ opinions on the effectiveness of 
a security mechanism 
Their outcomes indicate that some personalities influence how 
security controls are used by the user 
A component-based 
approach of PLS 
435 
Jeske et al. (2014) 
Explore the relationship between IT proficiency, 
impulse control and secure behavior 
Self-judged IT proficiency was in line with secure decisions; greater 




Kajzer et al. 
(2014) 
Investigate effectiveness of various InfoSec 
awareness messages upon users according to their 
personalities 
Their exploratory results suggest that practitioners can be assisted in 
finding a more suitable way to tailor security awareness messages 




Explore the relationship between several factors 
(e.g., personality and work ethics) and the strength 
of password chosen by users.  
The user’s password strength were related with their personality and 
work ethic  
t-test, 2-tailed, and 1-tailed 71 
Shropshire et al.  
(2015) 
Investigate the impact of personality upon user’s 
security software usage  
Agreeableness and conscientiousness have strong relation with 
whether users would use security software 
A components-based 
structural equation modeling 
170 
Johnston et al. 
(2016) 
Study the impact of dispositional and situational 
factors upon violations on InfoSec policy 
Their results suggest that the connection between situational factors 
and security policy violation can be moderated by using dispositional 
factors 
A generalized form of the 
standard linear model 
242 




Motivated by the prior literature, this survey was designed to investigate the extent in which  
users are making risk informed decisions and the risk level associated to each user’s activity. As 
this information security behavior is influenced by a number of factors, this survey is sought to 
explore the role of variations in demographics, IT background, level of online activity  in terms of 
the frequency of using online services and personality traits, i.e. user-centric factors, on users’ risk 
exposure and in shaping their risk informed behavior. From this point, the term user-centric factors 
will be used, in all cases unless otherwise specified, to refer to user’s characteristics. The terms 
user(s) and end-user(s) are used interchangeably. Whilst the term security behavior is utilized 
throughout this thesis, in all cases unless otherwise specified, this refers to behavioral intent rather 
than actual behavior. Accordingly, this survey, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 , seeks to: 
1- Get an overview of participants ‘ demographic characteristics such as age group, gender, 
education and personality through the Big Five Inventory personality traits (BFI). 
2-  Investigate whether users use different Internet-enabled devices  
3- Measure the risk exposure, appetite, of users  
4- Explore if the nature of risk changes associated to variations in certain user-centric factors 
such as demographics and level of online service usage. 
5- Understand the relationship between risk posture and user-centric factors. 
6- Assess the risk behavior of users according to the following: 
a. Password  hygiene, i.e. frequency of changing passwords, password sharing, password 
strength and how to keep track of passwords. 
b. Public access networks , i.e. the frequency of use. 
c. Social networks, i.e. the frequency of engaging in social networks, accepting 
invitations  and type of information shared. 
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d. Security measures, i.e. what security measures are used, how frequently they update 
their security software, what problems they have with security measures and how they 
respond to security warning messages 
e. Security breaches, i.e. the kind of losses due to a security breach and to whom they 
reported it. 
f. Precautions taken in the case of downloading email attachments whether from a 
known or an unknown sender, the use of USB drives and encryption and locking of 
their devices. 
Therefore, the following research questions (RQ) were created: 
RQ1: “What is the general risk level associated with a user’s security behavior?” 
RQ2: “Is there a relationship between user’s-centric factor X and the risk level of security 
behavior y” 
RQ3: “If there is a relationship between user’s-centric factor X and the risk level of 
security behavior y, how strong is that relationship” 
Since this survey is targeting users from the general public and in order to maximize the 
number of participants across a broad spectrum of backgrounds and IT levels, it was decided to use 
a quantitative method to collect data. A quantitative-oriented survey will enable generic statistical 
models (e.g., Pearson’s correlation) to be applied on the response. Over long distances, an online 
questionnaire is particularly effective in gathering data from as large as a population sample of the 
general public as possible in a short time. Moreover, it was decided that questionnaire questions to 
be objective and achieve the aims of the survey. In order to be understandable by the general 




Figure ‎4.1: Survey's Methodology 
During the preparation for this survey, an ongoing project at the Center for Security, 
Communication and Network Research (CSCAN) at University of Plymouth, Clarke et. al (2016) 
produced a questionnaire that contained elements the researcher needed to evaluate. Furthermore, it 
answered the fundamental question about risk and personality and its questions met the criteria set 
by the researcher. As this survey is part of  the evidence gathering about the proposed PhD topic 
and (Clarke et. al 2016)  was done by the same research group as the researcher, it was advised to 
use the data set already collected and perform an independent analysis from this perspective.  
However, the dataset suffered from a skew towards IT background (65%). In order to get rid of 
this skew and make the population sample more representative of the general public with users 
varying  IT levels from novice to technology savvy, it was decided to redistribute the online 
questionnaire targeting non-IT professionals in particular. To ensure a high response rate, the 
researcher distributed the link to the online survey to a wide range of people but with the condition 
that they are 18 years or older and neither an IT professional nor an IT student. The link was 
promoted via email, popular social networks such as Facebook and Twitter and instant messenger 
such as WhatsApp. In total, 563 completed responses are gathered. However, 538 participants’ 
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responses are selected for the analysis as the other 25 participants answered wrongly to at least one 
of controlled questions and their responses are removed completely from the study. The data 
collection stopped when the IT proficiency skew changed from 35% of non-IT professionals to 
53%. 
To analyze the security behavior of users and how it is influenced by variations in age, gender, 
IT proficiency, IT service usage and personality traits, three levels of risk, high, medium and low, 
were associated to each participant’s behavior. The traffic light terminology was used in which red 
represented high risk level, orange for medium and green for low risk level. Further to that, three 
steps of analysis were performed as follows: 
Step 1: To measure the risk exposure of users, the behavior of the population sample in 
general was analyzed according to aspects in Figure 4.2. 
Step 2: Users are, first, categorized according to age, gender, IT proficiency, online service 
usage and personality trait as illustrated in Figure 4.2. As for each personality trait, for 
example, participants are classified as either high (+) in a trait, i.e. the average BFI score is 
greater than 3, or low (-), i.e. the average BFI score less than or equal 3. Second, their 
security behavior is analyzed according to aspects of  Figure 4.2. However, this is done to 
explore the effect of each of these factors on user’s behavior risk level and if it changes 
accordingly.  
A null hypothesis was generated as “ There is no relation between variations in user-
centric factor X and the risk level of security behavior Y”  
Where X: Represents the studied user-centric factors of IT proficiency, Age, Gender, 
online service usage and personality traits. Y: Represents the assessed security behaviors, 
i.e. 33 security behaviors. Pearson Chi-Squared Test was used to determine the 
significance effect of variations in each studied factor on users security behavior. The p-
value is calculated for each factor/security behavior so that if it is less than a pre-
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determined threshold , i.e. 0.05, then the relation is statistically significant and the null 
hypothesis is rejected, otherwise not. 
Step 3: Similar to level 2, users are first categorized according to their user-centric factors 
as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Second, to determine the correlation between user-centric 
factors and each security behavior, the survey data is examined using the Bi-variate 
Pearson two-tailed correlation according to aspects as shown in Figure 4.2.  
 




4.4 Survey Findings 
An analysis of the demographic characteristics shows that more than 71% of participants are 
males and 62% are in the age group from 18 to 30. A fairly even split was found in the IT 
background of participants where 53% were found to be non-IT professionals. In addition to the 
fact that the majority of participants (71%) are students, 68% of them had at least an undergraduate 
level of education. This could be because of the author’s personal contacts. Moreover, 67% of 
participants reside in Europe as shown in Figure 4.3. 
Although the analysis results of this survey are likely to be skewed towards age and gender, but 
the population sample presents a relative representation of technology users. To this end, it is in-
line with the United Kingdom’s Office of National Statistics findings that the age group (16-34), 
regardless of gender differences, where found to be the top users of Internet services (Ons.gov.uk 
2013). Further to that, it could be suggested that they are more likely to be IT literate which allows 




Figure ‎4.3: Summary of Participants Background Information 
 
In order to analyze participants technology use and services, they were asked about the digital 
devices they use. Unsurprisingly, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, participants own an increasing 
number of devices where 76% of them have at least 3 digital devices from various manufacturers 
and represent a variety of models and sizes.  
 
Figure ‎4.4: Number of Owned Devices 
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Moreover, devices used/owned ranged from desktop/laptop computers to tablets, smartphones, 
game consoles and smart watches as illustrated in Figure 4.5. Windows enabled desktop/laptop 
computers take precedence over its rivals, Mac and Linux by 81%. In terms of tablets/smartphones, 
Apple’s  iPad/iPad mini and iPhone tip the scales with 75% over its competitors Android 54%, 
Windows 10% and Blackberry 7%. However, this popularity of these three are consistent with 
market share analysis (Gartner.com  2015). Regarding other Internet enabled devices such as game 
consoles, navigation devices, smart TV’s and smart watches, they were utilized by 37%, 29%, 24% 
and 4% respectively. This diversity of platforms and operating systems is challenging as it 
increases the knowledge burden on users in maintaining security of these different devices. 
 
Figure ‎4.5: The Used  Digital Devices 
In addition to their device usage, participants’ usages on online services were also examined. 
Based upon how frequently they use these services, three levels of usage are obtained: high (i.e., 
always), medium (i.e., often), and low (i.e., sometimes, rarely and never). As illustrated in Figure 
4.6, email is the most popular service as 77% of the participants had a high usage; in addition, 
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office applications, instant messenger, online streaming, and social networking are also very 
popular as more than 70% of the participants claimed that they use these services on at least often 
basis. To this end, this popularity of email arguably increases participants’ vulnerability to email 
related security threats such as phishing.  Additionally, the popularity of other services such as 
instant messaging and social networking may suggest that they could be used as an attack vector by 
hackers. In contrast to these popular services, P2P was the least used service where almost 26% of 
participants used this service. Continuing the trend of analyzing concurrent use, 87% of surveyed 
have access to minimum 5 services at a high/medium basis, suggesting majority of the participants 
highly engage with different IT technology and services.  
 
Figure ‎4.6: Usage of IT Services  
The results of these two figures suggest that users are no longer relying on a single device and 
access services from a number of different operating systems and platforms. Hence, increasing the 
risk level of users where attackers have a wider range of attack vectors across a range of platforms. 




In spite of this high access and reliance on various services, an obvious question to ask is about 
the used security measures as one of the lines of defense against security attacks. To identify 
participants who might have provided arbitrary responses or exaggerated their knowledge, a fake 
security measure, ‘Intrusion Attacking System’, was included in the list of security measures and a 
couple of fake terms, ‘Whooping and Phibbing’, in the list of security incidents. However, a 
relatively small number of participants (4%) selected these terms. This said, it is of little concern 
that these terms received any attention at all. Nevertheless, their entire entries were excluded. It 
was found that 4 different security measures at maximum were used by 22% of participants as 
depicted in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure ‎4.7: The Number of Used Security Measures 
Figure 4.8 reveals the popularity of Anti-Virus software as a security countermeasure where it 
was utilized by 88% of participants followed by secret knowledge in 69%. However, firewalls and 




Figure ‎4.8: Types of Used Security Measures 
To estimate the level of risk associated with their security practice, participants are initially 
asked how often they perform an activity, i.e., always, often, sometimes, rarely, and never; which 
were then codified into three risk levels (i.e., high, medium, and low) based upon the types (i.e., 
positive and negative) of the security activity. For the positive security activity (e.g., a user scans a 
USB drive before using it), the more frequent the user performs it, the lower the risk level is 
associated to it. Therefore, for the positive security activities, “always” is coded into low; “often” is 
coded into medium; and “sometimes, rarely and never” are coded into high. In comparison, for the 
negative security activity (e.g., a user stores his/her passwords), the more frequent the user does it, 
the higher the risk level is linked to it. As a result, “always, often, and sometimes” are coded into 
high; “rarely” is coded into medium; and “never” is coded into low for the negative security 
activities. Thus, participants behavior was analyzed according to various aspects as follows: 
4.4.1 Password Hygiene 
Many techniques and tools are used by hackers for cracking or guessing passwords. Moreover, 
cracking passwords is easier if they are weak or short or contain personal information such as 
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birthdate or names. A hacker can easily gain entry to a system by hitting on a password through a 
dictionary search, for example. Hence, one way of protecting information from theft or 
unauthorized access is to use a strong password. A password that contains a mixture of upper and 
lower case letters, numbers and special characters and is more than eight characters in length is a 
difficult to crack password (Alarifi et al. 2012).  
As a result, it is important that users use their passwords in a secure manner. Participants 
appreciate the need for passwords as means of protection as almost two thirds of them always use 
one to log into their home computers. However, a surprising result was that 81% of participants 
failed to apply strong password requirements on 81-100% of their passwords.  Despite the use of a 
strong password is effective to protect systems from password cracking, participants are in high 
risk of password cracking attacks as more than four fifths of the participants’ passwords were 
poorly created.  
However, choosing a strong password is not enough to ensure the security of information and 
offer the required level of protection as passwords need to be changed on a regular basis. A great 
lack of secure behavior was found among participants as only 6% of them changed their passwords 
in less than three months. Also, less than two thirds of the participants change their passwords 
regularly (i.e., within a 6-month timeframe); and 42.2% of the participants only change their 
passwords if they were asked (e.g., a system may force its users to change their password every 6 
months), providing a large window of opportunity for attackers if a user’s password is 
compromised. Hence, having a weak password that is not changed frequently is a major security 
risk.  
Nevertheless, 46.3% of participants have less than 6 passwords for all their services and 
devices, providing a strong indication of password reuse as 98.1% of the surveyed use 10 services 
and/or devices or more. This is reiterated by finding that merely 20% of participants never use the 
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same password for multiple sensitive services. This offers opportunities to attackers who can obtain 
access to multiple systems by only successfully hacking into one of the systems. Hence, this high 
risk level behavior suggest that participants are facing hard time in remembering different 
passwords for various services.  
To keep track of their passwords, data collected suggests that participants are in favor of 
storing their passwords such as writing it on a post-it note or by using password stores. This is 
evident as almost two thirds of participants store their passwords. Another way for remembering 
passwords could be by allowing web browsers, systems or applications to remember them. 
Unfortunately, 80% of participants are in favor of this high risk practice. One possible way to 
reduce the vulnerability of an attacker steeling session information and cookies from tracking 
user’s online activities is to log off from these online services when done. This need is increased 
when accessing sensitive services such as banking and Government. However,  only one quarter of 
the participants practice it safely by logging off from online systems activities when done. It is 
envisaged that both activities offer some levels of user convenience (e.g., saving time) and users 
have less concerns as these browsers/online systems are initially protected by the main OS 
authentication mechanism (assuming it is correctly used). In contrast, participants appreciate the 
role of the password for workstations as more than two thirds of them lock their stations when they 
are away from desks. 
The best password hygiene practice employed by participants in general was that in them never 
sharing passwords with others. This was prevalent as almost 62% of participants have low risk as 
they never share their passwords with others. A similar result is presented in Helkala and Bakas 
(2013) that 63% of their 1,003 users do not share their passwords. Unfortunately, the results also 
highlight that almost two fifths of users have experience of sharing their passwords, demonstrating 
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that an opportunity exists for a high level of misuse on IT systems and data as illustrated in Figure 
4.9.   
Based upon these results, it shows that significant effort is required on reducing the risk of 
password practices even for users with a more technical savvy and educated background. Password 
practice activities that are associated with high risk levels are also linked to user convenience: 
system security is compromised as user convenience is more preferred. Therefore, additional 
consideration regarding usability and security should be given by designers when developing new 
systems.  
 
Figure ‎4.9: The Risk Level of User Password Hygiene Practices 
4.4.2 Social Networks 
One of the popular Internet services is social networking where almost 2 billion users around 
the world use social networks such as Facebook and google+ in 2015 which is expected to rise half 
a billion in 2018 (Statista.com  2016). This popularity was reflected in the surveyed users as only 
5% of them never engage in social networking. Nevertheless, social networks are used as a 
common threat vector by hackers to collect information about people that is used in identity fraud 
(Talib et al. 2010). However, this highly depends on the kind of activities performed by social 
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networkers. Unfortunately, the risks of sharing information online are underestimated by users and 
tend to mistakenly choose their privacy settings in favor for social networks benefits that may 
result in unintended parties sharing information with them. This may result in an increase in 
privacy and security threats (Bachrach et al. 2012; Halevi et al. 2013; Egelman and Peer 2015 a and 
b). This informed behavior is lacking when it comes to the type of information shared online. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 4.10, amongst all participants, a common high awareness level is 
shared by more than half of them as they never accept invitations from people unknown to them 
which demonstrates a more careful and informed behavior.  
 
Figure ‎4.10: The Risk Level of User Social Networks Practices 
4.4.3 Security Software Practices 
Although the utilization of security measures is a step towards protection against security 
incidents, but this is not enough. The idea is in how these security measures are maintained by the 
user. Four fifths of participants experienced non-physical security incidents such as data loss, 
phishing and malware compared to almost half of them (56%) experienced physical security 
incidents such as device loss and hardware failure. To this end, the survey moves forward to 
assessing participants’ security software behavior. 
One common security practice is to update systems/applications regularly as a range of 
vulnerabilities could exist in unpatched software. As basic security measures such as Anti-Virus 
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software and Firewalls were implemented by the majority of participants as in Figure 4.8, the 
question was how frequently they were updated to cope with the regularly introduced malware. 
Although more than half (52%) of participants always update their Anti-Virus software  as 
illustrated in Figure 4.11, the other half of participants put their IT systems into a more risky 
environment as an adequate level of protection cannot be provided by antivirus software with out-
of-date signatures. Indeed, Microsoft’s biannual Security Intelligence Report suggests that the 
infection rate of Windows OSs with out-of-date security software is more than three times higher 
than those with latest signatures (Microsoft.com 2014).   
What if the user’s computer performance slowed down, because of the installed Anti-Virus 
software or Firewall? How users are going to behave? Are they annoyed and going to simply 
disable them or not? Fortunately, more than half (59%)  of surveyed users were knowledgeable of 
the consequences of such behavior and never practiced it. As a result, low risk level was prevalent 
among participants.  
By further generalizing the assessment of user’s behavior to include all installed software in 
terms of installing the latest updates and security patches and if they canceled or postponed a 
security related update when notified to do so, the findings were intimidating. Almost one third of 
participants in general ‘always’ install patches and ‘never’ cancel security related updates 
endangering their systems, with 85% of exploitation attacks related to unpatched software, i.e. 
posing medium to high risks to their systems, (Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre 2015).  
With the continuously evolving threat landscape, the importance of patches as a methodology for 
fixing vulnerabilities in pre-installed systems that may be exploited by malware is paramount.  
Interestingly, a comparison of these results highlights a similar pattern that is obtained from the 
password practice in terms of user convenience. Regarding Anti-Virus Software update, the burden 
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upon the end-user is removed or at least reduced as the process is typically configured as 
automated. Conversely, the end-user’s attention is more required for patching: either to approve it 
or to wait whilst an automated patch is installed, and often more inconveniently a reboot of the 
system could be required. Nevertheless, knowing that technology alone will not provide the 
required level of protection, this highlights an interesting fact that whenever the user is involved in 
the security process as in updating the software the burden is increased on him. This suggests the 
need for an automation of these tasks or at least in better communicating the risks to the user in a 
user-centric persuasive manner to convince him of changing his behavior. 
With the growing prices of software, it may be cheaper or free to install or use pirate software. 
This illegitimate software when installed, may contain spyware that can exploit user’s data such as 
passwords and credit card numbers by identity thieves. Further to that, vulnerability to various 
attacks are increased as these counterfeit software are unable to incorporate updates released by 
vendors. Surprisingly, such behavior was experienced in almost two thirds of surveyed users 
posing high risks to their systems. Further analysis reveals that a quarter of the total participants 
perform both activities of disabling Anti-virus/Firewall and the utilization of pirate software ; yet 
72% of them claimed that they are experienced and expert IT users. This phenomenon could 
suggest that while technical users understand better security they may also be the ones who put the 




Figure ‎4.11: The Risk Level of User Security Software Practices 
4.4.4 Email Security 
With the high popularity of email service, where 96% of participants use it on an 
‘always/often’ basis, rises the threat of email related incidents such as phishing, spoofing and spam 
(Kaspersky 2017). Phishing attacks are getting more sophisticated and targeted (spear phishing) in 
an attempt to make fraudulent emails look like legitimate emails and enhance the attacks response 
rate.  The aim of these attacks is to convince users to reveal their personal information and use it to 
impersonate the user. Hence, participants susceptibility to fall victims to such attacks were 
explored. A fairly good behavior was demonstrated as almost two thirds of the surveyed users 
never click on attachments/links in emails from unknown sources.  In contrast, a strikingly 
converse behavior was practiced if the email was sent from a colleague or a friend. Almost 72% of 
surveyed participants seemed to be not suspicious of emails received from people known to them 
and tend be at risk as they open links/attachments in them without checking. This highlights the 
importance of trust and also potential danger when the sender’s email was perpetrated.  




Spam, in which chain emails are a form of, is also an increasing threat to email users 
(Kaspersky 2017). The majority of participants were knowledgeable of such emails. This is evident 
as almost 78% never forwarded these emails. Subsequent good actions to receiving such suspicious 
emails is to always delete them and notify IT support. However, two contradicting behaviors were 
observed. On the one hand, participants’ behavior is good in general as three quarters of the 
surveyed claim to delete them. On the other hand, low awareness of adequate behavior in notifying 
IT support was noticed. As illustrated in Figure 4.12, almost three quarters of surveyed users do not 
always report these tricky emails to IT support. Although such warning could benefit other users 
from being victimized, this could be due to several reasons such as participants feeling ashamed to 
report such incidents, do not know whom to report it to or simply think that this is of no interest to 
others. Nevertheless, this practice could reduce the speed in dealing with threats.  
 
Figure ‎4.12: The Risk Level of User email Security Practices 
4.4.5 Data Management 
Today, users are more connected to their computing devices and rely on them in their everyday 
lives such as chatting with friends, finding the nearest restaurant and as means for storing data. 
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Moreover, users are storing various types of data such as photos, contacts and health information 
on their computing devices. Hence, the risk of losing such data may have a devastating effect. 
Therefore, an obvious and easy solution is to backup this data on a regular basis, regardless of the 
used digital medium, to restore it whenever needed. Moreover, being aware of most common risks 
that may jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity and availability  (CIA) of data, encryption could 
be used as an enabler to achieve an acceptable level of data security and privacy. To this end, 
combining these two good practices will provide confidence that user’s data is safe even if this 
backup is stolen. 
Across most of the surveyed users, a disturbing finding was that they fell short of practicing 
good behavior in both backing up their data and encrypting it. Regardless of the popularity of data 
backup as a security measure, almost two thirds of participants as in Figure 4.8, less than one third 
of participants are in low risk as they always back up their data on a regular basis as demonstrated 
in Figure 4.13. However, this suggests that participants do use this service but with lower 
frequency than expected.  
A USB drive is a cheap and easy to use medium for storing and transferring data between 
computers. With this, comes a greater chance of them being stolen, lost or used to spread malware 
such as viruses. Therefore, a good practice is to always scan such drive before using it. The most 
terrifying statistic is the prevalent insecure behavior among participants. As only 15% of 
participants ‘always’ scan a USB drive before using it. However, a contradicting trend was found 
when it comes to inserting and accessing USB sticks from unknown sources where 40% of 
surveyed users ‘never’ practiced such behavior.  
Unfortunately, encryption seemed not to be a popular practice by surveyed users. This is 
apparent as only 7% of participants always use encryption when transferring data via a USB drive 
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and 12% claimed they always encrypt sensitive information that is stored on their computer.  This 
suggests the need for further education on the benefits of encryption and how to practice it.  
In the case of hardware disposal, a good preceding practice to protect security and privacy is to 
always destroy all data stored on it. Luckily, a high level of awareness was found among 
participants as two thirds of them regularly destroy their data before disposing of hardware. 
In order to protect their IT system from various attacks, end-users should practice better 
security on data, such as paying more attention to security warnings. More than four fifths of the 
participants open a document despite security warnings as demonstrated in Figure 4.13.  This 
suggests that security software is failing in effectively communicating the risks to users and 
convincing them of the consequences that may occur in case they disobey such warnings.  
The last data management behavior that was assessed was the decision to download files from 
suspicious websites or not,  as they may be packed with malware and spyware.  However, a noted 
informed behavior was remarkable as almost one third of participants never trust these websites. 
Nevertheless, extra education and awareness raising of the threats of such “not safe” files are 




Figure ‎4.13: The Risk Level of User Data Management Practices 
4.4.6 Network Management 
Good network management is essential to protect devices and its data against various network 
related attacks (e.g. browser attacks and man-in-the-middle attack). It is common practice that 
network security managers and IT administrators are responsible for securing business networks 
and servers. However, it is mainly individual’s responsibility to protect their own endpoints.  
However, users do have more control over the use of wireless technology on their devices. 
Users can be online by simply connecting to a public WiFi network that are almost found 
everywhere from shopping malls to coffee shops free of charge. This allows the exchange of data 
between the user’s device and access point in clear air, unencrypted. As a result, any exchanged 
communication can be easily eavesdropped by an attacker. Hence, connecting to such networks is 
not as risky as the kind of activities performed when connected to these networks such as accessing 
an online banking account. To assess user’s vulnerability to such threats, the survey proceeded by 
asking participants about the frequency of using public access WiFi networks. A common finding, 
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as shown in Figure 4.14, is the great lack of awareness in wireless network threats among 
participants exposing them to a high risk level. This is evident as only as low as 8% of participants 
never connect to public WiFi networks suggesting the need for further awareness/education. 
Another good security and privacy maintaining practice is to always disable unnecessary 
wireless technologies such as WiFi and Bluetooth when not using them. Hence, the more services 
running on a computing device the more the chances for attackers to use them as a threat vector by 
breaking into or taking control of the computing device through them. However, a disturbing 
insecure behavior was practiced by participants as more than three quarters (81%) do not always 
disable wireless services when not used. This could be a result of either them not being aware of 
risks related to such practices or due to their heavy reliance on them that they want to easily and 
rapidly access them. 
The use of an anonymizing proxy or the TOR network is a for (from user’s point of view) and 
against (from system administrator’s standing point) area in terms of security and privacy. 
Nevertheless, the survey result shows that less than one third of the participants always use the 
technique for anonymous communication. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) enables end-users to 
connect to a private network and access information over public networks securely. Figure 4.14 
shows that less than 5% of the participants utilize the service on an ‘always’ basis (i.e. low risk 
level). This could be because VPN technology is mainly used to access corporate networks and the 




Figure ‎4.14: The Risk Level of Network Management Practices 
4.5 Correlation Testing on The Relationship Between User-centric Factors and 
The Risk Taking Behavior 
To determine the significance effect of the studied user-centric factors on the risk level of each 
surveyed intended user behavior, two statistical tests were used as explained in Section 4.3.  
Pearson’s Chi-square test was used first to determine the significance effect of the studied factors 
on each user’s behavior risk level. Then, the Bi-variate Pearson two-tailed correlation was used to 
explore the relationship between various user-centric factors and the risk level of user’s intended 
security behaviors. For the purposes of clarity and because the second test included both correlation 
and significance, the output of the first test is as in Appendix A. The correlation output of the risk 
level of survey security behaviors and 5 user-centric factors (including personalities) is presented in 
Table 4.2. However, none of the user-centric factors were found correlated with 6 out of 33 
surveyed behaviors, hence not included.  
As shown in Table 4.2, amongst the personality factors, conscientiousness personality trait is 
negatively correlated with the risk of most user security behaviors (18 out of 27 are highly 
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significant (i.e., p-value of 0.01) and 3 are significant (i.e., p-value of 0.05)). This appears logical 
as people who score high on the conscientiousness BFI scale have been shown to be more 
responsible (Zhang 2006). A similar trend can also be observed from the agreeableness and 
openness personality traits; both are negatively correlated with the user’s security behavior/risk 
level. The former and the latter are associated with 10 and 12 behaviors at a significant level 
respectively. In comparison, the neuroticism personality trait is positively correlated with the user’s 
security behavioral risk level with 7 behaviors being statistically significant. This suggests people 
with high neuroticism are likely to be emotional more unstable; as a result, their security behavior 
might be more radical than others. With respect to extraversion personality trait, only one of the 
security behaviors correlated with significance. This suggests it is not a suitable moderator for 
predicting the risk level associated with user’s security behavior.  
Investigating the demographic factors, age is negatively related with the risk level of more than 
half of the end-user’s security behaviors (i.e., 10 are highly significant and 6 are significant), 
suggesting the younger a user is, the higher the risk. One of the reasons behind this could be the 
more mature a person is, the more responsible they are. This is confirmed from a further analysis 
on the survey data that shows age and conscientiousness are positively correlated (r=0.158**, 
p=0.01). Regarding gender, the results demonstrate little significance, with only the odd behavior 
flagging as significant.  
Regarding the user-centric factors of IT proficiency and service usage, a general trend of 
negative correlation between end-user’s security behavioral risk level and these factors is 
demonstrated by the results. The higher score of a factor, the lower the risk level associated to it. 
The results are almost self-explanatory: the higher the user’s IT skill level and their familiarity with 
IT services, the lower the risk level is associated with their behaviors as they tend to understand 
more about IT services and would take IT security more seriously. Nonetheless, five positive 
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correlations (representing less than one third of total significant correlations) are presented between 
the service usage and the security behaviors, including Install/use of pirate software, Opening a 
document despite security warnings, and saved password on browsers/systems. The first two could 
suggest that users with a high level of understanding of IT tend to be more arrogant when dealing 
certain IT risks; while the last one could be caused by the amount of additional/repeated 
authentication that is often required for high usage users.  
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N=538 BFI Demographics Self-judged 






* 0.000 -.163** 0.047 -0.074 -0.071 -.181** -.168** -0.046 
Lock workstation when away from desk -0.063 -0.031 -.188** -0.003 -0.069 -.106
* 0.031 -.148** -.156** 
Password storage 0.020 -0.070 0.009 -0.009 -.088
* 0.0034 -.098* -.119** -0.007 
Log off from online systems -0.052 -0.072 -.182** .090
* -.118** -.092
* -0.051 -0.060 0.070 
Saved password on browsers/systems 0.013 -0.070 -.173** 0.054 -0.005 -.191** 0.035 0.051 .238** 
Same password for multiple sensitive accounts 0.037 0.030 -.129** .096
* -.092* -.220** -0.056 -.257** 0.046 
Disable antivirus/firewall -0.061 -.112** -.212** 0.081 -.116** -.097
* -0.015 -.209** -0.063 
Keep anti-virus software up-to-date -0.013 -0.070 -.222** .097
* -.099* -.093* -.109* -.355** -.205** 
Install security patches without any delay -0.001 -.101
* -.176** .147** -.114** -0.083 -.206** -.278** -.229** 
Install/use of pirate software 0.005 -.123** -.159** 0.056 -0.050 -.311** .174** 0.005 .138** 
Forward chain emails 0.034 -.186** -.178** 0.082 -.130** -0.048 -0.012 -.197** -.116** 
Click on email links/attachments from 
unknown sources 
-0.016 -.098* -.159** 0.075 -.128** -0.001 -.114** -.212** -.120** 
Delete suspicious emails -0.022 -.095
* -.100* 0.057 -.103* -.204** 0.059 -.113** -0.069 
Click on email links/attachments from known 
sources without checking whether it looks 
suspicious 
0.006 -0.063 -.095* 0.042 -0.079 -0.009 -.124** -.224** -.097
* 
Notify IT support about suspicious emails -0.033 -0.024 -0.071 0.046 -0.041 -.271** 0.080 0.000 -0.068 
Destroy all data before hardware disposal 0.007 -.116** -.141** .094
* -.150** -.124** -.095
* -.231** -.161** 
Accessing USB from unknown sources 0.005 -0.070 -.132** 0.057 -0.035 -0.016 -0.033 -.168** -0.048 
File downloading from suspicious/unknown 
websites 
-0.034 -.163** -.193** .114** -0.057 -.185** 0.047 -0.012 0.013 
Performing regular data backup -0.073 -0.054 -.243** 0.072 -0.069 -.188** 0.068 -.212** -.165** 
Opening a document despite security warnings -0.016 -.153** -.187** 0.061 -0.056 -.262** 0.022 0.005 .133** 
Scanning a USB drive before usage -0.046 -0.034 -.145** .119** -.113** -0.083 -.128** -0.062 -.117** 
Encryption for sensitive information stored on 
computer 
-0.072 -0.046 -0.053 0.075 -0.068 -0.049 -.113** -.137** -.111
* 
Use the TOR network -0.059 -.097
* -0.053 0.030 -0.01 -.103* .138** -0.004 0.055 
Use an anonymising proxy -0.071 -0.071 -.133** 0.040 -0.023 -.137** .232** 0.062 .158** 
Disable wireless technologies when not using 
them 
0.008 -0.012 -.096* -0.017 -0.083 0.048 -.134** -0.072 -0.053 
Connect to public access networks/Wi-Fi 0.051 -0.045 -0.028 0.038 -0.046 -.105
* -0.076 -.091* .143** 
Use a VPN 0.031 0.028 -0.028 -0.031 -.104
* -0.076 -0.064 -0.082 -.131** 
Table ‎4.2: Pearson Correlation results on various user’s factors and the risk level of their security behaviors 
E: Extraversion; A: Agreeableness; C: Conscientiousness; N: Neuroticism; O: Openness;  




The results of this survey were obtained from a population sample that fairly represents 
technology users with different demographics, personality traits and varying levels of IT 
background. Although the population sample suffered from some skews in gender and age, but this 
does not affect the major results of the survey. Additionally, this survey was an opportunity to 
explore user’s security behavior from a holistic view and how this behavior is affected by 
variations in IT proficiency, demographics (age, gender), IT service usage and BFI personality 
traits. 
Apparently, participants interact with a wide variety of online services through a number of 
digital devices that utilize different platforms, varying security requirements and configurations. 
This implies the increased security knowledge burden on the user, especially that the majority of 
participants valued their need for information security as essential or high. Further to that, it was 
evident that even those with a good IT background failed to securely implement some basic 
security practices such as downloading files from suspicious websites and using the same password 
for multiple sensitive accounts.  
With the continuously evolving threat landscape and users’ augmented reliance on technology 
and services, the requirement of up-to-date security awareness is a must for users to remain secure. 
Moreover, the varying differences between users should be taken into account. Therefore, the 
necessity to continuously protect users’ information on a multi-platform basis is paramount. 
Although participants used one or more security measure on their devices, such as Anti-Virus 
software and passwords, they fall foul in using it safely. This is apparent as the majority of them 
failed to utilize a strong password, employed password reuse and canceled or postponed a security 
related update.  
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Encouragingly, the results of this survey demonstrated that some of the reasons behind 
participants varying behavior risk levels are related to variations in age, gender, IT background, IT 
service usage and personality traits. It was found that IT professionals, although did not practice 
good behavior as expected, were in lower risk than non-IT professionals. Even in those practices in 
which they shared the same risk level, such as clicking on links/attachments within an email from 
unknown sources, non-IT professionals were in higher risk.  
Whereas for age variations, it was found that the older the user the lower the risk. This is in 
line with the risk taking behavior of younger users as 38% of cybercrime victims were users in the 
age group 18-30 (Statista.com 2013). However, this does not imply that the older the user the more 
security minded he is, but could be due to reasons such as using the Internet less.  
Regardless of the findings that males use pirate software more frequently than females, it was 
found that males are practicing better security, thus in lower risk, than females for most of the 
assessed security behaviors. Further to that, females practiced password hygiene lower than males, 
do not always disable their wireless technologies when not using them, connected and engaged 
more in public WiFi networks and social networks, and showed more tendency to click on 
attachments and links in emails without checking regardless of the sender, to name a few of their 
risk taking behaviors. This may explain why they are more prone to phishing than males as found 
by (Sheng et. al 2010).  
Due to their high online engagement , thus the higher the chances they may face security risks, 
one might expect that higher online engagement may result in higher risk but when their security 
behaviors were assessed no particular pattern was found. As a matter of fact, those with medium 
service usage maybe in higher risk than others especially that they practice most of password 
hygiene behaviors less, more inclined to open documents even if warned not to, click attachments 
within emails without checking, not to lock their workstations when away from desk or use a 
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password for their home computers and less frequently back up their files and scan USB sticks 
before using them. This suggests that the higher the level of service usage/online activity does not 
necessarily imply better security behavior.  
Further to that, survey findings suggest that personality traits play a role in effecting the risk 
level of users. This said, it was found that those of the same personality trait do not practice 
security behaviors in the same way. As a matter of fact, the BFI score of each personality trait 
played a significant role in participants’ risk taking security behavior. As the higher the BFI score 
of personality traits of Openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness the more 
responsible they are, this was reflected positively on their security behaviors. Therefore, the lower 
the BFI score the higher the risk across most of the assessed behaviors. However, a converse 
relation was found in the case of neuroticism personality trait. It is worth noting, though, that 
differences in Extraversion BFI score was correlated with only one of the assessed behaviors. Thus, 
this maybe an opportunity to further explore this fact by conducting similar studies targeting users 
of this trait.  Among all personality traits, those who were high in conscientiousness were found to 
be practicing security better than others, thus in lower risk. This suggest that the competence, order, 
dutifulness and self-discipline attributes of conscientiousness personality were mirrored in most of 
their security behaviors.  
Moreover, the survey findings suggest that there are several areas where users need to be 
educated and their behavior continuously monitored and directed. As it is challenging to predict 
how users behave, especially when security in practice is different from security in abstract, it is 
critical to understand how users communicate with systems. This survey highlighted some factors 
that could be used to predict user’s risk level. Hence, to get security right and to encourage good 
security behavior, systems should adapt to users instead of vice versa.  
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As it was found that user’s may easily become victims of such attacks not only because of their 
insecure behavior but because technology is failing them (Ibrahim et al. 2010). Decisions such as 
using pirated software or opening attachments in emails should be monitored in near real time and 
alerting the user in an individualized and persuasive manner. Further to that, the consequences of 
such actions should be explained to him prior attempting to do such action and educated on how to 
do it right. Hence, arguably, instead of telling users what not to do, they should be taught how to 
safely do what they want. Additionally, these findings suggest that users are willing and looking 
forward to added and convenient security that copes with their needs and notifies them in real time 
and up-to-date information on how to behave securely in a user-dependent way that is mostly 
understood by them. Increased targeted security awareness and communication through 
understanding risk will arguably improve the security behavior and lead to reduced security risks.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The study has sought to further investigate the relationship between user’s behavior (or 
specifically behavioral intent) and various user-centric factors. A more complete set of analyses 
across a wider set of behaviors and factors has provided a more appreciable understanding of what 
significant relationships exist. The results of this investigation has shown that the studied factors do 
play an important role in shaping user’s behavior and risk level. Conscientiousness, agreeableness 
and openness personality traits all play a role across two-thirds of all behaviors. The study has also 
reaffirmed that age, IT proficiency and service usage also have an impact on behavior. By 
capitalizing upon this, end-users could be provided with more effective awareness based upon the 
risks they present to systems. Thus, by the development of solutions that adapt to these differences, 
whether in assessing risk or in communicating it to users, this may enhance the way in which users 




Chapter 5 : Establishing a User-centric Risk Assessment and 
Response Model  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Having identified that a number of factors influencing user’s risk-taking behavior, the aim of 
this research is to develop a novel approach that takes into account these factors when assessing 
security risks for users and communicating them in a timely and individualized fashion. Aside from 
the traditional “one-size-fits-all” solutions, the approach introduces a new platform independent 
model – User Centric Risk Assessment and Response (UCRAR). This proposed model is 
anticipated to provide a comprehensive framework for individually assessing and communicating 
risks especially with the continuously evolving threat landscape. As such, user’s behaviors are 
continuously monitored and risks are assessed on both system and user level taking into account 
the influence of a number of factors on user’s risk taking behavior. Then, an individualized risk 
profile is created and risks are communicated accordingly in a timely manner. Further to that, it 
acts as an individualized security awareness/education tool that will give the user the ability to 
better understand risk and make a security informed decision.  
This chapter will discuss the system requirements in the following section followed by a 
detailed description of the UCRAR model in section  3. A demonstration of operational flow in the 
proposed framework and how processes interact with each other in section 4 precedes the 
conclusion in section 5.  
5.2 System Requirements 
The proposed model seeks to help users in assessing their behaviors, improving their security 
knowledge/behavior and giving them the ability to make an informed decision. In order for such 
system to be applicable, a number of requirements need to be identified. 
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Among the aforementioned findings of the previous chapters was that users, access a wide 
range of services from a number of different devices and platforms, thus, increasing the users’ 
security risk level. Additionally, it was explained how user-centric factors were related to 
changing/influencing this risk level, the burden to be aware of such risks and how to protect form 
them. Therefore, the necessity for a user-centric risk assessment and communication approach that 
adapts to user-centric factors and can be used across services and technologies becomes more 
apparent.  
Given the fact that users have usability issues related to security software that may result in 
them dumping it or at least, due to misuse, degrading its performance, the model needs to be 
flexible, user-friendly, usable, adapts to the user and speaks his language.  
As the use of vulnerable software is considered a threat to the user, the system itself in terms of 
installed software should be assessed. Examples of such vulnerable software are a vulnerable 
Operating System and an out-of-date application. Not limited to application vulnerability, but the 
fact that malicious/pirate software originating from suspicious sources could be a possible threat. 
Consequently, the source from which the software originated should be considered. Further to that, 
connecting to the Internet could be of risk to the user especially with the increasing number of 
Internet users and how users are spending more time doing online activities. Thus, a vulnerable 
router could also be considered as a threat to the user. As such, risks should be assessed on the 
system level. 
As user-centric factors were found to significantly relate to user’s risk taking behavior, they 
should be considered when assessing risk. Hence, risks are not only assessed on the system level 
but also on the user’s level. However, to keep the system up-to-date over time, a community based 
approach of risk data is required. 
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With this continuously evolving threat landscape where almost two million threats introduced 
on a daily basis (Symantec 2018), the fact that users only try to protect themselves from risks 
apparent to them and that they are, arguably, unwilling to constantly learn about information 
security comes the need for an individualized security risk assessment/awareness approach. Not 
limited to that, but user’s behaviors need to be continuously monitored and timely assessed. Prior 
literature largely focuses on one-size-fits-all solutions and, arguably, this does not provide the 
granularity required for the individual users. Therefore, the proposed model needs to go beyond the 
traditional solution to adapt to user’s needs and constantly monitor and assess his behaviors against 
good  or expected behavior to generate an individualized risk profile. Then,  these risks are 
communicated in an individualized persuasive manner and targeted security education/training is 
provided accordingly.  
Nevertheless, this continuous monitoring of user’s behaviors does have some ethical 
implication. From an ethical perspective, it is important not to violate any privacy rights of the 
user. An important aspect is that users need to trust the system and that this continuous monitoring 
is motivational and not invasive. Hence, if this continuous monitoring is done without user’s 
consent, it will be considered a breach of privacy. Therefore, users need to be aware that this 
continuous monitoring is done for their own protection and will not violate their privacy. However, 
this practice is subject to regulations of current standards and laws. The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which was enforced in May 2018, has 99 articles that are concerned with 
working practices in the way that personal data is used, handled and shared (General Data 
Protection Regulation 2019). In compliance with GDPR, user’s consent to the use of their data is 
obtained when installed the application. This is done by having the user accept an agreement terms 
in an  understandable, jargon-free and accessible way. In this agreement, it is clarified to the user 
that  data is not shared with any other application. Additionally, the continuous monitoring of 
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user’s behavior and any collected data will not be used for purposes other than those intended for 
risk assessment.  
 To this end, the proposed model is based on two components, risk assessment and risk 
communication. For the former component to operate, it requires access to a number of 
databases/repositories. Particularly, a database/repository of good/expected behavior, community-
based risk data and a vulnerability database that are created and managed by third parties such as 
an ISP, Network operators, the Government or big companies such as Google and Microsoft. 
Although the implementation of such databases is outside the scope of this research, their 
functionality will be explained in the following section. Additionally, a personality and a learning 
style test tool is needed to determine the user-centric factors of personality trait and learning style. 
For the latter component, an Internet-based body of knowledge is needed as a source for required 
security awareness/education materials. However, to avoid overwhelming the user with redundant 
risk-related messages, those that are issued by this system or other applications are recorded so that 
a similar message will not be issued twice, i.e. from UCRAR and from other installed applications. 
5.3 The UCRAR Framework 
In the literature, many risk assessment methodologies were found as discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, they tend to assess risks either on the software/application level, based on assets and 
applicable threats, or permissions that are requested by each application prior to installing it, as in 
mobile devices for instance. Opposed to other risk assessment methodologies that utilize experts 
opinions, methods such as those proposed by (Ledermuller and Clarke  2011) and (Theoharidou et 
al. 2012) employ user input resulting in a personalized risk assessment. However, this user 
involvement could be considered as a burden on the user, especially if the number of installed 
software/applications is numerous, that may result in him dumping/rejecting the risk assessment 
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software/application. Moreover, the quality of the risk assessment maybe affected by the varying 
input details reflecting different users’ characteristics, namely, their IT expertise and skills.   
 
Many types of data are stored on users’ devices such as photos, contacts, documents and 
messages that are accessed by different applications. However, the unauthorized modification or 
disclosure of this data may result in a number of undesirable consequences on the CIA and privacy 
of such data. As each application has different impacts on data, which implies that the risk level is 
changing within the application. Actually, different processes within an application have different 
impacts, thus, generating different risk levels for the same application. As a result, no single risk 
level could be assigned to an application. Not limited to that, but the way in which the user uses 
these processes may escalate or de-escalate these risk levels. For example, in the HSBC mobile 
application, user’s behaviors where there is no sharing of user’s data as in reading products, 
services and offers has no impact on data. Thus, from an application based behavioral perspective, 
risk is kept to a minimum. However, this risk level could escalate when combined with other non-
app related behaviors such as connecting to a public Wi-Fi network or using a non-updated version 
of the application. Another example is the process of adding a photo in the Facebook application. 
On the one hand, adding a photo of The London Eye, for example, has a low risk level whether the 
user’s account is public or private. Whereas adding the same photo with location data may have an 
impact on user’s privacy, thus, escalating the risk level to medium in a private account and possibly 
to high in a public account. On the other hand, for the same process of adding a photo but of the 
user’s child, for example, in a private account has a medium risk level that escalates to high when 
the account is public. These examples serve to demonstrate that the risk level of user’s behaviors 
within an application process could change when combined with other behaviors within the same 
application. Thus, arguably, assessing the risk level based on user’s behavior may result in a more 
realistic and accurate assessment. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, assessing and 
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calculating risk for each user behavior of each process within an application and combining it with 
other behaviors simultaneously, and using user-centric factors such as demographics, online 
activity, personality traits and IT expertise as additional risk factors to create a user-centric risk 
score/level has not been investigated yet. Moreover, combining this user-centric risk assessment 
with system-level risk assessment to create an individualized risk profile is a novel approach to 
information security risk assessment.  
Consequently, the proposed methodology for assessing security risks will be based upon 
continuously assessing and calculating risk on both system and user level and an individualized 
risk profile will be created accordingly. Additionally, risk information from a third party that is 
based on a large population, i.e. community-based, is used in the risk assessment. Therefore, the 
novelty of this proposed model, UCRAR, depends upon three significant aspects: monitoring and 
assessing user’s behaviors, monitoring and assessing the system from which the user is working 
and individually/persuasively communicating risks. Hence, UCRAR is composed of two main 
components as in Figure 5.1. Namely, the Risk Assessment component and the Risk 
Communication component. 
In the first component, user’s behaviors are monitored, security risks are assessed and an 
individualized risk profile is created accordingly. Whereas the second component is mainly 
concerned with receiving the individualized risk profile, analyzing it and communicating the risk in 
an individualized manner. As part of the novelty of this proposed framework, user-centric factors 
are utilized, among other factors, in both components.  
Actually, in the Risk Assessment component, the assessment is not limited to assessing risks on 
system level such as installed software/apps, but user’s behaviors will be continuously monitored 
and assessed against good or “expected” behavior. Consequently, user-centric factors are used to 
generate a risk profile that changes and is individualized to users. Further to that, risk information 
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from a third party that is based on a large population, i.e. community-based, is used in the risk 
assessment. As a result, the aggregated final risk score/level is a quantitative value between 0-low 
risk and 10-high risk and passed as part of the individualized risk profile to the second component 
of UCRAR. From this point, the terms software and application will be used interchangeably to 
refer to any piece of software installed on user’s device. 
 In the Risk Communication component, the risk profile is analyzed. Based upon that analysis, 
it decides on the most suitable individualized, persuasive form of communicating this risk to the 
user and how to enhance his security knowledge. Additionally, topics in which the user needs 
further education will be internally identified and, as a result, individualized security training and 
awareness that adapt to user-centric factors will be provided in the user’s preferred learning style 
such as an educational security game for teen agers.  
To this end, UCRAR will continuously monitor, assess, communicate and educate users of 
security risks that relate to them in an individualized persuasive audio/visual manner to convince 
the user to change his behavior, be “security-minded” and give him the ability to make an informed 




Figure ‎5.1: The User-centric Risk Assessment and Response, UCRAR, Framework  
149 
 
5.3.1 Risk Assessment Component 
For this component to carry out its functionality, the following processes are established: 
5.3.1.1 Software Detector 
The risks of a vulnerable/out-of-date application and those originating from an illegitimate 
source have been previously explained in this research. However, there are millions of software 
products in the world. For example, the number of applications in Google Play store increased from 
400.000 in 2011 to 3.5 million  in 2017 with an average of almost 6000 applications released on a 
daily basis (Statista.com 2017). However this fails to consider the existence of organizational 
application. Many applications could be installed on the user’s device with varying consequences 
on the CIA and privacy of user’s data.  
To individually risk assess each installed application would be a time consuming task. Thus, 
the aim of this process is to detect all installed software on user’s device and assign a quantitative 
score/weight to each detected software. This score could be determined in many ways such as level 
of application/service usage or type of application/service such as banking, messaging or social 
networking. Additionally, it could be determined in terms of its CIA impact. To reduce the burden 
on the user in individually scoring each installed application, the categorization approach proposed 
by (Ledermuller and Clarke 2011) is adopted. In this categorization approach, applications are 
classified into groups according to their type/usage and each group is assigned a certain weight. 
This weight assignment will be part of system startup/configuration where each group will be 
assigned a quantitative value by asking the user explicit questions of  how important this group to 
him.  
To avoid user’s confusion when using a large scale, a scale of 0-very low to 4-very high will 
be used. Then, each detected application will be mapped into its corresponding group and assigned 
a score accordingly resulting in an app-score. For example, applications are classified but not 
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limited to as in Table 5.1. Further to that, application version, app-ver, and the name of the 
source/market from which the application was installed from, install-name, are detected (if any).  
Social networking e-banking e-mail 
Messaging Maps and navigation Entertainment (games, music …etc) 
News Shopping Office applications (Ms Word, Ms Excel …etc) 
Photography Security Operating system  
Web access     
Table ‎5.1: An Example of Software/Applications Groups 
Thus, the output of this process is the following tuple 
Sw-info = (sw-id, app-score, install-name)  
where: sw-id is the software/app ID in Common Product Enumeration CPE  
5.3.1.2 Good (Expected) Behavior 
To individually assess each behavior, a clear description of a good user behavior to compare it 
against the current user behavior has to be determined. Since it is difficult to include all 
expected/good behaviors, this knowledge base will include a set of descriptors that suggest what 
good behavior should be in a certain aspect and used as a reference for user security compliance. In 
password hygiene, for instance, a list of good behaviors related to passwords will be provided such 
as : 
 Use of  a strong password, i.e. at least 8 characters long with a combination of capital and 
small letters, numbers and special characters. 
 Password is not recycled in which the same password is used for multiple accounts 
 Frequency of changing passwords, every three months for example 
 Not allowing web browsers/software/apps to store passwords 
5.3.1.3 User Behavior Monitor 
With this continuously evolving threat landscape and the wide range of computing platforms 
and services accessed, the need to continuously monitor and assess user’s behaviors in a timely 
manner becomes more apparent. Certain users’ characteristics were related to changing/influencing 
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his risk level, as discussed in Chapter 4, suggesting that user’s characteristics need to be gathered. 
Hence, the functionality of this monitor is a two-fold: 
I. To continuously monitor user’s behavior independently of the used software/app and 
compare it against good/expected behavior. This is timely done and is event triggered. For 
example, if a user is to close a browser/app, he will be reminded to sign off from online service 
before closing. These monitored behaviors may include, but not limited to: 
 Information posted on social networks 
 Opening attachments/links in emails without checking them 
 Connecting to public access WiFi networks 
 Backing up data  
 Using a USB drive without scanning it 
 Opening a document/link despite security warnings 
 Downloading files from suspicious websites 
 Locking workstation when away from desk 
 Disabling wireless technologies when not used 
 Logging off from online systems before closing the browser 
 Disabling AV/firewall 
 Cancelling or postponing a security related update 
 Installing pirate software 
II.  To collect user information in terms of the specified user-centric factors. This data 
collection is done in three ways, namely, explicitly, implicitly and by taking a specialized test as in 
Table 5.2. The categories of the user-centric factors of age and gender are determined by asking the 
user explicit questions. Based on the results of a personality and learning styles tests such as the 
Big Five and the VARK learning style test, the user-centric factors of personality and learning style 
are determined and the user is assigned a factor category accordingly. This user-info data collection 
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is considered as part of system setup/configuration. The User Behavior Monitor will automatically 
and transparently detect and measure the following user-centric factors : 
 IT proficiency level: A number of metrics will be used to determine user’s IT proficiency 
level such as settings and modification of web browser configurations, frequent use of 
shortcut keys and the use of advanced features in software/apps such as section breaks and 
cross sections in MS Word and macros in MS Excel. Accordingly, the user will be 
assigned an IT proficiency level of either professional or not.  
 Service usage: A number of metrics will be used to determine user’s level of online 
activity and service usage such as number of services utilized and number of times these 
services are accessed on a predefined basis. Accordingly, the user will be assigned a 
service usage level of high usage, medium usage or low usage. 
However, for IT proficiency and service usage level user-centric factors the worst-case 
scenario is adopted. The categories whom found to be in highest risk, as in findings of Chapter 4, 
are assumed as default values, i.e. non-IT professional and high service usage. As the user is using 
the system, his behavior is monitored and these categories will be adjusted according to a 
predefined set of metrics.  
 
Table ‎5.2: Settings of User's-centric Factors 
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Thus, the output of this process is the following tuple 
B-info =  (B-expected, B-actual, U-info) 
Where:  B-expected is the expected good behavior derived from the Good Behavior 
knowledge base 
B-actual is user’s current behavior 
U-info is user-centric factors expressed as the tuple =  (IT-level, Use-level, Age, Gender, 
Personality, Learning-style) 
Where: IT-level Є {IT-pro, non-IT}, where IT-pro= IT professional, non-IT = 
Non-IT professional 
Use-level Є { Highuse, Mediumuse, Lowuse}, where Highuse= high usage, Mediumuse= 
medium usage, Lowuse=low usage 
Age Є {Lowage, Mediumage, Highage}, where Lowage= 18-30 years old, Mediumage= 
31-50 years old, Highage= 51+ years old 
Personality Є {HO, LO, HC, LC, HE, LE, HA, LA, HN, LN}, where HO, for 
example,= High BFI in Openness personality and LE = Low BFI in Extraversion 
Gender Є {female, male} 
Learning-style Є {V, A, R, K} where V = visual, A = auditory, R = read/write, K = 
kinesthetic  
5.3.1.4 User-Centric Risk Estimator 
This process performs a mapping of user behavior to software/apps. Hence, what is the user 
doing against what software given that a threat against a software  maybe increased by user’s 
insecure behavior. For example, if a user was logged into an online service and attempts to close 
the browser, the User-Centric Risk Estimator will map it to the current used application which is an 
online banking application that was detected by the software detector.  Consequently, a quantitative 
risk score between 0-low risk and 10- high risk will be determined after assessing user behavior 
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given the previously mentioned data.  This risk score is calculated according to a proposed model 
as will be explained in the next Chapter. As a result of this mapping/calculation, a behavioral risk 
score, behavior-risk, will be calculated and passed to the Risk Aggregator. Thus, the output of this 
process is: 
 behavior-risk, the quantitative behavioral risk score, 0 ≤ behavior-risk ≤ 10. 
5.3.1.5 Community-Based Risk Data 
The proposed UCRAR is based upon user’s behaviors from the user survey of Chapter 4 in a 
certain point of time.  Once the proposed system is running with many people using it, there is the 
chance to look at their user-centric factors, behaviors and responses in real time on a continuous 
basis. Information about users, behaviors and responses are fed into this Community-Based Risk 
Data in an anonymized form on a continuous basis. Hence, those found statistically significant 
correlations could be re-evaluated and the user-centric risk estimation will be modified 
accordingly. For example, if the user-centric factor of age no longer has a statistically significant 
correlation with a certain behavior or a new user-centric factor becomes significant for a behavior 
the system will adapt accordingly. The system has all required information to do this so called re-
evaluation by mapping user’s actual responses to a more meaningful risky/non-risky decision. 
Hence, replacing the survey data with measured data from users. This will allow the system to 
move beyond the static point in time to a continuous understanding of these factors and 
correlations.  Therefore, by knowing the actual behavior and response, those found significant 
correlations will be truly significant.  
With the continuously evolving threat landscape, new threats might be introduced and impact a 
behavior quite differently depending on user-centric factors. As such, those relations are 
periodically revised such as every six months. Not limited to that, user’s responses will be 
periodically used to intelligently  re-measure user-centric factors. For example, user’s age is 
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recalculated to ensure he belongs to the assigned age category or reassign him accordingly. Or a 
user’s IT-level could be changed from a non-IT professional to an IT-professional based on his 
behavior and so on. These examples serve to demonstrate that UCRAR can dynamically adapt to 
changes in user-centric factors. 
Hopefully, this process will be used as feedback mechanism to keep the system up-to-date 
without having to re-run the survey and gradually move away from behavioral intent to actual 
behavior. Further to that, by measuring these responses, this process will have a smoothing effect 
on generated risk score/level by moving away from grouping of user’s (based on survey results) to 
a more personalized risk model. Similar to the knowledge base of good/expected behavior, this 
community-based risk data is a centralized web service managed by a third party such as ISP, 
network operator …etc. 
5.3.1.6 Network Estimator 
Given that a vulnerable router is more likely to be exposed and used as a threat source, this 
process monitors the status of the network in which the user is connected to and is kept to a 
minimum level. Information about the used network devices, i.e. routers, are collected and passed 
to the System-Based Risk Estimator. Router information will be expressed in terms of router’s 
software name and version and passed to System-Based Risk Estimator to check it for 
vulnerabilities. Thus, the output of this process is the parameter r-id which is the ID of the software 
executed on the router in CPE 
5.3.1.7 System-Based Risk Estimator 
A vulnerable software could be exploited by attackers compromising the system where this 
software is running such that the more vulnerabilities in a software/app the less secure it is and, 
eventually, the lower its trustworthiness level. Hence, a vulnerability-oriented approach (NIST 
2012) where the method starts with the identification of a set of vulnerabilities is used. This process 
analyses and calculates security risks on system level. As perfect security is considered to be 
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unachievable for information systems, then the goal is to achieve a security level that is deemed 
appropriate to user’s needs and requirements. This is accomplished by checking all installed 
software, router software and also platform information in terms of the used Operating System for 
vulnerabilities. For each of the previously mentioned, the System-Based Risk Estimator will check 
vulnerabilities knowledge bases such as NVD and CVE for known vulnerabilities and calculate a 
software risk score accordingly. The final system risk score, system-risk, will be calculated based 
upon a proposed model as explained in the next Chapter.  Thus, the output of this process is: 
 system-risk which is the quantitative system risk score, 0 ≤ system-risk ≤ 10. 
5.3.1.8 Risk Aggregator 
The purpose of this process is to evaluate/assess security risks based on information obtained 
from User-Centric Risk Estimator and  System-Based Risk Estimator and generate a risk profile 
that adapts to users accordingly. Hence, this risk profile is composed of a set of parameters that are 
required by the Security Response Manager to do its job. This aggregator will assess and analyze 
the security risk and determine the final risk score according to a proposed model as will be 
explained in the next Chapter. However, the quality of the risk assessment depends on the accuracy 
and granularity of data provided by the previously mentioned processes. Thus, a risk profile will be 
generated as follows: 
Risk-Profile=(B-actual, U-info ,overall-risk ,risk-level, date) 
Where:  
Overall-risk  quantitatively expressed and calculated overall risk score, 0 ≤  risk-score ≤ 10   
risk-level is the level of final risk score expressed qualitatively Є {h, m, l} 
date is the date and time stamp this behavior was performed. 
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5.3.2 Risk Communication Component 
The second component of the framework, Risk Communication, starts by receiving the risk 
profile from the Risk Aggregator, analyzing it and deciding on the best targeted form of 
communicating the risk to the user. The importance of communicating risks in a persuasive and 
individualized fashion has been previously discussed in Section 3.7.  To this end, the aim of this 
framework is to convert the user from arguably being ill-informed into a security minded user who 
is able to make an informed decision. The proposed way to accomplish this is, as previously 
discussed, by continuously monitoring, assessing user’s behaviors and to use persuasive risk 
communication in the form of individualized messages to give the user an opportunity to make a 
security informed decision. In addition, subjecting the user to targeted security 
awareness/education to influence his behavior to be more secure.  
Unlike employees of an organization, users have no security policy to comply to nor an 
enforcement of security education. This lack of education enforcement may be one of the reasons 
behind this insecure behavior. In addition, there is the challenge of convincing the user of his 
responsibility to protect himself (Kritzinger, Von solms 2010). Based on user’s risk score/level, 
two broadly potential behaviors are recognized. Namely, secure and insecure behaviors as follows: 
 Secure behavior:  The user is behaving in a good/safe manner, thus his risk level 
is low. 
 Insecure behavior: The user is at risk whether this behavior is done intentionally 
or unintentionally. The risk level of this behavior is either medium or high.  
The reasons behind these behaviors were established especially the fact that user’s behavior is 
hard to predict and there is the case of an aware user that simply chooses to behave insecurely. In 
addition, different types of user’s classifications were previously discussed in Section 3.5. As such, 
two broad user’s categories could be identified according to their insecure behavior as aware and 
unaware. However, many user’s categories could be identified in between. The timing of the 
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behavior, for example, could be used as an indicating  factor when categorizing users. For example, 
a user that was alerted for an insecure behavior, then, after a long period of time he performed the 
same behavior. This could be as a result of him forgetting about the insecurity/consequences of this 
behavior. Thus, the time period between these behaviors could be used as one of the reasons behind 
this insecure behavior. Consequently, a third category of users, the forgetful, could be identified. 
The user-centric factor of service usage could be used when determining this time factor. Given a 
certain window of time, the rate of using the Internet varies from high as in high usage users to low 
as in low usage users.  Three time periods are suggested as short, medium and long. However, the 
duration of each of these periods is different according to the user’s service usage level. A 
suggested categorization of such periods is as in Table 5.3. However, according to data provided by 
the User Behavior Monitor on the user’s service usage level, this will be adjusted accordingly. 
Hence, the following user’s categorization will be used when assessing their insecure behaviors: 
I. Unaware user: A user who has done this behavior for the first time and the risk of 
it may be unknown to him.  
II. Aware user: A user who has repeated the same behavior within a short time 
period. Thus, the user maybe aware of this insecure behavior and its consequences 
but simply does it again. This may be interpreted as intentional insecure behavior. 
III. Forgetful user: A user who has previously done this behavior but within a 
medium or long time period.  Hence, the user maybe aware of this insecure 
behavior and its consequences but forgot about it due to time duration. This may 
be interpreted as unintentional insecure behavior.  
 However, whenever a behavior is performed more than once, the difference between 









Short Medium Long 
Low 0 days..30 days 31 days ..60 days 61 days ..90 days Three months 
Medium 0 days ..20 days 21 days .. 40 days 41 days .. 60 days Two months 
High 0 days .. 10 days 11 days .. 20 days 21 days .. 30 days One month 
Table ‎5.3: Suggested Categorization of Time Period 
Evidence suggests that static risk communication may result in users becoming inattentive to 
messages delivered (Wash 2010; ; Blythe et al. 2011; Wash and Rader 2011; Blythe and Camp 
2012; Wahelberg et al. 2013). Thus, the robustness of risk communication should be suited to the 
encountered risk by providing timely information to the user about their risk taking behavior. To 
overcome the challenge of convincing users to avoid risks, changing their behavior to promote 
good practice and to improve the effectiveness of persuasive technology, three response approaches 
will be used. It is anticipated that the utilization of such approaches  will facilitate targeted risk 
communication, prevent habituation and change risk perception of users. These approaches utilize 
a blocking and a non-blocking mechanism. In a blocking approach, an explicit decision is required 
from the user where he is banned from doing any further activity until this blocking dialog is 
confirmed. Whereas in a non-blocking approach, an alert is shown for a certain period of time then 
disappears without preventing the user from doing his current activity nor his need to confirm it. 
The advantages and disadvantages of using each of these approaches are appointed in the security 
literature. For instance, the former could be dismissed without the user noticing the contents and 
the latter may simply be overlooked (Maurer et al. 2011). One way to overcome these 
disadvantages is not to rely on a single mechanism but on a combination of them that differs 
according to response severity. Additionally, between these two extremes, a proposed semi-
blocking approach could be used. In this approach, explicit attention is required from the user as an 
alert is shown to him but does not stop him from performing his current activity. To attract user’s 
attention, sound will be used in a discontinuous manner. To dismiss it, it needs to be confirmed.  
This will make the user continue with his current activity before dealing with the alert. All of the 
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previously discussed factors will be considered when communicating risk to the user. To 
accomplish this proposed risk communication, the following processes are established: 
5.3.2.1 The Security Response Manager 
Based on the user’s behavior risk level, the Security Response Manager will make a decision 
on what the next step is. However, when communicating risk to the user, The Security Response 
Manager will decide upon the best way to do that. The best form of persuasive technology that best 
suits the user will be decided upon and used based on U-info that is part of the risk profile. Security 
is “rarely the user’s primary goal” and users only try to protect themselves from risks salient to 
them (Blythe and Camp 2012). Thus, to educate user’s about security risks and promote good 
behavior, user-tailored messages that take into account the individual user-centric factors are used. 
Two sub-processes carry on the functionality of The Security Response Manager as follows: 
* Risk Evaluator: Once the risk profile is received, the behavior’s risk level is checked 
first. If the behavior is secure, i.e. low risk, then behavior-response-information is sent 
immediately to the Historical Risk Register. If the behavior is insecure, i.e. risk level is 
medium or high, then the risk profile is forwarded to The Response Organizer. 
* Response Organizer: Prior to issuing a message, it will check the Historical Risk 
Register of previous incidents of the same behavior and the issued security messages 
related to it. Hence, the response mechanism of this process depends on two concepts, 
namely, informing the user of his behavior’s risk score/ level and deciding on the best way 
to communicate/educate the user about his risk-taking behavior. Hence, based upon the 
information received in the risk profile and historical data about the same behavior (if any) 
from the Historical Risk Register process, a gradual, individualized and persuasive 





Figure ‎5.2: The Response Mechanism 
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Educating users about information security is a challenging but a must to fight against this  
continuously evolving threat landscape. As discussed previously in this research, although a 
number of traditional techniques are used to educate users, but unfortunately failing as users tend to 
ignore threat warnings. Furthermore, the traditional one-message/one-size-fits-all approaches to 
risk communication, for example, should be replaced by a targeted approach that goes beyond just 
informing the user. This targeted approach should focus on the user, stress on his responsibility to 
protect himself, provide him with information on what to do and provide some level of security 
education in an individualized persuasive and timely manner.  However, this combination should 
be used cautiously to avoid overwhelming the user with information and help in motivating 
continuous secure behavior.  Therefore, a response mechanism is proposed that is intended to 
create an information security literacy by creating a baseline of information security culture. 
Hence, instead of just warning the user once of his insecure behavior, six response levels are 
proposed and to be used in a gradual manner. The risk score, number of times a behavior was 
performed and time period are all factors used to leverage the response level as shown in Table 5.4. 
These response levels are: 
1) Level 1 (Response 1): This is the lowest response level. In this level, a basic awareness 
message tailored to user’s personality trait is given in a blocking approach.  
2) Level 2 (Responses 2 and 3) : A basic awareness message tailored to user’s personality 
trait is given in addition to information about what others are doing in the same situation/ a 
statistics about the consequence(s) of this behavior. A blocking approach is used. 
3) Level 3 (Responses 4 and 5) : Similar to Level 2. Additionally, to continuously raise 




4) Level 4 (Response 6) : A basic awareness message tailored to user’s personality trait is 
given in addition to information about what others are doing in the same situation/ a 
statistics about the consequence(s) of this behavior. An awareness module related to his 
current behavior and in the user’s preferred learning style such as watching a video, is 
recommended to the user in a blocking approach. To continuously raise user’s awareness, a 
further reminder of these consequences and what to do in a non-blocking approach is used. 
If the user cancelled or postponed the recommended module, he will be reminded of it 
using a semi-blocking approach.  
5) Level 5 (Response 7): Similar to level 4, but instead of an awareness module, a training 
module related to his current behavior and in the user’s preferred learning style such as 
playing a security game, is recommended to the user.  
6) Level 6 (Response 8): This is the highest level of response. Similar to level 5 except that If 
the user cancelled or postponed the recommended module, he will be reminded of it using 
a blocking approach. 
As no enforcement of security education could be made on the user, the reminder approach is 
used. Firstly, it is used as means for providing further education about user’s behaviors. Secondly,  
when a user cancels or rejects a recommended security education module, the reminder approach is 
used as a “remind me later“ option. Nevertheless, there is the case of him cancelling or postponing 
several recommended modules. In this case, they are arranged in a descending order according to 
how frequent these behaviors were committed in a time period. To avoid bombarding the user with 
reminders and alerts, it is suggested that the recommended security education module related to the 
most frequently done behavior supersedes the others. Further to communicating risks in a 
visual/audio manner, passive security messages that are integrated within software/app will be 
provided. Moreover, the user will be given the option to be notified by email/SMS sent to his cell 
phone such as reminding him to change his Library online account password or to logoff from the 
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Employment Service account. A summary of these response levels is as shown in Table 5.4 given 
that security education is always given in a blocking response approach. 
 
Table ‎5.4: Response Levels 
In these response levels, user-centric factors of personality traits, age, IT-proficiency and 
learning styles are considered when communicating risk to the user. Little evidence is found 
relating the effect of security messages of various behaviors to gender. The study by Sheng et al. 
(2010), for example, has shown that females have a stronger tendency to reply to phishing emails 
than males. This could be extended to include more security behaviors. However, no specific 
evidence was found that relates the service usage level to security messages nor to security 
education. The authors of (Kazjer et al. 2014) found that messages tailored to user’s personality 
trait could increase its effectiveness and minimize a backfire response. The message themes and 
related personality traits are as shown in Table 5.5. 
 Personality Traits 
Message Themes Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Openness Neuroticism 
Deterrence - √ - - √ 
Morality - √ - - - 
Regret - √ - × - 
Incentive - - - × - 
Feedback √ √ √ × √ 
Table ‎5.5:  Personality Traits and Message Themes (Kazjer et. al 2014) 




Each personality trait is more receptive to one or more message except for the personality trait 
of Openness. Apposed to other personality traits, openness was not more receptive to any message 
theme. Actually, it was less receptive to regret, incentive and feedback messages. As such, these 
themes will not be used for a user with an openness personality trait to avoid a backfire response. 
Consequently, it is suggested to use deterrence and morality message themes when responding to 
an openness personality trait user. For the behavior of “ Using pirate software”, for example, the 
same security message could be written in five different ways through the manipulation of words as 
follows: 
 Deterrence: Using illegitimate software can result in criminal prosecution and a fine of 
thousands of Pounds. 
 Morality: Using legitimate software is the right thing to do and complies to secure/safe 
security behavior. 
 Regret: Illegitimate software maybe malicious. Imagine how bad you feel if your 
computer gets a Virus and crashes. 
 Incentive: When using legitimate software, Software companies will frequently give you 
technical support, gift cards and promotions. 
 Feedback: Almost 70% of computer users do not use illegitimate software. You should 
join them to be security conscious.  
In addition to the previously mentioned design factors, a number of design concepts are 
suggested when responding to the user about his insecure behavior. These are, but not limited to, as 
follows:     
 Physical mental models: Evidence suggests that mental models were found to be more 
accessible by the user (Blythe and Camp 2012; Camp 2006). Hence, an approach of 
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embedding graphics and visual indicators within security messages will be used. 
Particularly, the use of physical mental models to change users risk perception.  
 Messages that speak the user’s language: Given that users do not react to security 
messages in the same way, messages that speak the user’s language will be used. Thus, 
persuasive messages that adapt to user’s characteristics will be determined and delivered. 
For example, a message displayed to a novice user should be jargon free, in contrast to a 
message displayed to an IT expert user. Moreover, personality based risk communication 
strategies will be utilized in which messages will be tailored to user’s personality trait as 
explained earlier.  
 Colors and sounds: Colors will be used to attract user’s attention by using the traffic light 
terminology. Accordingly, risk level will be expressed in color (red for high risk, orange 
for medium risk and green for low risk), quantitatively (scale 0..10) and qualitatively (high, 
medium and low). A user who is overwhelmed with his work may not notice or ignore the 
security message, as a result, sounds will be used as a second form of attracting user’s 
attention in the semi-blocking approach. 
 Minimalist consistent design: To avoid overwhelming and distracting the user, more 
details about the behavior and what to do are provided by clicking on a “ More Info” 
button in the alert (Ibrahim et al. 2011). When clicked, the dialog box will expand to 
include more details. From a usability perspective, the placement of buttons in the alerts 
such as “OK” and “More Info”, are consistent regardless of the response level. 
 Animated avatar: The security status of both system and user behavior will be 
continuously monitored and visually expressed in the form of an animated avatar. This 
avatar will wave a flag, for example, that changes its color according to the current risk 
level. If the user wishes for further detail, a balloon that briefly describes the risk status 
will be displayed when this avatar is clicked.  
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 Behavior report: Similar to the concept of an Ant-Virus software monthly report, a 
periodic report is issued to the user describing his behavior in that period. This will be in 
the form of a graph showing the number of times the user was in each risk level, number of 
issued alerts and the number of accepted/rejected alerts. Further details could be offered by 
clicking on a “More Info” button. As a form of motivating the user, an awareness meter is 
proposed. The mechanism of such meter is that  if the user is not warned /obeyed 
immediately all displayed security messages in a short period of time, he will be awarded 
by sharing this success with his friends on Facebook, Twitter… etc. or with other users of 
this system, i.e. being in the community leader board. 
As this proposed framework is multiplatform, Figures 5.3,5.4,5.5,5.6 and 5.7 are suggestive 
and not definitive designs of alerts generated by The Security Response Manager.  
 


















Figure ‎5.7: Suggested Design of a Motivation Alert  
5.3.2.2 Historical Risk Register 
All user’s behaviors, whether secure or insecure, and information related to it are continuously 
stored in this register/database. Whenever a risk profile is received, it is compared with relevant 
historical risk data. The result of this comparison is used to determine the type/level of response. 
This will be stored as the following tuple: 
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Res-behavior= (b-actual, date,  response-num, module, u-action, risk-score, risk level) 
Where: reponse-num is the number of the response displayed to the user as shown in Figure 
5.2. Reponse-num Є {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}. 0 is used to indicate no response issued, i.e. secure 
behavior 
Module is to indicate the type of recommended security education module (if any) of either 
security awareness or training. Module Є {aw, tr, no} 
u-action is user’s behavior towards a given module if any, i.e. ignored, or obeyed.  
U-action Є {i,o} 
Additionally, this information will be used by the Security Response Manager when issuing a 
motivation alert, user’s behavior report and to identify areas in which the user has mostly behaved 
insecurely and in need of further education.  
5.3.2.3 Alerts, Reminders/Notifications, Awareness and Training 
This targeted risk communication goes beyond passively notifying/warning users of security 
risks to act as a tool to educating and training the user on good behavior to make security informed 
decisions whilst displaying the security message. This is can be achieved through additional 
teaching/education in the user’s preferred learning style such as gamification, video and podcast. 
Additionally, in three different response approaches , six response levels and further details as an 
option as explained earlier. 
5.3.2.4 Internet-Based Body of Knowledge 
To educate the user about security, a form of targeted security education (basic awareness, 
consequences, awareness module and training module) will be provided based on user’s behavior 
focusing, mainly, on educating him of his risk taking behavior. This will be decided upon by 
searching an Internet based body of knowledge that is developed by a third party, or simply the 
Internet as a huge knowledge base for security information such that the required security 
information will be searched for, identified and located on the Internet. As the accuracy and 
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effectiveness of such provided info should be evaluated, the creation of such knowledge base and 
evaluation of retrieved security information are outside the scope of work of this research and 
could be part of future work. 
Given the researcher’s focus on proposing a user-centric model to assess user’s behaviors, this 
research was not designed to propose and evaluate the best approach to communicate risk to the 
user. Actually, the suggested risk communication approach was used as means to show how the 
results of the risk assessment, i.e. risk profile, can be used to communicate and educate users about 
risks in a way that goes beyond the one message/one size fits all approach.  It is anticipated that 
this suggested approach will give the users a better understanding of various security issues, threats 
and how to avoid them in an individualized way. It is believed that doing work in both components  
of the proposed UCRAR Framework is beyond the work of a single PhD. As such, a decision was 
made to focus on the Risk Assessment component and not to move forward in the Risk 
Communication component of UCRAR. 
5.4 UCRAR’s Operational Flow 
To assess and communicate risk, the previously mentioned processes need to collaborate 
together. As user’s behaviors are continuously and transparently monitored, the risk assessment 
process is triggered by the query request sent by the Automated User-behavior Monitor to the Good 
Behavior knowledge base. The Good Behavior Knowledge base will compare user’s behavior 
against a set of behavior’s related descriptors as described in Section 5.3.2 and sends the query 
result back to the Automated User-behavior Monitor. This result is sent to the User-centric Risk 
Estimator as a user-centric risk assessment request. Additionally, user and behavior information 
such as behavior type and whether it is an application or system related behavior are sent along 
with the assessment request. However, to reduce processing overhead, user information maybe 
cached into the User-centric Risk Estimator. Upon receiving this request, the User-centric Risk 
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Estimator will send an application information request to the Software/App Detector which is 
needed for the assessment process. After getting the result, user-centric assessment is performed 
based upon the received information and the user-centric risk assessment result is sent to the Risk 
Aggregator. Hence, the User-centric Risk Estimator assesses behavior’s risks based on information 
received from both The Automated User-behavior Monitor and the Software/App Detector.  
Meanwhile, the Software/App Detector will send information about the current 
software/application and Operating System to the System-based Risk Estimator. To assess user’s 
end-to-end communication, if any, the System-based Risk Estimator will issue a network 
information request to the Network Estimator process. After receiving all device information, i.e. 
application, Operating System and Network Router software, a device information query is sent to 
the CVE/NVD knowledge base for vulnerability data. Hence, the System-based Risk Estimator 
assesses system’s risks based on information collected from the Software/Application Detector, 
Network Estimator and CVE/NVD knowledge base. Subsequently to calculating the security score 
for each of device information, the  system-based risk assessment is carried out and the result is 
sent to the Risk Aggregator process. Then, a final risk assessment is done by the Risk Aggregator. 
By combining both risk assessment results, user-centric and system-based, a final risk score is 
calculated and a resulting risk profile is generated and sent to the Security Response Manager as 
shown in Figure 5.8.  
The risk communication process starts by the Security Response Manager receiving the risk 
profile and analyzing its data. Similar to the User-centric Estimator, user information maybe 
cached into the Security Response Manager. The Risk Evaluator sub-process of the Security 
Response Manager will first check the risk level of the behavior. If it is low, i.e. secure, then 
secure-response-behavior information will be sent immediately to the Historical Risk Register. 
Otherwise, it is sent to the Response Organizer sub-process which will send a behavior query to the 
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Historical Risk Register. Based on the query result, the Security Response Manager will decide 
upon the response. Before communicating the risk, a query is sent to the Internet-based Body of 
Knowledge for security education information related to the behavior. User’s response to the risk 
communication is sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior information as 










Figure ‎5.9:  Operational Flow in The  Risk Communication Component 
To further explain how a response decision is made in this operational flow, a scenario is 
assumed of four different behaviors undertaken by a user in a time span of three months from 1-9-
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2017 to 1-12-2017 as in Table 5.6. The user is assumed as a medium level service usage user. The 
response to his behavior is as described in section 5.3.2.1 and according to the response mechanism 
of Figure 5.2. 
Behavior # Behavior Name Date Risk score/level 
1 Behavior A 1-9-2017 3.2 / L 
2 Behavior B 5-9-2017 8.8 / H 
3 Behavior C 12-9-2017 5.3 / M 
4 Behavior B 13-9-2017 7.3 / H 
5 Behavior D 20-9-2017 6.5 / M 
6 Behavior C 5-10-2017 6 / M 
7 Behavior D 6-10-2017 7.6 / H 
8 Behavior B 20-10-2017 6.2 / M 
9 Behavior C 25-11-2017 6.7 / M 
10 Behavior D 1-12-2017 4.8 / M 
Table ‎5.6: Response Scenario Behaviors 
 Behavior #1: 
Risk level = Low, i.e. secure behavior. Thus, no alert issued and response-behavior-info is 
sent to Historical Risk Register. 
 Behavior #2: 
Risk level = High, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was not seen before, i.e. first time. Thus, Response 2 is issued. User’s response is 
recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-info. 
 Behavior #3: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was not seen before, i.e. first time. Thus, Response 1 is issued. User’s response is 
recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-info. 
 Behavior #4: 
Risk level = High, i.e. insecure behavior 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 8 days ago, i.e. short time period. 
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Current risk score (7.3)  < last time risk score (8.8). thus, Response 7 is issued. User’s 
response is recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-
info. 
 Behavior #5: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was not seen before, i.e. first time. Thus, Response 1 is issued. User’s response is 
recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-info. 
 Behavior #6: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure. 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 24 days ago, i.e. medium time period. 
Current risk score (6)  > last time risk score (5.3). Thus, Response 6 is issued. User’s 
response is recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-
info. 
 Behavior #7: 
Risk level = High, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 17 days ago, i.e. short time period. 
Current risk score (7.6)  > last time risk score (6.5). Thus, Response 8 is issued. User’s 
response is recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-
info. 
 Behavior #8: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 38 days ago, i.e. medium time period. 
Current risk score (6.0)  < last time risk score (7.3). Thus, Response 5 is issued. User’s 





 Behavior #9: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 51 days ago, i.e. long time period. 
Current risk score (6.7)  > last time risk score (6.2). Thus, Response 4 is issued. User’s 
response is recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-
info. 
 Behavior #10: 
Risk level = Medium, i.e. insecure behavior. 
Behavior was seen before. Last seen 55 days ago, i.e. long time period. 
Current risk score (7.6)  > last time risk score (6.5). Thus, Response 3 is issued. User’s 
response is recorded and sent to the Historical Risk Register along with response-behavior-
info. 
5.5 Conclusion 
A novel framework that aims to assess, communicate and educate users about risks in a 
continuous, individualized and timely manner was proposed. This is accomplished by continuously 
and transparently monitoring his behaviors. The novelty of this proposed framework is that it 
attempts to assess user‘s risk-taking behaviors from both a user-centric and a system-based 
perspective to generate a final individualized risk score/level. However, in order to determine this 
risk score/level, novel Information Security Risk Assessment Models that assess risk on both the 
user and system levels and take into account user-centric factors among other factors as part of this 
assessment are required. These models need to be utilized within the functionality of the Risk 
Assessment component of the proposed UCRAR framework. Namely, the User-centric Risk 




Not limited to that, an individualized risk profile with user’s risk data is created and used as 
means on how to best communicate risk to the user. Based on the analysis of user’s behavior and 
other factors within the risk profile, a decision is made upon the best persuasive and individualized 
form of communicating/educating the user about his insecure behavior. Aside from the traditional 
approaches to risk communication such as the one message and one-size-fits-all approaches, 
responding to insecure behaviors goes beyond alerting the user of his insecure behavior to 
providing a level of security education. This is done in a gradual manner utilizing three different 
response approaches and six response levels.  
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Chapter 6 : A Novel Approach to Information Security Risk 
Assessment 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In order for the aforementioned UCRAR framework to operate, there needs to be a mechanism 
upon which risk is calculated and explicitly incorporates user interaction and user’s behaviors in 
understanding risk. Having established that risk is changing within an application, there exists other 
sources of risk on the system level  and that a number of different user-centric factors affect user’s 
risk-taking behavior, the outstanding research question is how to calculate that risk. Therefore, 
based on Figure 5.1, three risk estimation models are proposed in this chapter to timely calculate 
risk apart from the traditional risk assessment formula where risk is calculated as 
Risk = Asset x Threat x Vulnerability. 
These models are namely, System-based Risk Estimation Model, User-centric Risk Estimation 
Model and the Aggregated Risk Estimation Model to be used by System-based Risk Estimator, 
User-centric Risk Estimator and the Risk Aggregator processes of UCRAR respectively.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, various risk assessment techniques whether qualitative, quantitative 
or semi quantitative are given in (ISO 2009) that have been used in the literature to assess and 
analyze information security risks such as fault tree analysis, cause and effect analysis, Bayesian 
networks and decision trees (Alguliev et al. 2009; Imamverdiyev 2013; Pirzadeh and Jonsson 2011; 
Poolsappasit et al. 2011; Sadiq et al. 2010; Tamjidyamcholo et al. 2013; Tao et al. 2010).  A 
matrix-based approach is a sound, tested, well documented and widely used approach amongst risk 
assessment methodologies (ISO 27005 2011). Therefore, in these proposed three models, the 
calculation of risks is on the basis of a risk matrix. A vulnerability-oriented approach (NIST 2012) 
where the method starts with the identification of a set of vulnerabilities is adopted as explained in 
181 
 
Section 5.3.1.7. Hence, some form of information source that can measure the criticality or 
vulnerability of software is needed. Currently, this could be done through the CVSS scoring 
algorithm. Thus, risk scoring will be based on the scoring system used by (Mell et al.,2007). 
Consequently, the generated risk scores of each model are quantitative numbers between 0 and 10, 
where 0..3.9 = low risk, 4..6.9 = medium risk and 7..10 = high risk. 
In the rest of this chapter, the proposed system-based risk estimation model is discussed in 
section 2 followed by an explanation of the proposed user-centric risk estimation model. How the 
results of these proposed models are used to generate an aggregated risk profile using a proposed 
aggregated risk estimation model is demonstrated in section 4 followed by a conclusion in section 
5.  
6.2  System-based Risk Estimation Model 
For the system-based risk assessment, a vulnerability-oriented approach will be used to assess 
and analyze security risks on the system level through the use of CVSS scoring algorithm. To 
calculate a software risk score/level, the System-based Risk Estimator process of UCRAR will 
check all installed software, router software and also platform information in terms of the used 
Operating System for known vulnerabilities. This is done by using knowledge bases such as NVD 
and CVE. Time  is a critical factor in determining the severity of such vulnerabilities. Thus, the 
methodology proposed by (Wu and Wang  2011) will be used to calculate the risk score (0.. 10) of 
installed applications, app-risk, the used Operating System, os-risk, and router’s software, nw-risk.  
However, this methodology is not definitive and the nature of the proposed model allows the use of 
any software risk scoring methodology.  
As applications installed from illegitimate sources such as suspicious websites and non-
legitimate app-markets or pirate software maybe malicious, thus, increasing the vulnerability to 
various attacks, the source name of the installed application, install-name, is used as a risk factor. 
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Since this risk factor is application-specific, then it will be added to the calculated app-risk.  If the 
application was installed from an illegitimate source, then the final security score of the 
application, app-risk, is re-calculated as follows: 
       IF install-name = illegitimate THEN      (1) 
    IF 0<= app-risk <= 3.9 THEN app-risk = 4 {increase app risk level from low to medium}  
 ELSE IF 4<= app-risk <=6.9 THEN  app-risk = 7{increase app risk level from medium to high} 
There is an understanding that each of the application, router and operating system has a 
different impact on the overall system risk. As no evidence yet on the amount/percentage of impact 
each of these aspects has, weights are used. In practice, it could be quite difficult to understand 
how to set these weights. Indeed, future work will need to identify a mechanism in which this could 
be done more reliably. Whenever any evidence is found, the model is flexible enough to adopt to it. 
Therefore, the final system risk score, system-risk, is calculated as follows: 
System-risk  = App_risk *wapp + OS_risk *wos + NW_risk*wnw / (wapp+wos+wnw)     (2) 
where wapp, wos and wnw are subjective weights. 
Thus, the resulting system risk score, system-risk, is the is the quantitative system risk score 
where  0 ≤ system-risk ≤ 10 . Accordingly, the resulting system risk level is 0..3.9 Low, 4..6.9 
Medium and 7..10 High. 
6.3 User-Centric Risk Estimation Model 
The findings of Chapter 4, demonstrated the impact of user-centric factors on users’ risk taking 
behavior. This suggested that given a certain user behavior and different users, risk is not the same 
for all of them. As such, these user-centric factors will be considered as a risk factor when 
assessing risk on the user level. As threat against a certain application maybe increased due to 
user’s insecure behavior, behaviors are assessed, resulting in a risk score/level, behavior-score, and 
used as a risk factor. Additionally, other risk factors that are behavior-related are considered such 
as the application importance, app-score, as detected by the Software Detector process and the 
183 
 
used communication channel. Consequently, assessing these user-centric and behavior-related risk 
factors will result in an individualized risk score/level, behavior-risk.  
6.3.1 A Categorization of User’s Behaviors 
 The first step in this proposed risk estimation model is to have a list of possible user’s 
behaviors in order to understand what needs to be measured and quantified. Nevertheless, it is 
unrealistic to assume all possible user’s behaviors especially with the existence of multiple 
platforms and the increasing number of applications on a yearly basis (Statista.com 2016). As such, 
when looking at mobile devices usage for example, a list of possible user’s behaviors is as in 
Appendix B. For this purpose, applications were categorized into groups and an example 
application of each category was selected based upon its popularity, i.e. number of subscribers. 
Although this comprehensive list of behaviors is in the context of mobile devices, but it does not 
include any platform-specific behaviors and, accordingly, could be used as a starting point and 
generalized to any computing device.  
However, to individually and continuously risk assess user’s behaviors in near real-time could 
be time consuming. Most traditional risk assessment models (Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2005; 
Ledermuller and Clarke 2011; Theoharidou et. al 2012;  Jing et. al 2014) rely on user input where  
users have to complete extensive questionnaires for example. This is not acceptable and may result 
in the user dumping or rejecting the application. Hence,  the need to be particularly careful about 
placing input burdens/demands on the user is paramount. Therefore, to help automate this step, an 
approach has been taken to develop a structure upon which user’s behaviors could be categorized 
as in Figure 6.1. In this suggested categorization, each behavior category has its own proposed risk 
assessment model. Namely, these behaviors could usefully be categorized as: 
I. System/Device-related behaviors: These are stand-alone behaviors that are not application-
specific. These could be classified as: 
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I.1 Device locking behaviors: These include the utilization (if any) of a device 
locking mechanism as means of authentication. Examples of such mechanisms are 
a password/pin lock, a face lock and a swipe pattern lock.  
I.2 Connectivity: This refers to how the device accesses the Internet (i.e. network 
connections). These network connections/communication channels are either wired 
networks such as cellular network (3G/4G) or wireless communication such as  
public/private WiFi networks, Bluetooth and NFC. However, this is different from 
using a vulnerable router as when calculating system risk.  
I.3 Settings behaviors: These are behaviors that are related to the settings options 
for system/device backups, system/device/applications update such as enabling 
auto-checking for updates and privacy options such as enabling location services.  
I.4 Responding to security alerts: These include responding/rejecting various 
security alerts whether issued by UCRAR or by other applications.  
II. Application-related behaviors: These are behaviors regarding the way the user is using the 
different processes (functionalities) within an application such as opening an email 
attachment within the Gmail application, posting on the Facebook wall and opening 
contacts in the Twitter application. These could be classified according to the nature of the 
behavior and the type of data accessed as follows: 
II.1 Nature of behavior: from the application-related behaviors mentioned in Appendix B, 
they could be classified as: 
II.1.1 Read behaviors: These are passive behaviors where there is no sharing of 
information with others. Examples of such behaviors are forecasting the weather, 
reading BBC news or services provided by HSBC. 
II.1.2 Write behaviors: These are the behaviors where the user is sharing 
(exposing) information with others such as tweeting in Twitter, posting a photo in 
Facebook or writing a message in Whatsapp. 
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II.1.3 Settings behaviors: These are behaviors that are related to changing settings 
of an application such as turning on photo tagging in Twitter and “who can look 
me up” in Facebook. 
II.1.4 Authentication behaviors: These are behaviors related to the signing in to an 
application/service (if any) using an authentication mechanism, i.e. passwords.  
II.2 Type of data accessed: Data is classified according to the risk and impact on user’s 
CIA and privacy when this data is modified or disclosed. Consequently, data could be 
either: 
II.2.1 Private: Examples of such data are email contacts and personal photos of the 
user.  
II.2.2 Public: Examples of such data are products on sale in Amazon and weather 
news on BBC. 
These two types of data are, mainly, related to the read/write behaviors, i.e. read-private-
data, read-public-data, write-private-data and write-public-data. 
 
 
Figure ‎6.1: A Suggested Categorization of User's Behaviors 
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As an example of the generalizability and applicability of this proposed categorization and to 
benefit from empirical data, a mapping of behaviors mentioned in the users’ survey of Chapter 4 to 
the categorization of user’s behaviors is as given in Table 6.1. 
Categorization of User’s Behaviors 




























 Changing of passwords 
 Using the same password for multiple 
sensitive accounts 
Settings 
 Disable Ant-virus software because it was 
slowing my device 
 Logging off from online systems 
Read 
Private 
 Clicking on links/attachments in emails from 
unknown senders without checking 
 Clicking on links/attachments in emails from 




 Storing of passwords 
 Deleting suspicious emails 
 Using encrypted USBs when transferring 
data 
 Encrypting sensitive information  
 Using pirate software 
 Allowing web browsers to remember my 
passwords 
Public 
 Downloading files from 
unknown/suspicious websites 















 I lock my workstation when away 
 I use a password for my home PC 
Connectivity 
 Connecting to public WiFis such as in 
shopping malls and coffee shops 
 Disabling of wireless services such as 
WiFi and Bluetooth when not used 
 Using an anonimying proxy 
 Using a TOR network 
 Using a VPN 
Settings 
 Keeping Anti-virus software up-to-date 
 Scanning of USBs before using them  
 Backing up of data on a regular basis  
 Installing of patches  
Responding to alerts 
 Canceling/postponing a security related 
update 
 Opening a document despite security 
warnings 
Table ‎6.1: A Mapping of User's Survey Behaviors of Chapter 4 to The Suggested User's Behaviors Categories 
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When looking at these types of behaviors, two different situations were identified especially in 
the case of authentication and connectivity behaviors. To differentiate them, they are denoted as 
primary and secondary behaviors. A primary behavior is when the behavior is a stand-alone 
behavior and it is assessed independently of any other behavior. Whereas a secondary behavior is 
when the behavior assessment result is combined with the assessment of another behavior as 
explained in the next sections.  
6.3.2 Application-related Behaviors 
A risk assessment model is proposed for each application-related behavior category as 
follows: 
 Authentication behaviors, two situations are identified: 
A. When the authentication behavior itself is assessed independently of any other behaviors 
such as signing in to Twitter account or using the same password for multiple sensitive 
accounts. Hence, the authentication behavior is the primary behavior.  
B. When this behavior relates to an application/service that requires authentication and  its 
assessment result is combined with the assessment of another behavior such as writing an 
email with personal details using Gmail and the email password is weak. Hence, the 
authentication behavior is not the primary assessed behavior but a secondary behavior and 
its risk assessment is combined with the primary behavior. 
In both situations, the same approach is applied to assessing its risk. The used password 
is assessed, first, for its hygiene against a predefined rule-set of 0=low, 1=medium and 
2=high. Passwords are checked for several attributes such as its length, password reuse, how 
old the password is and the utilization of uppercase, lowercase, numbers and special 
characters. An authentication risk matrix is generated for each attribute as in Matrix1. Each 
password attribute is assessed as Low, Medium or High and mapped into Matrix 1. 
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  Password Attribute 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 
Matrix 1: Authentication Matrix, auth-score 
Second, each application will be mapped into its corresponding category and, 
consequently, assigned its importance level, app-score. This  app-score was generated by the 
Software Detector based on user input and has values 0= very low, 1= Low, 2= Medium, 3= 
High and 4= Very High. Finally, based on the “worst case scenario” principle (Theoharidou et 
al. 2012), the maximum value resulting from the above risk matrix is used. Hence, an 
authentication behavioral risk score, auth-score,  will be generated as 
auth-score =  MAX(attributes)      (3) 
If authentication behavior is assessed  independently of any other behaviors, i.e. primary 
behavior, then the resulting auth-score is reassessed based upon the significance correlation 
risk factor (if any) as explained in section 6.3.3. However, as all scores used in the risk 
assessment are from 0 to 10, the resulting auth-score will be normalized. The resulting risk 
score is the behavioral risk score, behavior-risk 
behavior-risk = normalize (significant (auth-score))  (4) 
 Application-related settings behaviors, risk is assessed for this category of behaviors such 
that If the setting is disabled as in behaviors of “Disabling Anti-Virus software” and “Not 
logging off from online systems”, then risk is high. Then, the related application will be 
mapped into its corresponding category and, consequently, assigned its importance level, app-
score as generated by the Software Detector. The assessment of  behavioral score, behavior-




IF app-score = 0 THEN behavior-score = 2     (5) 
ELSE IF IF app-score = 1 THEN behavior-score = 3  
ELSE IF app-score = 2 THEN behavior-score = 4  
ELSE IF app-score = 3 THEN behavior-score = 5  
ELSE IF app-score = 4 THEN behavior-score = 6  
The resulting behavior-score is reassessed based on the significance correlation risk factor 
(if any). As all scores used in the risk assessment are from 0 to 10, then the resulting behavior-
score will be normalized. Finally, the resulting risk score is the behavioral risk score, behavior-
risk. 
behavior-risk = normalize (significant (behavior-score))  (6) 
 Application-related behaviors of Read and Write, each behavior depending on its nature 
and data accessed has its own consequences. As the impact of consequences of various user 
behaviors generate different risk levels within an application where the nature of the behavior 
may escalate or deescalate the risk level of an application. This is evident as a “read” behavior 
has a different risk level than a “write” behavior. Furthermore, the data type accessed by the 
behavior plays a role in the risk assessment whereas reading the weather has different impact 
consequences than reading a bank’s account balance. Similarly, sharing (writing) a link on 
BBC News has different impact consequences from posting (writing) a family photo on 
Facebook. However, reading public data such as browsing products in Amazon, reading the 
weather forecast or searching Google maps might have no potential consequences on the user, 
hence no risk.   
Adopted from CRAMM (Yazaar 2011), seven impact consequences are identified:  
 Impact of Disruption (D) 
 Impact on Personal Privacy (P) 
 Impact of Data Corruption (DC) 
 Impact of Embarrassment (E) 
 Financial Lost (F) 
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 Legal Liability (LL) 
 Impact on Personal Safety (S) 
As it is hard to assess this from one user to another due to different user-centric factors and 
to provide a fine-grained valuation that reduces the burden on the user in terms of user input, 
the potential consequences will be assessed and assigned for each behavior category. Then, 
each behavior will be mapped into its corresponding category. For simplicity, potential 
consequences are rated as 0-Low (L), 1-Medium (M) and 2-High (H). An example of the 
suggested behavior consequences rating is as in Table 6.2. 
 Suggested Consequences 














































Table ‎6.2: An Example of Suggested Behavior Consequences 
Each application will be mapped into its corresponding category and, consequently, 
assigned its importance level, app-score. This  app-score was generated by the Software 
Detector based on user input and has values 0= very low, 1= Low, 2= Medium, 3= High and 4= 
Very High.  A risk matrix will be generated for each consequence as in Matrix 2. 
  Consequence 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 
Matrix 2 : Behavior Matrix , behavior-score 
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The first step in assessing the behavioral risk score is by identifying the app-score and the 
behavior’s nature,  type, accessed data-type, and consequences. Second, based on the “worst 
case scenario” principle (Theoharidou et al. 2012), the maximum value resulting from the 
above risk matrix is used. Hence, a behavioral risk score, behavior-score, will be generated as 
behavior-score =  MAX(consequences)   (7) 
 Additionally, both the used password and communication channel are assessed as additional 
risk factors, i.e. auth-score and connect-score, as explained earlier. Given that the disclosure or 
modification of private data in a private Facebook account, for example, has a lower risk level 
than in a public account, a pre-set score is assigned for each account type as: 
IF account-type = Public THEN account-type-score = 2    (8) 
ELSE IF account-type = Private THEN account-type-score = 1 
To calculate behavior-risk, two situations are identified: 
 If the assessed behavior is significantly correlated with a user-centric factor, then the 
resulting behavior-score is recalculated based on the significance correlation risk factor. 
Finally,  
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score,auth-score,connect-score)+account-type-score   (9) 
 If the assessed behavior is not correlated with a user-centric factor, then behavior-risk is 
calculated as in (9). However, as all scores used in the risks calculations are from 0 to 10, 
the resulting behavior-risk will be normalized. 
Regardless of the application-related behavior category, the resulting behavior risk score, 
behavior-risk, is the quantitative behavior risk score where  0 ≤ behavior-risk ≤ 10 . Accordingly, 
the resulting behavioral risk levels are 0..3.9 low, 4..6.9 medium and 7..10 high. 
6.3.3 The Significance Correlation Risk Factor 
 The novelty of this risk assessment scheme is that a different risk profile is created for the 
same behavior given a number of users. From the findings of Chapter 4,  it was found that the risk 
score/level of a behavior may be positively or negatively affected by certain user-centric factor 
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such as personality trait, age and IT proficiency. Thus, the significance of the correlation between a 
user’s behavior and user’s-centric factors (if any) is used as a risk factor to reassess the behavioral 
risk score, behavior-score. Although one or more user-centric factors were found to be 
significantly correlated with a behavior, only the user-centric factor with the most significant 
correlation is used in the proposed risk assessment models as a risk factor. A number of user-
centric factors have two possibilities/values (low and high) such as personality trait, IT proficiency 
and gender whereas service usage and age have three possibilities/values (low, medium and high). 
However, when considering the significance correlation risk factor, two situations are 
identified, namely, the significance correlation risk factor for application-related behaviors and the 
significance correlation risk factor for system/device-related behaviors. 
I. The Significance Correlation Risk Factor for Application-related behaviors: 
 The significance of a correlation implies that due to certain user-centric factors 
values, the likelihood of a security threat is either decreased or increased. Asset value is 
equivalent to the application’s importance level from the user’s perspective whereas how 
easy a security breach may occur depends on the type of user’s behavior. Hence, the 
following matrix is adopted from (ISO 27005 2011) where user-centric factor value, 
behavior-score and app-score are used instead of threat likelihood, ease of exploitation and 




Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 




The proposed methodology is as follows: 
1. Determine the value of the user-centric factor, i.e. high, medium or low.  
2. Determine the related app-score, i.e 0..4 
3. Determine the behavior-score resulting from Matrix 1. This is a quantitative value 
between 0 and 6 where it will be mapped as 0..2 = low risk, 3 = medium risk and 4..6 = 
high risk.  
4. IF –ve correlation THEN       (10) 
IF user-centric factor = high THEN  {decrease the risk } 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user-centric factor to low 
level. Based on behavior-score and app-score a new risk score/ level will 
be assigned to behavior-score. 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = low THEN  {increase the risk } 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user-centric factor to high 
level. Based on behavior-score and app-score a new risk score/level will 
be assigned to behavior-score. 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = medium THEN   
The user-centric factor is mapped to medium level. Based on behavior-
score and app-score a new risk score/level will be assigned to behavior-
score. 
5. IF +ve correlation THEN       (11) 
IF user-centric factor = high THEN  {increase the risk} 
The user-centric factor is mapped to high level. Based on behavior-score 
and app-score a new risk score/level will be assigned to behavior-score. 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = low THEN  {decrease the risk } 
The user-centric factor is mapped to low level. Based on behavior-score 
and app-score a new risk score/level will be assigned to behavior-score. 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = medium THEN   
The user-centric factor is mapped to medium level. Based on behavior-
score and app-score a new risk level will be assigned to behavior-score. 
 
II. The Significance Correlation Risk Factor for System/Device-related behaviors: 
As these are not specific to a certain application, the proposed methodology is as follows: 
1. Determine the value of the user-centric factor, i.e. high, medium or low.  




3. IF –ve correlation THEN      (12) 
IF user-centric factor = high THEN  {decrease the risk } 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = low THEN  {increase the risk } 
behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = medium THEN   
Neither increase nor decrease the risk score. 
4. IF +ve correlation THEN      (13) 
IF user-centric factor = high THEN  {increase the risk } 
behavior-score = behavior-score +1 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = low THEN  {decrease the risk score} 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 
ELSE IF user-centric factor = medium THEN   
Neither increase nor decrease the risk score 
6.3.4 System/Device-Related Behaviors 
A risk assessment model is proposed for each system/device-related behavior category as 
follows: 
 Connectivity behaviors, as there is no 100% safe communication channel, and given that a 
range of communication channels could be used to connect a computing device to the 
Internet, a pre-set risk level will be assigned to each channel. Apart from the use of a VPN, 
this risk level will be based on the security measures that are utilized for data transmission by 
the communication channel (Community Norton.com 2017). Therefore, 
 Wired private networks and Cellular networks (3G/4G), they normally contain 
provisioning regarding data privacy that protect the user better than  WiFi networks. 
Although there is a probability of eavesdropping but the connection is encrypted and the 
used hardware is harder to obtain and more expensive than for WiFi eavesdropping. Thus, 
data sent over the cellular network is encrypted and considered to have the lowest risk of 
exposure.  
 WiFi, the risk level depends on the connected network as WiFi Protected Access, WPA, is 
considered to be more secure than Wired Equivalent Privacy, WEP. Usually, public Wifi 
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found in coffeeshops, shopping malls …etc transmit data unencrypted, thus resulting in 
higher vulnerability to security threats. However, a private WiFi at homes and offices 
utilizes data encryption and password-protected access making them safer than public WiFi 
and, consequently, introducing a medium risk level. 
 Bluetooth connectivity, encrypted data is exchanged between devices over short distances 
(less than 10 meters). Paired devices can communicate only with user’s consent. This 
pairing requires an authentication mechanism ensuring that a malicious connection is not 
possible without victims knowledge and acceptance. Once paired, this authentication is no 
longer required for future connections. However, security concerns arise when this trusted 
device is compromised. As a result, enabling this connectivity has a medium risk level 
especially when device is “discoverable”, whether used for transmitting data or not. 
 Similar to Bluetooth, Near Field Communication NFC is another form of two-way wireless 
communication between devices except that devices have to be in near proximity, 4 cm. 
Unfortunately, this technology does not offer built-in security measures. Given NFC ease 
of use where data is transferred by bumping two devices and lack of authentication, a 
hacker can easily manipulate data by being in near proximity. Knowing that NFC is 
sensitive to direction where a slight directional movement will disrupt the signal, a medium 
risk level is assigned to this kind of connectivity. 
Nevertheless, connectivity risks are either assessed as: 
A. A stand-alone system/device-related behavior, such as not turning off Bluetooth when 
it is not used. In this case, the behavior is the primary behavior and a predefined risk 
level as explained above is assigned to the used communication channel. For each risk 
level, an average risk score is assigned as 2, 5.5 and 8.5 for risk levels of low, medium 
and high respectively to generate connect-score. Hence, two situations are considered: 
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A.1 If the assessment is done only for the used communication channel such as 
the behavior of “connecting to a public WiFi network”, then the resulting 
connect-score is reassessed based on the significance correlation risk factor (if 
any).  
A.2 If time and status of connection is to be considered in the assessment such 
as in the behavior “ Did not Disable connection”, then if the connection is idle 
for a time period T, the resulting connect-score is reassessed based on the 
significance correlation risk factor (if any). 
In both situations, the resulting risk score is the behavioral risk score, behavior-risk.  
B. Combined with the assessment of other user’s behaviors when used for means of 
transferring data, i.e. secondary behavior. Thus, a risk matrix is generated for the 
connectivity behavior, connect-score, as in Matrix 4. 





e.g. (Bluetooth, NFC 
and Private WiFi) 
High 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 
Matrix 4: Connectivity Matrix , connect-score 
Risks of the connectivity behavior are assessed by mapping the used communication 
channel’s pre-assigned risk level with the related app-score to generate a  connect-score. 
 Responding to alerts behaviors, risk is assessed for these behaviors as stand-alone behaviors 
regardless of application importance, app-score. If an alert is ignored/no action taken by the 
user, then risk is high and an averaging approach is used to calculate behavior-score. This is 
by adding the values at both ends of the level’s scale, i.e. high risk level has a risk score 
between 7 and 10, and dividing it by 2 as:  
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behavior-score= (7 + 10)/2 = 8.5   (14) 
The resulting behavior-score is recalculated based on the significance correlation risk factor 
(if any) resulting in behavior-risk.  
If an alert is specific to a certain application such as in the behavior “Cancel/postpone a 
security related update”, then the vulnerability score of the application as calculated by (Wu 
and Wang 2011) is additionally displayed to the user. However, the number of ignored alerts 
is calculated over a certain time period T. When it exceeds a certain threshold, awareness is 
enforced. 
 Settings behaviors, risk is assessed such that If setting is disabled, then risk is high and 
behavior-score= (7 + 10)/2 = 8.5   
For the special cases of behaviors related to backups and updates, if setting is enabled but 
an old backup or out of date application/OS is detected, then risk is medium and  
behavior-score= (4 + 6.9)/2 = 5.5   (15) 
The resulting behavior-score is recalculated based on the significance correlation risk factor 
(if any) resulting in behavior-risk.  
 Device locking behaviors, risk is not only assessed if such control is utilized or not, but also 
the degree it complies to good authentication behavior such as password hygiene. Opposed to 
other user’s behaviors, the consequences of this behavior are related to physical threats only, 
i.e. device lost or stolen. Thus, this particular behavior could be considered as a stand-alone 
behavior and its risk assessment is done individually and not combined with the assessment of 
other user’s behaviors. Hence, risk is assessed such that: 
o If no lock is used, then risk is high and behavior-score is assessed as in (14) 
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o If device lock (PIN) is used, then it is assessed  for its hygiene using Matrix 5. 
The suggested PIN hygiene attributes are reuse, old, same number and predictable 
numbers. By mapping these risk levels in Matrix 5,  
behavior-score = MAX (PIN attributes)   (16) 
 PIN Attributes 
 Reuse Old Same Number Predictable  numbers 
 L M H L M H L M H L M H 
Consequences 0 4 7 0 4 7 0 4 7 0 4 7 
Matrix 5: PIN Assessment Matrix 
The resulting behavior-score is recalculated based on the significance correlation risk 
factor (if any) resulting in behavior-risk 
Regardless of system/device-related behavior category, the resulting behavior risk score, 
behavior-risk, is the quantitative behavior risk score where  0 ≤ behavior-risk ≤ 10 . Accordingly, 
the resulting behavioral risk level are 0..3.9 Low, 4..6.9 Medium and 7..10 High. 
6.4 Aggregated Risk Estimation Model 
 
To calculate the final risk score/level, overall-risk, an aggregated risk estimation model is 
required to assess the results of both user-centric and system-based assessment. Hence the 
following model is proposed and to be used by the Risk Aggregator process:  
I. For Application-related behaviors: As this model was proposed, but within its scope and 
what we are trying to achieve, it has been recognized that it could be done in a variety of 
different approaches when assessing the final risk score/level, overall-risk for application-
related behaviors. For example, a matrix-based approach could be used where all risk scores 
are rounded, i.e. 3.5 = 4. Similarly, an averaging approach could be used by simply adding 
behavior-risk and system-risk then dividing the result by 2. The proposed model for 
aggregating the user-centric risk score, behavior-risk, and the system-based risk score, system-
risk, is  
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Overall-risk = (behavior-risk * wbr) + (system-risk * wsr)  (17) 
Where wbr and wsr are subjective weights  
Unfortunately, there is no evidence yet on the impact  behavior-risk and system-risk or 
suggest the proportion of impact each of them have on the final risk score/level, overall-risk, 
therefore, weights are used.  However, the proposed model allows for a variety of ways such 
that whenever future research is available regarding this proportion, the proposed model could 
easily adopt to it. If there is no information to suggest any other alternative, weights are set 
equally to 0.5. 
II. For system/device-related behaviors: As a vulnerable application is not considered, 
arguably, as a threat source when assessing risks of system/device-related behaviors such as in 
not utilizing a device lock or in connecting to a public WiFi network. Moreover, the threat is in 
the behavior itself as a stand-alone behavior regardless of compound risks. Thus,  overall-risk 
for system/device related behaviors is the same as the behavior risk score as 
Overall-risk = behavior-risk  (18) 
In both cases, the resulting final risk score, overall-risk, is the quantitative final risk score 
where  0 ≤ overall-risk ≤ 10 . Accordingly, the resulting final risk level are 0..3.9 low, 4..6.9 
medium and 7..10 high. 
Detailed worked examples of how these proposed mechanisms work are explained in the next 
chapter, section 7.3.2. 
6.5 Conclusion 
As variations in user-centric and behavior-related factors resulted in different risk scores/levels 
for the same behavior, an approach to a multi-platform risk assessment that considers these 
variations in near real time is needed. Hence, having a list of  possible user’s behaviors is the first 
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step in this approach. However, it is unrealistic to neither assume all possible user’s behaviors nor 
assess each of them independently. Therefore, a categorization of user’s behaviors is proposed.  For 
each behavior category, a novel risk estimation model is proposed resulting in an individualized 
risk profile. Motivated by findings from Chapter 4, the significant correlation risk factor has been 
used in the proposed models when assessing risk either for application-related or system/device-
related behaviors. These proposed multi-platform risk estimation models are an attempt to assess 
risks for users aside from the traditional approach. Nevertheless, the feasibility and applicability of 
such models need to be investigated and assessed. 
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Chapter 7 : An Evaluation of The Model for User-centric Information 
Security Risk Assessment  
 
7.1 Introduction 
As identified in Chapter 5, the proposed Model for User-centric Risk Assessment and Response, 
UCRAR,  incorporates both risk assessment and risk communication. The focus of this research and this 
evaluation will be on the Risk Assessment component rather than the Risk Communication component.   
From the findings of Chapters 1-4, it has been found that risk cannot be treated the same for all users. 
Being that there are factors about risk that have been identified and quantified, a user-centric Information 
Security Risk Assessment Model is proposed where risk is assessed independently for each user using a 
number of proposed risk estimation models. The resulting risk scores/levels from those models will 
enable other processes of UCRAR, the Security Response Manager for example, to take that information 
and act accordingly.  
Given that the proposed risk estimation models are dependent upon a variety of factors, whether user-
centric such as IT proficiency and personality traits, or behavioral-related such as the used 
communication medium and authentication hygiene, the aim is to: 
1) Evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed model.  
2) Examine the nature of the proposed risk assessment model and how it works.  
Therefore, the following research questions are asked: 
RQ1: What is the impact of a user-centric factor x on the model? 
RQ2: What is the impact of a behavioral-related factor y on the model? 
RQ3: Given a number of different users with different characteristics and behaviors, how does 
the model work? 
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This chapter is structured as follows: the evaluation methodology is described in the next section 
followed by analysis of the results in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results of the proposed models 
followed by a conclusion in section 5. 
7.2 Methodology 
To obtain meaningful answers to the proposed research questions, three non-user based experiments 
are done. However, a number of assumptions have to be made at first for Experiments I and II where 
some variables need to be controlled and the others varied to understand their impact. 
Experiment I: 
I.1 For a user-centric factor x, different possible categories are assumed such as 18-30 years, 31-
50 years and 51+ years for the age factor and high conscientiousness and low conscientiousness 
for conscientiousness personality trait factor. 
I.2 For a certain user behavior, an average risk score representing each risk level is assumed for 
all behavioral-related factors such as risk scores of 2, 5.5 and 8.5 to represent risk levels of low, 
medium and high respectively. 
I.3 The model is applied and risk is calculated. 
I.4 Results are analyzed to understand what change in the output, i.e. the resulting risk 
scores/levels, is obtained as a consequence of the change in input. 
Experiment II: 
II.1 For the same user-centric factor x as in Experiment I, different possible categories are 
assumed such as 18-30 years, 31-50 years and 51+ years for the age factor and high 
conscientiousness and low conscientiousness for conscientiousness personality trait factor. 
II.2 For the same user behavior as in Experiment I, an average risk score representing each risk 
level is assumed for a behavioral-related factor y while other behavioral related factors are 
assumed the other risk scores/levels. For example, if the behavioral-related factor of 
authentication thru auth-score variable is assumed as low risk with risk score of 2, then other 
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behavioral-related factors are assumed medium and high with risk scores of 5.5 and 8.5 
respectively.  
II.3 The model is applied and risk is calculated. 
II.4 Results are analyzed to understand what change in the output, i.e. the resulting risk 
scores/levels, is obtained as a consequence of the change in behavioral-related factor y. 
Experiment III (Scenario-based Simulation): 
To evaluate the model, there exists a number of challenges in implementing the proposed model 
on real users and within a real environment. The need to develop the required controls to do the 
process of user monitoring and the development of  several knowledge bases such as the community-
based risk data are examples of such challenges. Furthermore, this research is done by a single 
researcher with time constraints. Although different approaches could be taken to evaluate the model, 
the most complete and comprehensive approach that will enable a comprehensive analysis of the 
model appeared to be a simulation-based approach. In this approach, a number of users with different 
risk profiles across the spectrum will be replicated.  Hence, in order to do a walkthrough of the 
proposed model and understand, in a categorized fashion, how different users are impacted by risk, a 
scenario-based simulation based upon a variety of users’ profiles from one end to the other is 
designed considering the following: 
1) All possible user-centric factors permutations for different users. 
2) Based on findings of Chapter 4, two users with user-centric factors representing the two 
extremes of low and high risk profiles are assumed (users D and E). 
3) Behaviors included in the scenario reflects examples of each behavior type from the 
suggested categorization of user’s behaviors as in Figure 6.1 to understand the nature of how 
they impact the risk score/level. 
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4) Behaviors selected demonstrate the difference between the resulting risk scores/levels of 
behaviors that were found to be most significantly correlated with a certain user-centric factor 
and those that were not (Behavior 6).  
5) Varying app-scores with low, medium, high and very high importance are assumed. 
The experiment, i.e. scenario-based simulation, is done as follows: 
III.1 The scenario is assumed. 
III.2 A variety of users with different user-centric factors are assumed. 
III.3 The model is applied and risk is calculated. 
III.4 Results are analyzed to understand how different users are impacted by risk and if resulting 
risk scores/levels reflect trends and patterns observed in Experiments I and II. 
Together, all of these experiments will give an understanding of what this model is going to do, how 
it works and the impact of the identified factors/behaviors have on the overall-risk. 
7.3 Results 
In order to perform these non-user based experiments, a number of assumptions have to be made at 
first. Then, the proposed model is applied and its performance is analyzed accordingly. 
7.3.1 User-centric VS. Behavioral-related Analysis 
For Experiments I and II, conscientiousness personality trait and the application-related behavior of 
write public data thru the behavior “ Downloading files from suspicious/unknown websites” are selected 
as examples of a user-centric factor and a user behavior respectively. Based on findings of Chapter 4, this 
user behavior has a significant negative correlation with the mentioned user-centric factor. The impact of 
authentication hygiene thru the variable auth-score is selected as a behavioral-related factor. The type of 
this behavior, according to the suggested categorization of user’s behaviors as in Figure 6.1, is an 





=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (app-behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5.  
From Table 6.2, the suggested consequences of this behavior are 
E = 1 (M), F = 0 (L), P = 1 (M), DC = 1 (M), LL = 0 (L), S = 0 (L), D = 1 (M) 
To calculate behavior-score and for the purposes of Experiments I and II, the suggested consequences 
are all assumed either Low, Medium or High, then mapped to Matrix 1. Whereas for system risk, system-
risk, an average risk score representing each risk level is assumed as 2, 5.5 and 8.5 for low, medium and 
high risk levels. For each conscientiousness personality trait level, two types of user accounts are 
considered, private and public, and both app-behavior-risk and overall-risk are calculated.  
























































































As in Figure 
7.1 
I.b M M M 5.5 (M) 
As in Figure 
7.2 
I.c H H H 8.5 (H) 
As in Figure 
7.3 
II.a L M M 5.5 (M) 
As in Figure 
7.4 
II.b L H H 8.5 (H) 
As in Figure 
7.5 
II.c M L L 2 (L) 
As in Figure 
7.6 
II.d M H H 8.5 (H) 
As in Figure 
7.7 
II.e H L L 2 (L) 
As in Figure 
7.8 
II.f H M M 5.5 (M) 
As in Figure 
7.9 
Table ‎7.1: Settings of Assumptions I and II Risk Scores/Levels  
                                                          
1
 The terminology “app-“ and “sys-“ are used interchangeably to differentiate between the behavior-risk of an 
application related behavior and that of a system-related behavior. 
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After applying the model and calculating risk, different risk scores/levels spanning the entire 
proposed risk scale are obtained as in Figures 7.1,7.2 and 7.3 where Pr and Pb denote private and public 
account, HC and LC denote a High and Low level of conscientiousness personality trait respectively. 
Generally, the higher the risk of behavioral related factors the higher the app-behavior-risk and overall-
risk and vice versa. The resulting risk scores/levels are in line with findings of Chapter 4 as the more 
conscientiousness the user is, the lower the risk level of his behavior. Actually, even users with the same 
level of conscientiousness and same score/level of behavioral-related factors do not share the same 
resulting risk scores/levels. More notably, when comparing between the resulting risk scores/levels of 
those who scored high in conscientiousness personality trait and those with who scored low, a general 
trend is observed in all assumptions as the resulting risk scores/levels in private user accounts are lower 
than those of a public user account. This suggests the granularity and personalized nature of the proposed 
risk model and the fact that risk is not the same for all users. This is apparent as the overall-risk of users, 
in assumption I.a for instance, with high conscientiousness and a private user account range between 1.5 
and 3.8 ( low) and from 2.0.(low) to 4.3 (medium) for the same user but with a public account as 
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Whereas for a user with a lower level of conscientiousness, the overall-risk 
ranged between 1.9 (low) and 4.3 (medium) in a private user account and between 2.3 (low) and 4.7 
(medium) for the same user but with a public user account. The same trend was observed in assumptions 




Figure ‎7.1: Assumption I.a resulting risk scores/levels 
 
 






Figure ‎7.3: Assumption I.c resulting risk scores/levels 
 
From Figures 7.1,7.2 and 7.3, the comparison between app-behavior-risk and overall-risk offers an 
indication on the impact of system risk thru the variable system-risk on the resulting overall-risk. 
Regardless of the positive relation found between app-behavior-risk, overall-risk and behavioral-related 
factors, an opposing trend was found between app-behavior-risk and overall-risk. This relation was noted 
such that whenever system-risk is greater than app-behavior-risk, then the resulting overall-risk is greater 
than app-behavior-risk and vice versa. When system-risk is medium with risk score of 5.5 as in 
assumption I.b Figure 7.2, for example, a high conscientiousness user with a private account and app-
score = 3, app-behavior-risk is 5.3 , i.e less than system-risk, the resulting overall-risk is 5.4, i.e greater 
than app-behavior-risk. Whereas for the same user but with a public account when app-behavior-risk is 
6.3, i.e. greater than system-risk, the resulting overall-risk is less than app-behavior-risk with a score of 
5.9. This implies that a highly vulnerable system may, arguably, be a bigger threat source to the user than 
his own behavior. 
To further explore the impact of variations in user-centric factors and behavioral-related factors on 
the resulting risk scores/levels, Experiment II is done. For the same selected user-centric factor of 
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conscientiousness personality trait and the user behavior of “Downloading files form suspicious/unknown 
websites” as in Experiment I, the impact of authentication hygiene thru the variable auth-score is 
selected, for instance, as a behavioral-related factor in Experiment II. As such, assumptions II.a, II.b, II.c, 
II.d, II.e and II.f are made as in Table 7.1 and resulting risk scores are as in Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 
and 7.9 respectively. 
 
 






Figure ‎7.5: Assumption II.b resulting risk scores/levels 
 
 
   
















Figure ‎7.9: Assumption II.f resulting risk scores/levels 
 
Based upon these resulting risk scores/levels, it shows that a similar trend as in Experiment I results is 
observed in terms of how conscientiousness the user is, type of user account, system-risk score and the 
resulting risk scores/levels. This suggests that this relation is preserved regardless of the change in 
behavioral-related factors risk scores/levels. However, this is in contrast to the impact of a change in only 
one behavioral-related factor on the resulting risk scores/levels as illustrated in Table 7.2. A comparison 
of the resulting risk scores/levels between assumptions I.b (Figure 7.2) and II.a (Figure 7.4), and between 
those of assumptions I.c (Figure 7.3) and II.b (Figure 7.5)  reveals the relation between auth-score and 
other behavioral-related factors. In the former, when all behavioral-related factors had an equal risk score/ 
level of medium as in assumption I.b (Figure 7.2) and for the same circumstances but the user is using a 
password complying to password hygiene rules, i.e. low risk, as in assumption II.a (Figure 7.4),  a fixed 
decrease in both app-behavior-risk and overall-risk of approximately 0.4 and 0.2 is noted. Whereas in the 
latter, assumptions I.c (Figure 7.3) and II.b (Figure 7.5), for the same used complying password but with 
higher risk for other behavioral-related risk factors, a similar relation was found when comparing the 
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resulting app-behavior-risk and overall-risk scores.  This reveals an increased decrease than of 
assumptions I.b and II.a as app-behavior-risk decreased in approximately 0.7 and the overall-risk 
decreased of 0.3. Regardless of the decreased amount, this comparison highlights the importance and the 
impact of using a password complying to password hygiene rules. This suggests the impact of 
authentication as a behavioral-related factor on the resulting risk scores/levels. 
However, an opposing relation was found when the risk of authentication is higher, i.e. the user is not 
using a complying password. This is apparent when comparing between the resulting app-behavior-risk 
and overall-risk scores of assumption I.a (Figure 7.1) with those of assumption II.e (Figure 7.8), as a 
fixed increase of approximately 0.7 and 0.3 between app-behavior-risk and overall-risk was found. 
Similarly, when comparing between the resulting app-behavior-risk and overall-risk scores of assumption 
I.b (Figure 7.2)  with those of assumption II.f (Figure 7.9), a fixed increase of approximately 0.4 and 0.2 
was apparent. This suggests the impact of authentication on resulting risk scores/levels such that the 
higher the risk of authentication the higher the resulting risk scores/levels even if other behavioral-related 
factors were lower in risk. 
When a medium risk password is used, comparing the resulting scores of app-behavior-risk and 
overall-risk lead to an interesting observation. The higher the risk of authentication than other behavioral-
related factors as in the comparison between assumptions I.a (Figure 7.1) and II.c (Figure 7.6), resulted in 
an increase in the resulting app-behavior-risk and overall-risk scores . Conversely, the lower the risk of 
authentication than other behavioral-related factors as in the comparison between assumptions I.c (Figure 
7.3) and II.d (Figure 7.7), resulted in a decrease in the resulting app-behavior-risk and overall-risk scores. 
Given the nature of scoring of both auth-score and connect-score, i.e scores 0..6, this suggests that 
these observed relations could be generalized for the connectivity behavioral-related factor.  
A similar impact that was found in assumptions of Experiment I of system risk on overall-risk, was 
also found in assumptions of Experiment II. This suggests the contribution of system risk to the user’s 
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risk level even if user’s behavior is in low risk, highlighting the importance of keeping operating system 
and installed applications/software up to date. This highlights the impact behavioral-related factors have 
on user’s risk level and showing that there are factors/risk sources that contribute to user’s risk level 
(compound risk) and should be considered when assessing risk. Even if the user’s behavior was 
considered secure but other behavioral-related factors are not such as the used communication medium or 
authentication behavior, there is a chance of information disclosure due to an old or reused password for 
instance. 
Comparison between resulting risk 
scores/level of assumptions: 
Impact on 
app-behavior-risk overall-risk 
I.b (Figure 7.2)/ II.a (Figure 7.4) ≈ - 0.4 ≈ - 0.2 
I.c (Figure 7.3)/II.b (Figure 7.5) ≈ - 0.7 ≈ - 0.3 
I.a (Figure 7.1)/II.e (Figure 7.8) ≈ + 0.7 ≈ + 0.3 
I.b (Figure 7.2)/ II.f (Figure 7.9) ≈ + 0.4 ≈ + 0.2 
I.a (Figure 7.1)/ II.c (Figure 7.6) ≈ + 0.3 ≈ + 0.2 
I.c (Figure 7.3)/ II.d (Figure 7.7) ≈ - 0.3 ≈ - 0.2 
Table ‎7.2: Analysis of impact of auth-score on resulting risk scores/levels 
7.3.2 Scenario-based Simulation 
The following scenario is assumed. However, it is worth highlighting that this scenario has no specific 
basis only that it introduces a number of different risks a typical user might encounter. Hence, assuming 
the following scenario: 
The user is sitting in Starbucks coffee shop and connected to their WiFi. While browsing his email’s 
inbox, he opened an email from an unknown sender asking for his credentials and bank account number 
to claim a won lottery prize, but ignored it. Then, he opened another email from a friend and downloaded 
a greeting card that was attached to it. Meanwhile, he was alerted that a new update for his Antivirus 
application is available, but cancelled it. At that time, a friend came to sit with him where they chatted for 
an hour. When his friend left, he unlocked his device and started browsing job websites. When a job 
request was found and wanted to apply for it, he was asked to register with a username and password first. 
After registration, he was prompted by the browser to remember this password and accepted. Subsequent 
to signing in, he was redirected to another website unknown to him to download and fill an application 
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form. Ignoring an alert not to open this document, he opened the document, filled it up and clicked on 
“SEND”. As he was typing the BBC News website’s URL, he was alerted that a preinstalled application 
(Antivirus application) is slowing down his device so he immediately disabled it and continued browsing. 
Starbucks’s Router is using CISCO AIRONET access point software version 8.1 (112.3). The user is 
using a Samsung Galaxy Note 3 running Android version 4.4.4, Google Chrome application version 
39.0.2171.45 and Email application version 4.2.2.0200. The user is using Symantec Mobile Security as an 
Antivirus application. Both the email’s password and the job website’s password comply to all password 
hygiene attributes except that the former does not contain uppercase letters and the same password is used 
for his Twitter account while the latter is 5 characters long. The used device pin lock is 1111. The user 
rated the importance of  Twitter application as low (app-score = 1), Chrome as medium (app-score = 2), 
Email as High (app-score = 3) and Symantec Mobile Security as very high (app-score = 4). However, all 
applications were installed from Google Play which is a legitimate market. 
The following types of users are assumed along with their characteristics as in Table 7.3: 
User 
Personality Traits 
Age Gender IT Proficiency 
Service 
Usage Extra. Agree. Con. Neuro. Open. 
A High Low Low High Low 40 Years Male IT Pro. Low 
B High High High Low Low 55 Years Female Non IT Pro. Medium 
C Low Low High Low High 27 Years Male IT Pro. High 
D* High Low Low High Low 19 Years Female Non IT Pro. High 
E** Low High High Low High 52 Years Male IT Pro. Low 
Table ‎7.3 : Users’ Characteristics 
* User with highest risk profile, ** User with lowest risk profile 
 
Given the above scenario, the following is a list of insecure security behaviors along with their 
behavior type (according to the suggested categorization of user’s behaviors as in Figure 6.1) and the 





Table ‎7.4: A List of Simulation’s Users' Insecure Behaviors 
Figure 7.10 demonstrates a mapping of the suggested categorization of  behaviors to simulation’s 
behavior numbers (B#) as in Table 7.4. 
To calculate and estimate risk of the behaviors mentioned in Table 7.4, risk is calculated and assessed 
on the system level first then on the user level. 
I. To calculate risks on the system level, system risk : 
1. The CVSS scores for Chrome, Email, Symantec Mobile Security applications, Android 
version 4.4.4 and the router’s software are determined. 
2. Using the methodology proposed by (Wu and Wang, 2011),  the security scores of each of the 
mentioned applications , app-risk, the used Operating System, os-risk, and router’s software, 
nw-risk, are calculated.  




 For Operating system: Android V. 4.4.4:   
Total number of vulnerabilities = 122.  
Detailed calculations of the sum of W, P and CVSS of such vulnerabilities are in Appendix C.  
Therefore, 
OS_Risk = Final score = W1*P1 + W2*P2 + W3*P3 = 2.5 + 1.0 + 3.3 = 6.8 medium risk 
 For applications: 
 
a) Google Chrome for Android v. 39.0.2171.45 : Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
b) Google Email Application v. 4.2.2.0200 : Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
c) Symantec Mobile Security v. 1.0 : Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
Detailed calculations of the sum of W, P and CVSS of such vulnerabilities are in Appendix C 
Therefore,  
App_Risk (Chrome) = Final score = W1*P1 = 5.0*1 = 5.0 medium risk 
App_Risk (Email) = Final score = W1*P1 = 5.0*1 = 5.0 medium risk 
App_Risk (Mobile Security) = Final score = W1*P1 = 4.3*1 = 4.3 medium risk 
 
 For Network Router CISCO AIRONET access point software ver. 8.1 (112.3):  
Total number of vulnerabilities = 3 
Detailed calculations of the sum of W, P and CVSS of such vulnerabilities are in Appendix C. 
Therefore, 
NW_Risk = Final score = W1*P1 + W2*P2+ W3*P3= 6.1*0.33 + 7.2*0.33 + 6.1*0.33 = 6.4 medium 
risk 
Hence, system risk is calculated as follows: 
System-risk  = App_risk *wapp + OS_risk *wos + NW_risk*wnw / (wapp+wos+wnw) 
For the purposes of this research these weights, wapp, wos and wnw, are suggested as 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 
respectively. Thus, 
system-risk (Chrome) = 5.0*0.5 + 6.8*0.3 + 6.4*0.2 = 5.8 medium risk 
system-risk (Email) = 5.0*0.5 + 6.8*0.3 + 6.4*0.2 = 5.8 medium risk 
218 
 
system-risk (Mobile Security) = 4.3*0.5 + 6.8*0.3 + 6.40*0.2 = 5.5 medium risk 
II. To calculate risks on the user level, behavior- risk and overall-risk: 
For each behavior in Table 7.4, risk of the behavior, behavior-risk, is calculated first followed by 
calculation of aggregated/final risk, overall-risk. According to user’s rating of used applications, Twitter’s 
app-score = 1, Chrome’s app-score = 2, Email’s app-score = 3 and Symantec Mobile Security’s app-
score = 4.    
B1: Connecting to a public WiFi: 
According to the suggested Categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device 
connectivity behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a standalone 
behavior.  
B1.1 The used communication channel is a public WiFi, thus, its assigned risk level is high.  
behavior-score=  (7+10)/2 = 8.5  
B1.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4 and the proposed significance correlation risk factor methodology, 
the user-centric factor of service usage level has the most significant positive correlation with this 
behavior. Hence, behavior-risk is recalculated independently for each user. 
IF service usage level =  High THEN   (Users C and D) 
Risk of behavior is increased such that 
 behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 = 9.5 = behavior-risk   
and overall-risk =   behavior-risk = 9.5 high risk  
 
IF service usage level = low THEN   (Users A and E) 
Risk of behavior is decreased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 = 7.5 = behavior-risk   
and overall-risk =   behavior-risk = 7.5 high risk  
 
IF service usage level = medium THEN   (User B) 
Risk of behavior is neither decreased nor increased such that 
behavior-score = 8.5 = behavior-risk   






B2: Same password for multiple Accounts: 
According to the suggested Taxonomy of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-related 
authentication behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a standalone 
behavior. The user rated the importance of Twitter application as low, i.e. app-score = 1, and Email 
application as high, i.e. app-score = 3. According to the proposed model, the highest app-score will be 
considered when calculating behavior-risk. This behavior is considered with the reuse attribute of 
password hygiene attributes.  
B2.1 The risk of this behavior is high. The behavior-score depends on app-score. Thus , by mapping the 
app-score and high risk in Matrix 2 
behavior-score = 5 
  Reuse 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5* 
4 4 5 6 
 
B2.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of IT proficiency has the most significant 
negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for calculating the 
significance correlation risk factor, behavior-score is recalculated and normalized independently for each 
user as follows: 
IF IT proficiency  =  non-IT professional (low) THEN    (Users B and D) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s IT proficiency group to high. In Matrix 3, 
the pre-calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the 





IT proficiency  group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7* 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk= behavior-score * 1.25 = 7 * 1.25 = 8.8  
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (8.8 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 7.3 High Risk  
IF IT proficiency = IT professional (high) THEN    (Users A, C and E) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s IT proficiency group to low. In Matrix 3, 
the pre-calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score = 3. Therefore, the 
resulting behavior-score = 5 
IT proficiency group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5* 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk= behavior-score * 1.25 = 5* 1.25 = 6.3 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk-score = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk-score = (6.3 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 6.1 medium risk  
B3: Did not delete a suspicious email: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-
related/ wirte private data behavior. As of the proposed model, risk is calculated as: 




B3.1 According to user’s importance rating, Email application app-score = 3.  
B3.2 The account type for this application is considered as private, thus account-type-score=1. 
B3.3 The used communication channel is a public WiFi, thus, its assigned risk level is high. By mapping 
both app-score and connectivity risk level in Matrix 4, the risk of this communication channel, connect-
score = 5 
  Connectivity 
  
Low 




(such as Bluetooth, NFC 
and Private WiFi) 
High 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5* 
4 4 5 6 
 
B3.4 The used password is assessed  for its hygiene using Matrix 1. The password complies to all 
password hygiene attributes (i.e. low risk) except for its reuse and uppercase attributes. Password does not 
have uppercase letters and is reused (shared) in Twitter account, thus, high risk for these particular 
attributes. By mapping these risk levels and the app-score in Matrix 1,  
auth-score = Max (length, reuse, old, uppercase, lowercase, characters, numbers) 
= Max ( 3, 5, 3, 5, 3, 3, 3) = 5 
 
  Password Attributes 
  Length Reuse Old Uppercase Lowercase Characters Numbers 








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
3 3* 4 5 3 4 5* 3* 4 5 3 4 5* 3* 4 5 3* 4 5 3* 4 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B3.5 This particular behavior is a write-private data and its suggested consequences are  
E=1 (M), F=2 (H), P=2 (H), DC=2 (H), LL=1 (M), S=0 (L), D=0 (L) 
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By mapping these consequences and the app-score in Matrix 2,  
behavior-score = Max (E, F, P, DC, LL, S, D) 
          = Max ( 4,5,5,5,4,3,3) = 5  
  Consequences 
  E  F P DC LL S D  








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
3 3 4* 5 3 4 5* 3 4 5* 3 4 5* 3 4* 5 3* 4 5 3* 4 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B3.6 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of age  has the most significant negative 
correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for calculating the significance 
correlation risk factor, behavior-score is recalculated independently for each user as follows: 
IF age = 18-30 years (low) THEN    (Users C and D) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s age group to high. In Matrix 3, the pre-
calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the resulting 
behavior-score = 7 
Age group Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7* 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (7, 5, 5) +1 = 6.7 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  




IF  age = 51+ years (high) THEN     (users B and E) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s age group to low. In Matrix 3, the pre-
calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the resulting 
behavior-score = 5 
 Age group Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5* 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (5, 5, 5) +1 = 6 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (6 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.9 medium risk 
 
IF age = 31-50 years (Medium) THEN       {User A} 
Age group is mapped to medium. In Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to 
high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 6 
Age group Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6* 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (6, 5, 5) +1 = 6.3 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
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Overall-risk  = (6.3 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 6.1 medium risk 
This particular behavior is considered to be not good practice. By interpreting the resulting overall-
risk score, risk decreases with age. Hence, the older the user the lower the risk. This is in-line with the 
findings of Chapter 4. 
B4: Opened an attachment in an email from a friend without checking 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-
related/ read private data behavior. As of the proposed model, risk is calculated as: 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
Therefore, B4.1, B4.2, B4.3 and B4.4 are similar to B3.1, B3.2, B3.3 and B3.4 respectively. 
B4.5 This particular behavior is a read-private data and its suggested consequences are  
E=2 (H), F=0 (L), P=2 (H), DC=2 (H), LL=0 (L), S=0 (L), D=1 (M) 
By mapping these consequences and the app-score in Matrix 2,  
behavior-score = Max (E, F, P, DC, LL, S, D) 
          = Max ( 5,3,5,5,3,3,4) = 5  
  Consequences 
  E  F P DC LL S D  








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5* 3* 4 5 3 4 5* 3 4 5* 3* 4 5 3* 4 5 3 4* 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B4.6 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of IT proficiency has the most significant 
negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for calculating the 




IF IT proficiency = non-IT professional (low) THEN    (Users B and D) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s IT-proficiency group to high. In Matrix 3, 
the pre-calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the 
resulting behavior-score = 7  
IT proficiency group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7* 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (7, 5, 5) +1 = 6.7 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (6.7 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 6.3 medium risk 
 
IF IT proficiency = IT-Professional (high) THEN    (Users A, C and E) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s IT-proficiency group to low. In Matrix 3, 
the pre-calculated behavior-score = 5 is mapped to high risk and app-score =3. Therefore, the 
resulting behavior-score = 5 
IT proficiency group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5* 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (5, 5, 5) +1 = 6 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
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where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (6 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.9 medium risk 
 This particular behavior is considered to be not good practice. By interpreting the resulting 
overall-risk score, due to users A, C and E IT proficiency they were in lower risk than others. This is in-
line with the findings of Chapter 4. 
 
B5: AntiVirus software not updated: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device 
related settings behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a standalone 
behavior.  
B5.1 The installed Anti-Virus application (Symantec Mobile Security) is not updated, thus, its assigned 
risk level is high.  
behavior-score = (7+10)/2 = 8.5 high risk 
B5.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4 and the proposed significance correlation risk factor, the user-centric 
factor of IT proficiency has the most significant negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, behavior-
score is recalculated independently for each user. 
IF IT proficiency = IT professional (High) THEN   (Users A, C and E) 
Risk of behavior is decreased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 = 7.5 = behavior-risk 
and overall-risk =  behavior-risk = 7.5 high risk  
 
IF IT proficiency = Non-IT professional (low) THEN   (Users B and D) 
Risk of behavior is increased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 = 9.5 = behavior-risk 






B6: Cancelled a security related update: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device-
related  responding to alerts behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a 
standalone behavior.  
B6.1 The risk of this behavior is high, thus  
behavior-score = (7+10)/2 = 8.5 high risk 
B6.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4, no user-centric factor was found to have a significant correlation 
with this behavior. This implies that no individualized risk calculation is done and all users will share the 
same resulting risk scores\levels. Hence,  
behavior-score = behavior-risk = overall-risk = 8.5 high risk 
B6.3 Since this update was concerned with the installed Anti-Virus Application, the overall-risk will be 
displayed to the user along with the calculated vulnerability score (Wu, Wang, 2011) of Symantec Mobile 
Security which is 4.3 medium risk. 
B7: Did not disable WiFi when not using it: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device-
related connectivity behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a standalone 
behavior.  
B7.1 According to Matrix 4, connecting to a public WiFi is high risk regardless of app-score. Thus, 
behavior-score =  8.5 
B7.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4 and the proposed significance correlation risk factor, the user-centric 
factor of gender has the most significant negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, behavior-score is 




IF gender = male (High) THEN   (Users A, C and E) 
Risk of behavior is decreased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 = 7.5 = behavior-risk 
and overall-risk =  behavior-risk = 7.5 high risk  
 
IF gender = female (low) THEN   (Users B and D) 
Risk of behavior is increased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 = 9.5 = behavior-risk 
and overall-risk =  behavior-risk = 9.5 high risk  
 
B8: Device Lock of “1111”: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device-
related device locking behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a 
standalone behavior.  
B8.1 The used PIN is assessed  for its hygiene using Matrix 5. The suggested PIN hygiene attributes are 
reuse, old, same number and predictable numbers. The PIN complies to all PIN hygiene attributes (i.e. 
low risk = 0) except for its same number attribute, thus, high risk for this particular attribute. By mapping 
these risk levels,  
behavior-score = MAX (reuse, old, same number, predictable numbers) 
= MAX ( 0, 0, 7, 0) = 7 
 PIN Attributes 
 Reuse Old Same Number Predictable numbers 
 L M H L M H L M H L M H 
Consequences  0* 4 7 0* 4 7 0 4 7* 0* 4 7 
 
B8.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4 and the proposed significance correlation risk factor, the user-centric 
factor of conscientiousness personality trait has the most significant negative correlation with this 
behavior. Hence, behavior-score is recalculated independently for each user. 
IF conscientiousness = High  THEN   (Users B, C and E) 
Risk of behavior is decreased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 = 7 – 1 = 6 = behavior-risk 
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and overall-risk =  behavior-risk = 6 medium risk  
IF conscientiousness = low THEN   (Users A and D) 
Risk of behavior is increased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 = 7 + 1 = 8 = behavior-risk 
and overall-risk =  behavior-risk = 8 high risk  
B9: Allowed browser to remember his password: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-
related/ write private data behavior. As of the proposed model, risk is calculated as: 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
Therefore,  
B9.1 According to user’s importance rating, Chrome application app-score = 2.  
B9.2 The account type for this application is considered as private, thus account-type-score=1. 
B9.3 The used communication channel is a public WiFi, thus, its assigned risk level is high. By mapping 
both app-score and connectivity risk level in Matrix 4, the risk of this communication channel, connect-
score = 4 
  Connectivity 
  
Low 




(such as Bluetooth, NFC 
and Private WiFi) 
High 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4* 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 
 
B9.4 The used password is assessed  for its hygiene using Matrix 1. The password complies to all 
password hygiene attributes (i.e. low risk) except for its length. Password is five characters long, thus, 
high risk for this particular attribute. By mapping these risk levels and the app-score in Matrix 1,  
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auth-score = MAX (length, reuse, old, uppercase, lowercase, characters, numbers) 
= MAX ( 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) = 4 
 
  Password Attributes 
  Length Reuse Old Uppercase Lowercase Characters Numbers 








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4* 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 
3 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B9.5 This particular behavior is an application-related write-private data and its suggested consequences 
are  
E=1 (M), F=2 (H), P=2 (H), DC=2 (H), LL=1 (M), S=0 (L), D=0 (L) 
By mapping these consequences and the app-score in Matrix 2,  
behavior-score = MAX (E, F, P, DC, LL, S, D) 
          = MAX ( 3, 4, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2) = 4  
  Consequences 
  E  F P DC LL S D  








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3* 4 2 3 4* 2 3 4* 2 3 4* 2 3* 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 
3 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B9.6 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of service usage level  has the most 
significant positive correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for calculating 






IF service usage level = low THEN    (Users A and E) 
The user’s service usage level is mapped to low. In Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 
4 is mapped to high risk and app-score =2. Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 4 
 
Service usage level Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4* 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (4, 4, 4) +1 = 5 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (5 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.4 medium risk  
IF  service usage level =  high THEN     (Users C and D) 
The user’s service usage level is mapped to high. In Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 
4 is mapped to high risk and app-score =2. Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 6 
Service usage level Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6* 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (6, 4, 4) +1 = 5.7 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
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Overall-risk = (5.7 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.8 medium risk  
IF service usage level =  Medium THEN     (User B) 
Service usage level is mapped to medium. In Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 4 is 
mapped to high risk and app-score =2. Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 5 
 
Service usage level Low Medium High 







 0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5* 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (5, 4, 4) +1 = 5.3 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (5.3 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.6 medium risk  
This particular behavior is considered to be not good practice. By interpreting the resulting overall-
risk score, risk decreases with service usage level. Hence, the lower the service usage the lower the risk. 
This is in-line with the findings of Chapter 4. 
 
B10: Opened a document despite security warning: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is a system/device-
related  responding to alerts behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a 
standalone behavior.  
B10.1 The risk of this behavior is high, thus  
behavior-score = 8.5 
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B10.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4 and the proposed significance correlation risk factor methodology, 
the user-centric factor of age has the most significant negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, 
behavior-risk is recalculated independently for each user. 
IF age =  18-30 years (low) THEN   (Users C and D) 
Risk of behavior is increased such that 
 behavior-score = behavior-score + 1 = 9.5 = behavior-risk   
and overall-risk =   behavior-risk = 9.5 high risk  
 
IF age = 51+ years (High) THEN   (Users B and E) 
Risk of behavior is decreased such that 
behavior-score = behavior-score - 1 = 7.5 = behavior-risk   
and overall-risk =   behavior-risk = 7.5 high risk  
 
IF age = 31-50 years (medium)  THEN   (User A) 
Risk of behavior is neither decreased nor increased such that 
behavior-score = 8.5 = behavior-risk   
and overall-risk =   behavior-risk =   8.5 high risk  
 
B11: Disabled AntiVirus software: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-
related settings behavior. The behavior-risk for this particular behavior is calculated as a standalone 
behavior. The user rated the importance of this application as very high, hence, app-score = 4. 
B11.1 The risk of this behavior is high. The behavior-score depends on app-score in Matrix 1. Thus, 
behavior-score = 6 
  Consequence 







 0 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6* 
 
B11.2 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of conscientiousness personality trait has the 
most significant negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for 
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calculating the significance correlation risk factor, behavior-score is recalculated and normalized 
independently for each user as follows: 
IF conscientiousness = low THEN    (Users A and D) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s conscientiousness group to high. In 
Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 6 is mapped to high risk and app-score =4. 
Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 8  
Conscientiousness  group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8* 
 
behavior-risk= behavior-score * 1.25 = 10 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (10 * 0.5) + (5.5 * 0.5) = 7.8 high risk  
IF conscientiousness = high THEN    (Users B, C and E) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s conscientiousness group to low. In Matrix 
3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 6 is mapped to high risk and app-score =4. Therefore, the 
resulting behavior-score = 6 
Conscientiousness  group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6* 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk= behavior-score * 1.25 = 7.5 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
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where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (7.5 * 0.5) + (5.5 * 0.5) = 6.5 medium risk  
  
B12: Downloaded a file from an unknown website: 
According to the suggested categorization of  behaviors as in Figure 7.10, this is an application-
related/ write public data behavior. As of the proposed model, risk is calculated as: 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
 
Therefore,  
B12.1, B12.2, B12.3 and B12.4 are similar to B9.1, B9.2, B9.3 and B9.4 respectively. 
B12.5 This particular behavior is an application-related write-public data and its suggested consequences 
are  
E=1 (M), F=0 (L), P=1 (M), DC=1 (M), LL=0 (L), S=0 (L), D=1 (M) 
By mapping these consequences and the app-score in Matrix 2,  
behavior-score = MAX (E, F, P, DC, LL, S, D) 
          = MAX ( 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3) = 3  
 
  Consequences 
  E  F P DC LL S D  








0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2 2 3* 4 2* 3 4 2 3* 4 2 3* 4 2* 3 4 2* 3 4 2 3* 4 
3 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 
 
B12.6 Based on findings of Chapter 4, the user-centric factor of conscientiousness personality trait  has 
the most significant negative correlation with this behavior. Hence, according to the proposed model for 
calculating the significance correlation risk factor, behavior-score is recalculated independently for each 
user as follows: 
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IF conscientiousness = low THEN    (Users A and D) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s conscientiousness group to high. In 
Matrix 3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 3 is mapped to medium risk and app-score =2. 
Therefore, the resulting behavior-score = 5 
Conscientiousness  group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 4 5* 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (5, 4, 4) +1 = 5.3 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (5.3 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.6 medium risk  
 
IF conscientiousness = high THEN    (Users B, C and E) 
An opposite mapping will occur by mapping the user’s conscientiousness group to low. In Matrix 
3, the pre-calculated behavior-score = 3 is mapped to medium risk and app-score =2. Therefore, 
the resulting behavior-score = 3 
Conscientiousness  group Low High 







 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 
2 2 3* 4 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 6 7 8 
 
behavior-risk=AVG(behavior-score, auth-score, connect-score)+account-type-score 
= AVG (3, 4, 4) +1 = 4.7 
237 
 
The final risk score/level,  Overall-risk = (behavior-risk* Wbr)+ (system-risk *Wsr)  
where Wbr= Wsr =  0.5. Thus,  
Overall-risk = (4.7 * 0.5) + (5.8 * 0.5) = 5.3 medium risk  
The resulting risk scores/levels are as illustrated in Table 7.5.  
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Given that Low = 0 --- 3.9, Medium = 4 --- 6.9, High = 7 --- 10.  
User 





















































































A 7.5 7.5 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6 5.9 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 7.5 7.5 8 8 5 5.4 8.5 8.5 10 7.8 5.3 5.6 
B 8.5 8.5 8.8 7.3 6 5.9 6.7 6.3 9.5 9.5 8.5 8.5 9.5 9.5 6 6 5.3 5.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.5 4.7 5.3 
C 9.5 9.5 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.3 6 5.9 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 7.5 7.5 6 6 5.7 5.8 9.5 9.5 7.5 6.5 4.7 5.3 
D* 9.5 9.5 8.8 7.3 6.7 6.3 6.7 6.3 9.5 9.5 8.5 8.5 9.5 9.5 8 8 5.7 5.8 9.5 9.5 10 7.8 5.3 5.6 
E** 7.5 7.5 6.3 6.1 6 5.9 6 5.9 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 7.5 7.5 6 6 5 5.4 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.5 4.7 5.3 
Table ‎7.5: The Resulting Users' Risk Profiles 
*user with highest risk profile , **user with lowest risk profile. 
 
 
Figure ‎7.10: A Mapping of The Suggested Categorization of Behaviors to Simulation’s Behaviors (B#)  
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A comparison of these results based on  the impact of  user-centric factors on the resulting risk 
scores/levels,  highlights a similar trend to that obtained from Experiments I and II. As IT 
proficiency and conscientiousness personality trait  user-centric factors were found to be most 
significantly negatively correlated with behaviors B2, B4 and B5 for the former and behaviors B8, 
B11 and B12 for the latter, this impact is explicit.  IT professionals and those with a high level of 
conscientiousness personality trait were in lower risk than non-IT professionals and users  with 
lower levels of conscientiousness as in Figures 7.11 and 7.12. A similar impact was apparent for 
males over females as gender user-centric factor is most significantly negatively correlated with  
behavior B7 as in Figure 7.13. 
 








Figure ‎7.13: Impact of Gender User-centric Factor on Behavior B7 
The user-centric factors of age and service usage levels are categorized in three levels of low, 
medium and high with an opposing significant correlation with behaviors B1 and B9 for the former 
and B3 and B10 for the latter. As illustrated in Figures 7.14 and 7.15, the variations in these user-
centric factors resulted in varying risk profiles for users as the higher the service usage level of the 








Figure ‎7.15: Impact of Age User-centric Factor on Behaviors B3 and B10 
Opposing to the above mentioned behaviors resulting risk scores/levels, behavior B6 that was 
found not to be significantly correlated with any of the studied user-centric factors resulted in  a 
unified risk score/level, i.e. 8.5 High risk,  for all users as in Figure 7.16. The comparison between 
resulting risk scores/levels of other behaviors and those of behavior B6 serve to show how the 
proposed risk models take into account the variations in the most significant correlated user-centric 
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factors when calculating risk. Moreover, it shows that for the same behavior, different risk scores 
were obtained based upon the differences in user’s user-centric factors highlighting the difference 
between an individualized and non-individualized risk score/level.  
 
Figure ‎7.16: Impact of Non Significance Correlation on Behavior B6 
This simulation is based on a time line scenario of activities. To reflect the evolving nature of 
risk over time, Figure 7.17  illustrates how the risk score changes for each user as the time goes 
through the scenario based upon the behaviors being exhibited.  
 




The findings of Chapter 4 were employed in proposing a User-centric Risk Assessment Model 
that takes into account, when calculating risk, variations in user’s characteristics. In addition, other 
behavioral-related factors were considered resulting in a risk score/level not of a single behavior 
but of compound risk. Using two experiments and a scenario-based simulation of a variety of users 
with different risk profiles, the proposed risk calculation models were applied and  results 
analyzed. It was an opportunity to show that risk has to be based on the user and there are factors 
whether user-centric or behavioral-related that influence his behavior. This is evident as different 
risk profiles were obtained for the same behavior as a result of variations in users’-centric factors 
such as his age,  personality trait and service level usage showing that the proposed models can 
adapt to change in these factors to produce an individualized risk score/level.  
The resulting risk scores/levels of simulation as in Table 7.5, reflect the noted trends and 
patterns from Experiments I and II.  However, when comparing the resulting risk scores/levels of a 
certain behavior for different users, as in B4 for instance, we are able to see no difference in the 
risk level. From the user’s perspective, this increase or decrease in the risk score but within the 
same risk level may not be relevant. Consequently, the nature of the proposed models do not allow 
for a decrease or an increase of 3, for instance, in one hit. Thus, this level of granularity is picked 
up and understood by the security response manager that this 0.7 increase or decrease, for example,  
does mean something and acts accordingly. This is similar in concept to the concept of “Fever” in 
the human body. As the normal temperature is 37.5c, an increase of temperature of 0.30c to 37.8 
implies that the person has high fever and a medical procedure has to be applied. Similarly, the 
temperature of 39c is still considered high fever but the difference is in how it is treated. 
Moreover, the analysis showed that, based on proposed models, user’s risk level is not 
primarily impacted by a change in a statistically significant user-centric factor only, but also by a 
change in a number of behavioral-related factors. Actually, the resulting risk scores/levels either 
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decreased or increased as a consequence of change in these factors and a number of general trends 
were identified. Among those behavioral-related factors were password hygiene in terms of auth-
score variable and type of used communication medium in terms of connect-score variable.  
Unlike application-related behaviors where several factors are considered when calculating risk 
scores, only user-centric factors are considered when calculating risk for system-related behaviors. 
As such, the impact of a statistically significant user-centric factor and the contribution of 
behavioral-related factors such as auth-score and connect-score as standalone behaviors to both 
behavior-risk or overall-risk were more obvious.  
When analyzing the impact of the user-centric factor of IT proficiency on the resulting 
behavior-risk and overall-risk on behavior B2 of simulation (Using the same password for multiple 
sensitive accounts), for example, the behavioral-related factor of authentication thru auth-score  is 
the primary behavioral-related factor used when calculating behavior-risk. When comparing the 
resulting behavior-risk of this behavior, and consequently the resulting overall-risk, with another 
application-related behavior that has significant negative correlation with IT proficiency such as 
the application-related behavior read private data of “clicking on attachments/links in an email 
from a friend without checking” (as in behavior B4 in simulation), the impact of IT proficiency is 
more apparent as in Table 7.6. The behavior-risk  of B2 is 6.3 for IT professionals and 8.8 for non-
IT professionals compared to 6 for IT professionals and 6.7 for non-IT professionals in B4.  
Moreover, when analyzing the impact of the user-centric factor of service usage on the 
resulting behavior-risk  and overall-risk  on behavior B1of simulation (Connecting to public WiFi), 
for example, the behavioral-related factor of used communication medium thru connect-score is the 
primary behavioral-related factor used when calculating behavior-risk. When comparing the 
resulting behavior-risk of this behavior, and consequently the resulting overall-risk, with another 
application-related behavior that has significant positive correlation with service usage such as the 
245 
 
application-related behavior write private data of “allowing web browsers to remember passwords” 
(as in behavior B9 in simulation), the impact of service usage is more apparent on B1 as a 
standalone behavior than on B9 as in Table 7.7. Behavior-risk level was high  with scores of  7.5, 
8.5, and 9.5 for service usage levels of low, medium and high in B1 whereas it is medium level 
with scores of 5, 5.3 and 5.7 in B9 for service usage levels of low, medium and high. This suggests 
a stronger impact of a user-centric factor on resulting risk scores/levels than when combined with 
other factors. 
 
“Using the same password for 
multiple sensitive accounts”, B 2 
“Opening/clicking on 
links/attachments in emails from 
friends without checking”, B4 
IT 
proficiency 
behavior-risk Overall-risk behavior-risk Overall-risk 
IT 
professionals 
6.3 6.1 6 5.9 
Non-IT 
professionals 
8.8 7.3 6.7 6.3 
 
Table ‎7.6:  Impact of IT proficiency on Resulting Risk Scores/Levels 
 
 “Connecting to a public WiFi”, B 1 
“Allowing web browsers to 
remember password”, B9 
Service 
usage level 
behavior-risk Overall-risk behavior-risk Overall-risk 
Low 7.5 7.5 5 5.4 
Medium 8.5 8.5 5.3 5.6 
High 9.5 9.5 5.7 5.8 
 
Table ‎7.7: Impact of Service Usage Level on Resulting Risk Scores/Levels 
To this end, the proposed scale from 0 to 10 is not a definitive scale but it allows a level of 
granularity of risk. These examples serve to demonstrate that user-centric factors do contribute to 
the resulting risk scores/levels either by escalating or deescalating it, but this amount of 
contribution is not fixed for all behaviors. There is clear evidence to suggest that risk factors are 
changing based upon behavior and that, in comparison to prior work, the proposed approach 
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incorporating user-centric factors in calculating risk is a novel approach to information security risk 
assessment. 
7.5 Conclusion 
There are other sources of risk, i.e. threats, to the user other than his actual behavior. These 
sources range from user-centric to behavioral-related. Using three experiments, the proposed user-
centric risk calculation models were tested for calculating both behavior-risk  and overall-risk and 
results analyzed. The proposed risk calculation models worked in the way they were expected to. 
The analysis of results revealed a number of trends and relations. Further to that, the analysis 
provided evidence that the level of impact and contribution of such factors is not fixed for all users 
and behaviors. This being said, their impact was stronger when used as standalone behaviors. Aside 
from the “one size fits all” solution, encouragingly, the results of these experiments provided an 
indication that risk could be assessed differently for the same behavior based on a number of user-





Chapter 8 : Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This chapter concludes this research and highlights the achievements, limitations and 
opportunities for future work. This research aimed at developing a novel approach to individually 
and adaptively assessing and communicating risks focusing specifically on factors such as user 
behavior, awareness, and timeliness. 
8.1 Achievements of Research 
The research objectives stated in Chapter 1were met through the following achievements: 
1.  Developed a current state-of-the-art understanding of Information Security Risk 
Assessment methods. The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed and analyzed various 
information security risk assessment  methodologies and approaches. Firstly, those tailored 
for organizations were classified according to a suggested classification approach then 
analyzed. Additionally, enhancements to such methodologies were demonstrated. 
Secondly, information security risk assessment  methodologies intended for users of the 
general public were presented discussing both their advantages and disadvantages. This 
provided an overview of some of the challenges and key issues related to information 
security risk assessment.  
2. Investigated the current approaches in security awareness, usability and human 
aspects of information security. This was achieved using a systematic literature review as 
in Chapter 3. The literature indicated that users have problems in protecting themselves 
due to various issues such as lack of awareness and usability problems. As human’s 
behavior is one of the causes of information security problems, information security 
awareness aims to improve that behavior. However, when discussing and analyzing the 
current approaches to information security awareness, it has been found that they rely 
mostly on the one-size-fits-all approach that needs to be improved.  
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3. Identified the factors that influence user’s risk taking behavior. The literature review 
in Chapter 3 also indicated that some users tend to be at-risk more than others, therefore, 
risk is not the same for all users. This is due to several factors that impact his behavior. The 
chapter concluded by outlining these factors and explaining how they contribute to the risk 
level of user’s behaviors. These influencers range between demographic to psychological 
and risk communication/awareness factors.  
4. Explored the extent in which users are making risk informed decisions. This was 
achieved using an online user survey as explained in Chapter 4. The analysis of the survey 
results demonstrated that users use more than one device with different platforms to 
perform their daily activities which increases the burden upon them in maintaining security 
across different devices and applications. Moreover, a holistic view of user’s risk-appetite 
was explored from several aspects including data management and authentication. The 
analysis of such behaviors suggested that users do consider information security to be 
important and practice a baseline of security knowledge that requires considerable 
improvement. 
5. Analyzed the relationship between differences in users’ characteristics (user-centric 
factors)  and their risk-taking behavior. Being that several factors were identified to 
influence user’s security behaviors, the survey in Chapter 4 also investigated the 
relationship between user-centric factors and user’s behaviors. Using Pearson Correlation, 
the set of analysis across a set of factors and behaviors provided a more appreciated 
understanding of what significant relations exist. Therefore, considering them when 
assessing and responding to user’s risks will result in a more realistic and individualized 
risk assessment and communication. 
6. Proposed a novel model for User-centric Risk Assessment and Response (UCRAR) 
that assesses risks on both user and system level and generate an individualized risk 
profile accordingly. Capitalizing upon the knowledge gained, a novel model was proposed 
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in Chapter 5 that aimed at enhancing user’s security behavior. The model is intended to 
provide a comprehensive framework for individually,  continuously and timely assessing 
and communicating information security risks. The novelty of the proposed model depends 
upon four significant aspects: the continuous monitoring of user’s behaviors, an aggregated 
risk score/level based upon risk assessment on both the user and system level, an 
individualized risk profile and a persuasive individualized response mechanism. These 
aspects are utilized to enhance user’s risk taking behavior and transform him from being 
ill-informed to a security minded user who is able to make a risk informed decision. 
7. Developed a novel approach in security awareness and usability to communicate risks 
effectively to users by designing a communication that efficiently and individually 
interacts with users. Based on the analysis of the generated individualized risk profile, a 
decision is made on how to best communicate and educate the user about his behavior as 
explained in Chapter 5. The novelty of this approach is that, aside from the traditional one-
message/one-size-fits-all approach, several factors are considered when deciding how to 
respond to user’s behavior. Examples of such factors are the risk score/level, has the 
behavior been undertaken before or not and the time period between these behaviors. As 
part of its novelty, the user is persuasively and individually educated about his risk taking 
behavior using a gradual response mechanism where response severity is escalated from 
level 1 to level 6 and by utilizing three response approaches. Moreover, user-centric factors 
and learning styles are considered among other factors in this mechanism. 
8. Proposed novel risk models that adapts to user’s-centric factors when calculating 
both of system and user level risks and generates an aggregated risk. As UCRAR 
provided an understanding of both user and system based risk, a novel mechanism for 
estimating such risks is proposed in Chapter 6. Aside from the traditional risk assessment 
formula, three risk estimation models are proposed: a user-centric, system-based and an 
aggregated model. As part of its novelty, both user-centric and behavioral-related factors 
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are considered. This resulted in an individualized near real-time risk assessment in granular 
form. 
9. Designed and implemented a scenario based simulation from which the models will 
operate. This involved various users with different combinations of user-centric factors to 
evaluate the effectiveness, reliability and feasibility of the proposed approach as in Chapter 
7. According to the proposed model, risks were assessed and results analyzed for each 
user/behavior. The analysis of simulation results was useful in demonstrating how risk is 
not the same for all users and how the proposed model is effective in adapting to 
differences between users. 
8.2 Limitations of The Research 
Although the research objectives were met, a number of limitations can be identified. The key 
limitations of this research are as follows: 
1. With regards to the research nature, an implementation of the proposed model in a real 
environment was challenging especially that this research was conducted by a single 
researcher with limited timeframe and resources. Hence, a better understanding of its 
effectiveness could be given by implementing and evaluating the proposed model in 
practical sense across a population of users. 
2. Only one risk assessment model was used, i.e. matrix-based. This was largely built upon 
best-practices. However, the literature has identified a variety of risk models that could be 
used. 
3. Whilst the survey conducted provided a holistic perspective of user’s risk-taking behavior 
from multiple domains, having more behaviors and more factors would have provided a 
richer and a more comprehensive set of analysis. 
4. How user-centric and system-based risk contribute to final risk score/level has not been 
investigated. Similarly, the impact of operating system, application vulnerability/risk and  
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network risk on the system-based risk score/level. Therefore these issues need to be 
considered to provide a more realistic assessment. 
5. The consideration of installed security software and its functionality was outside the scope 
of this research. Although the Risk Communication component of UCRAR does consider 
this in terms of registering messages delivered by such software, but this was not the case 
in the risk assessment component. The consideration of this will result in a better 
understanding of risk. 
8.3 Future Work 
A number of areas and opportunities exist for further enhancement and research. These are as 
follows: 
1. A complete fully functional version of the proposed model need to be developed and 
implemented in a real environment. This will be helpful in understanding the effectiveness 
of the model in enhancing user’s security behavior. Additionally, this will facilitate 
model’s evaluation and finding any limitations. 
2. The design of an experiment that can empirically understand and measure the relationship 
between user-centric risk assessment and system-based risk assessment and their 
proportion of impact on final risk score/level. So as the impact of operating system, 
application and network router (if any) vulnerability on system-based risk. 
3. Further investigation of different risk assessment models aided by a practical evaluation by 
getting real user data in. This will give an opportunity to a better understanding of which is 
the most effective and the granularity of generated risk scores/levels.  
4. Users use more than one device for performing their activities. Having the proposed model 
running on multiple devices, behaviors are monitored and assessed on them simultaneously 
as one  assessment instead of assessing behaviors on each device separately. This will 
strengthen the enhancement of user’s security behavior.  
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5. When assessing user’s behavior, more than one user-centric factor could be considered and 
not only the factor with the most significant correlation. This will enhance the 
individualized level of the resulting risk scores/levels. Moreover, the assessment is not 
limited to only one insecure behavior but to a number of behaviors, i.e. compound risk. 
6. The consideration of installed security software and its functionality in the risk assessment. 
7. The design and implementation of the processes proposed in UCRAR such as the Good 
behavior repository, the community-based risk data. Additionally, the implementation and 
evaluation of the Risk Communication component. Altogether, this will result in a 
complete implementation of the proposed model. 
8.4 The Future of Information Security Risk Assessment 
Carrying on daily activities using services provided by computing devices and the Internet are 
becoming part of users’ daily life. With this increase use, comes an increase in information security 
threats that users are not well aware of and not well equipped to protect themselves against the 
continuously evolving threat landscape. Although many methodologies exist for information 
security risk assessment, this research highlights the need to go beyond the traditional mechanisms 
to a continuous, timely and individualized assessment. In this research, a model has been proposed 
in which understanding risks posed to users is achieved by focusing on their behaviors and how to 
improve it. However, there is a wider set of issues in terms of better understanding the nature of the 
behavior, how the behavior changes over time, the evolution of those behaviors, how user-centric 
factors change over time and how that information could be better used within wider issues of 
information security awareness, education and communication. Moreover, the existing literature is 
largely about behavioral intent, the research domain needs to explore opportunities for developing 
new mechanisms to actually measure the behavior itself rather than behavior intent. Not 
specifically to the proposed model, but taking these concepts and applying them to information 
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security risk assessment, awareness, education and training such that the more that is done in that 




Appendix A: End-users’ Survey Questions (Clarke et al. 2016) 
 
SECTION A: Demographics  
 
 
A.Q1: Please select the appropriate age group in which you belong: 
o 18-25 o 26-30 o 31-35 o 36-40 o 41-45 o 46-50 o 51-55 
o 56-60 o 61+      
 
A.Q2: Please select your gender: 
o Female o Male      
 
A.Q3: In which country do you reside: 
A list of Countries 
 
A.Q4: Please select your highest level of education: 
o Secondary School (e.g. GCSE) o Higher Education (e.g. Bachelor’s degree, 
MSc, PhD) 
o Further Education 
(e.g. A-level) 
 
A.Q5: Are you a student: 
o Yes o No      
 





























o Life, physical, and 
social science 
occupations 
o Building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance occupations 
o Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media 
occupations 
 
A.Q7: Which subject do you study: 




o Sociology o Law 
o Biology o Music o Communication and Media o Geography o Philosophy o Music 
o Earth 
Sciences 
o Engineering o English 
Literature 
o Education o Economics o Chemistry o History 







o Management o Health and 
Medicine 






SECTION B: IT Background 
 
 
B.Q1: How would you rate your IT proficiency- (1 Novice, 3 Experienced and 5 Expert) 
o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 o 5   
 
B.Q2: Which of the following digital devices do you use- (Select all that apply) 
o Android Tablet/Smartphone (e.g. Samsung Galaxy Tab, HTC) 
o BlackBerry Tablet/Smartphone (e.g. BlackBerry PlayBook, Q10) 
o Game Console 
o GPS/Navigation Device 
o Handheld Game Console 
o iPad/iPad mini/iPhone 
o Linux Desktop/Laptop 
o Mac Desktop/Laptop 
o Smart TV 
o Smart Watch 
o Windows Desktop/Laptop 
o Windows Tablet/Smartphone (e.g. Microsoft Surface, Nokia Lumia) 
o Other 
 
B.Q3: How frequent do you engage in the following services: 
  Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
1. Access Emails (e.g. Gmail)      
2. Cloud services (e.g. Dropbox)      
3. Information gathering (e.g. 
reading news, weather 
forecast) 
     
4. Instant messenger (e.g. 
Skype, WhatsApp) 
     
5. Online banking      
6. Online blogs/forums      
7. Online gaming      
8. Online shopping (e.g. 
Amazon) 
     
9. Peer to peer sharing (e.g. 
torrents) 
     
10. Social networking (e.g. 
Facebook, LinkedIn) 
     
11. Watch TV or video (e.g. BBC 
iPlayer, YouTube) 
     
12. Word processing and 








SECTION C: IT Security Practice 
 
 
C.Q1: How high a priority is IT security for you: 
o Essential o High priority o Medium priority o Low priority o Not a priority 
 
 














o Graphical passwords 













(e.g. PIN / 
password) 
o Encryption o Other 
 
C.Q3: How many passwords do you have (including both devices and services (e.g. Amazon, eBay)): 
o 1-5 o 6-10 o 11-15 o 16-20 o 21-25 o 26+  
 
C.Q4: What proportion of your passwords can be described by the following statements: 
 0-40% 41-80% 81-100% 
1. Contains alphabetic characters    
2. Contains lower case characters    
3. Contains upper case characters    
4. Contains numbers    
5. Contains punctuation symbols    
6. Has been recycled / reused    
7. Is 8 characters or more    
 
C.Q5: Typically, how often do you change your passwords: 
o Less than 3 
months 
o Between  
3-6 months 
o Between 7-12 
months 
o More than 
1 year 
o Whenever a system 
requires me to do so 
o Never 
 
C.Q6: What kind of information do you share on social networking websites (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn etc.): 






o Telephone o Pictures of family 
and friends 
o Information of family and 
friends 
o Other     
 
C.Q7: Have you experienced any of the following security incidents: 
o Data loss o Denial of 
Service 
o Trojan o Hardware 
failure 
o Phishing o Phibbing o Spyware 
o Device loss (e.g. mobile 
phone/ USB / security token) 








C.Q8: Please indicate how frequently the following statements apply to you: 
  Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
1. I share my password with others      
2. I lock my workstation when I am away 
from my desk 
     
3. I store my passwords      
4. I click on links /  attachments within 
an email from unknown sources 
     
5. I click on links /  attachments within 
an email from friends/colleagues 
without checking 
     
6. I connect to a public wireless network 
(e.g. Starbucks Wi-Fi) 
     
7. I disable wireless technologies (e.g. 
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) on my 
laptop/tablet/mobile) 
     
8. I delete suspicious emails      
9. I notify IT support when I receive 
suspicious emails 
     
10. I use an encrypted USB drive to 
transfer files between computers 
     
11. I keep my anti-virus software up-to-
date 
     
12. I scan a USB drive before using it      
13. I back-up my data files on a regular 
basis 
     
14. I use a password to log-in my home 
computer system 
     
15. I insert & access USB sticks/CD/DVD 
from unknown sources 
     
16. I encrypt sensitive information on my 
computer 
     
17. I destroy all data before disposing of 
hardware (e.g. laptop, mobile phones) 
     
18. I install the latest security patches for 
my Operating System/ software 
applications/ web browsers without 
any delay 
     
19. I download files from 
suspicious/unknown websites 
     
20. I accept invitations from people I do 
not know on social networking 
websites 
     
21. I use a same password for multiple 
sensitive accounts 
     
22. I install/use pirate software on my 
computing devices 
     
23. I disable antivirus /firewall (e.g.      
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because it was slowing down my 
computer) 
24. I cancel or postpone a security related 
software update 
     
25. I allow web 
browsers/systems/applications to 
remember my passwords 
     
26. I open a document despite security 
warnings 
     
27. I forward chain emails (e.g. if you 
forward this email 50 times and you 
will be healthier) 
     
28. I use an anonymising proxy      
29. I use a VPN (Virtual Private Network)      
30. I use a TOR (The Onion Router) 
network 
     
31. I ensure I log off from online systems 
(e.g. Facebook account) before closing 
the browser/app 
     
 
C.Q9: Which of the following channels have you proactively used to enhance your knowledge of IT 
security: 
o Internet o A 
colleague 
o IT Support 
Officer 




o Never / Not 
interested 
o Haven't to date, but would 
like to learn more 
 
o Other     
 
SECTION D: PERSONALITY TRAITS 
 
 
D.Q1: Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that these personal characteristics describe 
you: 










1. Is talkative      
2. Tends to find fault with others      
3. Does a thorough job      
4. Is depressed, blue      
5. Is original, comes up with new 
ideas 
     
6. Is reserved      
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others      
8. Can be somewhat careless      
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well      
10. Is curious about many different 
things 
     
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11. Is full of energy      
12. Starts quarrels with others      
13. Is a reliable worker      
14. Can be tense      
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker      
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm      
17. Has a forgiving nature      
18. Tends to be disorganized      
19. Worries a lot      
20. Has an active imagination      
21. Tends to be quiet      
22. Is generally trusting      
23. Tends to be lazy      
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily 
upset 
     
25. Is inventive      
26. Has an assertive personality      
27. Can be cold and aloof      
28. Perseveres until the task is finished      
29. Can be moody      
30. Values artistic, aesthetic 
experiences 
     
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited      
32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
     
33. Does things efficiently      
34. Remains calm in tense situations      
35. Prefers work that is routine      
36. Is outgoing, sociable      
37. Is sometimes rude to others      
38. Makes plans and follows through 
with them 
     
39. Gets nervous easily      
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas      
41. Has few artistic interests      
42. Likes to cooperate with others      
43. Is easily distracted      
44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature 






Appendix B: Significance Testing on The Relationship Between User-centric Factors and The Risk 
Taking Behavior Using Pearson’s Chi-square Test 












p-value 18-30 31-50 51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
I.1 Changing of passwords 
H 63 56 68 
0. 06638 




56 65 65 
0.09673 M 32 40 24 32 32 33 34 27 41 31 26 
L 6 4 7 3 10 15 6 4 3 4 9 
I.2 Sharing of Passwords 
H 10 3 16 
1.25E-06* 




9 8 13 
0.39704 M 28 28 29 31 25 19 27 32 26 32 27 
L 62 69 55 58 66 70 66 50 65 60 60 
I.3 Storing of passwords 
H 43 37 48 
0.00711* 




44 37 47 
0.45584 M 22 21 22 23 21 11 23 21 22 24 20 
L 36 **42 30 36 35 37 38 30 34 **39 33 
I.4 Using the same 
password for multiple 
accounts 
H 63 55 70 
0.00138* 




61 68 61 
0.16810 M 17 21 14 16 21 7 17 17 20 16 17 
L 20 24 16 14 26 44 21 16 20 16 22 
I.5 Web-browsers/systems/ 
applications to remember 
password 
H 61 62 60 
0.78079 




71 64 50 
0.00030* M 18 18 17 15 23 26 16 23 16 16 21 
L 22 20 23 18 25 **48 22 21 13 20 30 
I.6 Locking workstation 
when away from desk 
H 31 29 32 
0.00382* 
 






21 33 36 
0.00165* 
 
M 25 28 23 26 26 19 25 26 23 30 24 
L 44 43 45 40 48 63 43 46 56 37 40 
I.7. Using a password to log 
in home computer 
H 23 15 29 
0.10592 
 






16 20 30 
0.23409 
 
M 12 10 14 10 16 11 13 10 9 13 14 
L 60 74 57 65 63 78 66 63 75 67 55 
I.8. Logging off from online 
systems before closing the 
browser/app 
H 56 52 60 
0.18556 
 





55 62 52 
0.28175 
 
M 20 22 19 20 22 19 20 20 18 19 23 









Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
I.1 Changing of passwords 









0.07488 M 16 22 34 23 33 31 32 31 32 32 
L 5 9 6 4 6 5 6 4 2 8 
I.2 Sharing of Passwords 









0.53742 M 28 29 28 30 30 27 30 23 30 27 
L 63 56 65 50 58 66 61 64 58 63 
I.3 Storing of passwords 









0.93393 M 20 33 20 29 19 26 20 31 21 22 
L 38 21 36 33 36 34 38 24 36 35 
I.4 Using the same 
password for multiple 
accounts 









0.04672* M 18 16 19 10 19 15 18 14 15 18 
L 21 12 21 14 17 22 19 23 15 22 
I.5 Web-browsers/systems/ 
applications to remember 
password 









0.43884 M 18 16 19 13 21 14 19 14 18 18 
L 21 22 25 11 20 24 22 17 18 23 
I.6  Locking workstation 
when away from desk 















M 25 27 27 22 24 27 26 24 26 25 
L 45 37 48 31 47 40 44 42 44 44 
I.7  Using a password to log 
in home computer 















M 11 17 11 15 14 11 12 15 14 12 
L 69 48 70 50 66 64 67 56 62 67 
I.8  Logging off from online 
systems before closing the 
browser/app 















M 21 17 22 14 18 23 21 18 17 22 























51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
II.1 Engaging in social networks 
H 86 87 86 
0.11081 




72 92 72 
0.68835 M 9 6 10 6 13 15 9 7 17 6 17 
L 5 6 4 3 5 26 7 1 11 2 11 
II.2 Accepting invitations from 
unknown persons 
H 21 15 27 
0.39483 




23 22 19 
0.66158 M 21 20 22 23 20 14 21 21 21 23 20 
L 58 65 50 54 61 74 56 62 56 55 61 
 





Openness Conscientiousness  Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
II.1 Engaging in social networks 









0.25230 M 9 8 9 6 7 11 8 11 6 10 
L 5 6 5 5 4 6 5 7 4 5 
II.2 Accepting invitations from 
unknown persons 









0.40162 M 23 14 20 26 22 20 22 18 18 23 





















51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
III.1 Updating AntiVirus 
software 
H 30 14 **44 
4.09E-14* 
 




19 31 37 
0.00058* M 18 18 17 19 15 22 18 18 15 20 19 
L 52 68 39 50 55 70 55 45 66 49 45 
III.2. Installing latest security 
patches 
H 41 23 52 
2.35E-11* 
 






24 42 47 
1.30E-07* 
 
M 24 33 21 26 27 26 29 21 23 32 24 
L 35 **44 27 33 **38 **41 **40 24 **53 26 29 
III.3. Disabling 
Antvirus/Firewall 
H 24 13 31 
1.50E-06* 
 




17 24 26 
0.33791 
 
M 17 19 19 21 15 19 19 17 22 19 17 
L 59 68 50 55 64 67 59 58 61 57 57 
III.4.Canceling or postponing 
security updates 
H 43 31 55 
0.13107 




34 51 45 
0.45205 
 
M 29 37 22 30 25 33 31 24 25 33 29 
L 28 **33 23 23 36 30 30 21 **41 17 26 
III.5.Installing/using pirate 
software 
H 42 45 40 
0.34286 
 





53 42 34 
0.00223* 
 
M 21 21 21 22 21 7 19 25 22 19 22 











Openness Conscientiousness  Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
III.1. Updating AntiVirus 
software 















M 18 17 17 20 19 16 19 11 18 18 
L 54 43 58 33 52 53 53 49 46 56 
III.2. Installing latest security 
patches 












0.00291 M 27 23 28 22 28 24 26 31 26 27 
L **37 26 **38 23 34 36 37 23 27 **39 
III.3. Disabling 
Antvirus/Firewall 














M 20 14 19 19 20 18 19 19 21 18 
L 60 50 63 42 60 56 61 48 52 62 
III.4.Canceling or postponing 
security updates 















M 31 16 32 17 29 29 32 21 22 32 
L 28 23 31 17 26 29 28 24 25 29 
III.5.Installing/using pirate 
software 












0.23510 M 22 16 21 19 19 24 22 14 23 19 




















51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
 
IV.1. Clicking on 
links/Attachments within 
emails from unknown sources 
H 15 8 22 
7.52E-06* 
 





15 14 17 
0.00481* 
 
M 22 21 22 20 24 30 21 22 20 19 25 
L 63 71 56 65 60 63 66 57 66 67 58 
IV.2.Clicking on 
links/Attachments within 
emails from friends without 
checking 
H 44 31 55 
2.15E-08* 
 





37 47 46 
0.03146* 
 
M 28 30 26 26 30 41 27 29 25 28 31 
L 
28 **39 19 31 25 22 32 20 **38 26 23 
IV.3. Deleting suspicious emails 
H 25 22 28 
0.00615* 
 




22 24 29 
0.16202 
 
M 19 21 17 18 20 19 20 17 16 24 17 
L 56 57 55 51 62 81 54 61 62 52 54 
IV.4. Notifying IT support when 
receiving suspicious emails 
H 72 80 65 
0.79935 
 





70 71 75 
0.54360 
 
M 14 11 16 11 20 7 12 18 13 15 13 
L 14 10 19 8 23 33 13 17 18 14 12 
IV.5.Forwarding chain emails 
H 12 4 20 
4.54E-09* 
 




10 12 14 
0.00279* 
 
M 10 8 12 9 11 15 9 12 6 11 12 










Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
 
IV.1. Clicking on 
links/Attachments within 
emails from unknown sources 














M 21 22 21 22 22 21 22 17 23 21 
L 65 52 67 52 64 63 64 57 59 66 
IV.2.Clicking on 
links/Attachments within 
emails from friends without 
checking 













0.46392 M 29 21 31 18 30 26 30 15 26 29 
L 29 24 29 26 27 30 28 29 27 29 
IV.3. Deleting suspicious emails 










0.38490 M 18 22 18 22 20 17 19 19 18 19 
L 58 44 59 46 56 56 58 46 52 58 
IV.4. Notifying IT support when 
receiving suspicious emails 










0.54910 M 14 11 14 14 15 12 13 14 13 14 
L 15 12 16 10 15 14 15 12 13 15 
IV.5.Forwarding chain emails 












0.16138 M 9 14 9 14 9 11 10 10 11 10 























51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
V.1. Backing up data on a 
regular basis 
H 48 48 47 
0.00934* 
 






41 51 51 
0.00104* 
 
M 25 24 26 20 33 30 21 33 20 26 28 
L 27 27 27 24 33 **37 27 28 40 24 21 
V.2. Using an encrypted USB 
drive to transfer files between 
computers 
H 83 89 77 
0.07525 
 






78 86 83 
0.22137 
 
M 10 8 14 12 10 11 10 13 12 11 10 
L 7 3 9 5 9 15 6 8 10 3 7 
V.3. Scanning a USB drive before 
using it 
H 68 66 69 
0.52662 
 





56 76 70 
0.00045* 
 
M 17 19 15 18 17 7 18 16 20 12 19 
L 15 15 15 13 17 33 18 8 24 12 11 
V.4. Inserting and accessing 
USB/CD/DVD from unknown 
sources 
H 30 19 **41 
1.57E-07* 
 





30 29 32 
0.87682 
 
M 30 35 26 33 28 19 30 31 30 29 32 
L 40 46 33 38 38 59 40 37 39 42 37 
V.5. Encrypting sensitive 
information on the device 
H 74 71 77 
0.00257* 
 






64 79 79 
0.04969* 
 
M 14 17 12 14 17 4 16 10 20 13 11 
L 12 12 10 11 12 15 13 8 16 8 10 
V.6. Destroying all data before 
disposal of hardware 
H 34 25 42 
0.00024* 
 






22 37 40 
0.00215* 
 
M 19 21 17 20 18 11 20 17 19 21 17 
L 47 54 41 43 52 67 50 42 59 42 43 
V.7. Opening a document 
despite security warnings 
H 51 54 47 
0.06612 
 






54 54 44 
0.00191* 
 
M 32 33 32 31 36 22 32 33 31 34 32 
L 17 13 21 11 26 **48 17 19 15 12 24 
V.8. Downloading files from 
suspicious websites 
H 31 27 35 
0.73422 
 






32 31 31 
0.36998 
 
M 32 39 27 35 29 19 34 28 30 **38 30 











Openness Conscientiousness  Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
V.1. Backing up data on a 
regular basis 














M 24 29 27 17 24 26 26 19 20 27 
L 29 19 32 13 30 24 28 25 26 28 
V.2. Using an encrypted USB 
drive to transfer files between 
computers 















M 11 10 12 9 12 10 12 6 10 11 
L 7 6 7 5 8 5 7 5 7 6 
V.3. Scanning a USB drive 
before using it 















M 18 11 19 12 16 18 17 15 18 17 
L 17 9 17 8 17 13 16 13 9 19 
V.4. Inserting and accessing 
USB/CD/DVD from unknown 
sources 















M 31 29 31 28 26 35 31 24 32 30 
L 40 37 42 30 41 37 40 36 35 41 
V.5. Encrypting sensitive 
information on the device 















M 15 11 16 10 17 11 13 20 11 16 
L 12 8 12 10 12 11 13 5 9 12 
V.6. Destroying all data before 
disposal of hardware 














M 19 21 18 23 17 21 19 20 20 19 
L 50 31 51 33 48 46 50 35 41 50 
V.7. Opening a document 
despite security warnings 















M 34 24 34 26 33 32 35 19 33 32 
L 18 17 20 8 18 17 19 11 14 19 
V.8. Downloading files from 
suspicious websites 















M 33 28 32 32 30 35 32 33 35 31 






















51+ p-value Male Female p-value High Medium Low p-value 
VI.1  Disabling wireless 
technologies when not using it 
H 62 67 66 
0.06211 
 





57 63 65 
0.63775 
 
M 19 23 16 19 21 15 20 19 22 19 18 
L 19 21 17 20 17 11 22 11 22 19 17 
VI.2  Connecting to public 
access WiFi networks 
H 70 60 80 
0.03617* 




77 72 64 
0.00274* M 22 31 13 20 24 22 16 15 17 21 25 
L 8 10 7 7 7 26 22 8 6 7 10 
VI.3 Using the TOR network 
H 63 64 65 
0.06274 




64 61 67 
0.08255 M 17 17 18 17 21 0 19 12 14 16 20 
L 18 19 17 21 14 15 22 13 22 23 13 
VI.4 Using an anonymizing 
proxy 
H 48 48 45 
0.09375 




42 48 54 
0.00283* M 21 21 25 22 21 7 22 19 20 20 24 
L 30 31 30 34 27 12 37 16 40 32 22 
VI.5 Using a VPN 
H 82 83 84 
0.48229 




75 85 86 
0.00592* M 13 13 14 10 20 11 13 13 17 11 12 










Openness Conscientiousness  Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value BFI+ BFI- p-value 
VI.1  Disabling wireless 
technologies when not using it 















M 20 16 20 16 18 21 19 21 21 19 
L 20 13 20 14 19 18 19 17 19 19 
VI.2  Connecting to public access 
WiFi networks 









0.67052 M 22 18 22 20 22 21 22 17 20 22 
L 8 7 8 7 6 10 8 7 7 8 
VI.3 Using the TOR network 









0.07329 M 17 19 17 18 14 21 18 13 17 17 
L 19 19 18 22 18 20 17 30 20 18 
VI.4 Using an anonymizing proxy 









0.29446 M 21 20 22 18 20 23 22 18 21 21 
L 30 33 27 42 28 33 29 30 33 30 
VI.5 Using a VPN 









0.23196 M 14 8 14 11 13 13 12 18 15 12 





Appendix C : A List of Users’ Behaviors in the Context of Mobile Devices and How To Monitor 
Them 
When looking at mobile device usage, these behaviors could usefully be classified as: 
I. System/Device related behaviors 
No. Process User behavior How to Monitor 
1 
Location services: Access to my 
location 
On The method IsProviderEnabled of the class 
LocationManager provides access to the system 
location services. If the user has enabled this provider 
(GPS_PROVIDER, NETWORK_PROVIDER) in the 
Settings menu, true is returned otherwise false is 
returned.  
Another option is by using The Google Location 
Services API, part of Google Play Services, which 
provides a powerful, high-level framework that 
automatically handles location providers, user 
movement, and location accuracy 
Off 
2 
Google location history: Allows 




3 Screen lock 
Select Face/pattern/pin or password 
Use KeyguardManager to determine the state and 
security level of the 
keyguard.  KeyGuardManager.isDeviceSecure
() returns true if the device is secured with a PIN, 
pattern or password. 
None 
4 Automatically lock 
Either immediately  
 The Settings.System provider offers 
a SCREEN_OFF_TIMEOUT setting that specifies the 
amount of time in milliseconds before the device goes to 
sleep or begins to dream after a period of inactivity. This 
value is also known as the user activity timeout period 
since the screen isn't necessarily turned off when it 
expires 
or after 30 seconds 
 
1min/2min …etc  
 
the longer the time period the more the 
risk 
5 
Make passwords visible (during 
entry) 
On Settings.System.TEXT_SHOW_PASSWORD is to 
show password characters in text editors. 1 = On, 0 = Off Off 
6 
Unknown sources: to allow the 
installation of non-market apps 
On.  
 
The system notifies the 




Of Settings.Secure returns whether applications 
can be installed for this user via the 
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I. System/Device related behaviors 
No. Process User behavior How to Monitor 
Select 
Cancel 
system's  ACTION_INSTALL_PACKAGE mechanism. 
Android keeps track of how a package was installed 
through the method getInstallerPackageName 





Owner Info: Text that appears on 
the lock screen 
Entering name, date of birth, address, 
phone number, email or a hello message 
LOCK_SCREEN_OWNER_INFO.This preference 
contains the string that shows for owner info on 
LockScreen. OR use the 
getDeviceOwnerLockScreenInfo method of the 
DevicePolicyManager class. It returns the device 
owner information. If it is not set returns null. 
 
8 
Privacy protection: To set two 
modes (passwords) one for guest 
and the other for owner of device 
Activation of this feature 
To get the number of user profiles 
use UserManager.getUserCount(). 
 
To identify which user profile is activated, 




With that it can be identified if the user is different 
of the system user. 
Whereas getAccounts() of the AccountManager 
class 
Lists all accounts of any type registered on the device. 
 
 
Unlock with guest password, then all 
private information will be hidden 





(to allow the app 
suspend button to 
erase all data, 
change the screen 
Activate  
The method getPackageName() of the class 
DeviceAdminInfo Return the .apk package that 
implements this device admin. 
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I. System/Device related behaviors 
No. Process User behavior How to Monitor 
unlock password, 
set password rules, 
monitor screen 
unlock attempts 





(to allow the app 
Google Play 
services to erase 
all data, change 
the screen unlock 
password, and 
lock the screen) 
 Activate  
Deactivate 
10 Backup and restore 
Off.  
When selected, the 
system notifies the user 
of the consequences. 
Select 
OK 
By checking that the Backup Manager is operational 
using the bmgr enabled command: adb shell 





Automatic restore: when an app is 
reinstalled, all backed up settings 
and data are restored 
On  
Off 
12 Factory data reset 
Reset phone. This is a good practice 





Ads: Instruct apps not 
to use user’s 













The system will 
notify the user that it 







I. System/Device related behaviors 











To check for available system updates 
15 Wi-Fi  
 
On 
The method isWifiEnabled() of the class 
WifiManager returns whether Wi-Fi is enabled or 
disabled.  
The getNetworkId () method of the WifiInfo 
class returns the ID for the currently connected network 
or -1 if no network is connected. 
WIFI_NETWORKS_AVAILABLE_NOTIFICATION_ON 
of the class Settings.Global determines whether to 
















The method isEnabled() of the class 
BlueToothAdapter 
Returns true if Bluetooth is currently enabled and ready 
for use.  
Or by using BLUETOOTH_ON of  the class 
Settings.Global that specifies whether bluetooth is 
enabled/disabled 
Off 




The method getScanMode() of the class 
BluetoothAdapter gets the current Bluetooth scan 
mode of the local Bluetooth adapter. It determines if the 
local adapter is connectable and/or discoverable from 
remote Bluetooth devices.  
Or by using the BLUETOOTH_DISCOVERABILITY of Off 
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I. System/Device related behaviors 
No. Process User behavior How to Monitor 
the class Settings.System that determines whether 
















Portable Wi-Fi hotspot 
On  
This could be detected programmatically by the use of 







Add device  The list of devices connected can be obtained 




Allow all devices to 




NFC: allow data exchange when the 
phone touches another device 
On 
Using  NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter() to 
get the adapter (if available) and call 
its isEnabled() method to check whether NFC is 




GPS tag to attach 
location information to 
each video or photo 
taken 
Enable  
There's no way to confirm if that setting is enabled or 
not, since it's not part of any public or standard Android 
API. But by the use of permissions, the accessibility API 
AccessabilityService could be used to read 






Auto update apps 
Do not 
TBC 
auto update at any time 
over Wi-Fi only 
Notify me when an 






I. System/Device related behaviors 
No. Process User behavior How to Monitor 
Notify me when Apps 









For example, The Android SDK has several classes for settings such as: 
 Class Settings.Secure 
Secure system settings, containing system preferences that applications can read but are not allowed to write. These are for 
preferences that the user must explicitly modify through the system UI or specialized APIs for those values, not modified 
directly by applications. 
 Class Settings.Global 
Global system settings, containing preferences that always apply identically to all defined users. Applications can read these 
but are not allowed to write; like the "Secure" settings, these are for preferences that the user must explicitly modify 
through the system UI or specialized APIs for those values. 
 Class Settings.System 
System settings, containing miscellaneous system preferences. This table holds simple name/value pairs. There are 
convenience functions for accessing individual settings entries. 
A list of all installed apps could be obtained programmatically by the use of the method getInstalledApplications of the 
packageManager. The method getInstallerPackageName gets the name of the package that installed the application.  
To check if installed apps are all updated (latest versions), the packageInfo class and versionCode returns the version 







II. Application-related behaviors 


















1 Sign in 
Enter user name and password. Password 
could be weak, old or reused 
A separate password table 
could be created for all app 
accounts. These passwords will 
be hashed and salted. Upon 
entry of password, various 
password defined- rules set 
could be checked using vt-
password (passay) library 
which is a password policy 
enforcement for JAVA. For 
example, HistoryRule is a 
rule for determining if a 
password matches one of any 
previous password a user has 
chosen. If no historical 
password reference has been 
set, then passwords will meet 
this rule. 
One or more 
password rule is 
violated 
All password 
rules are met 
2 Open tweets Read/browse tweets timeline 
Traffic analysis 
3 Refresh home Refresh home page 
4 Browse contacts 
Read contacts whether following or 
followers 
The GET friends/ids request returns a 
collection of user IDs for every user the specified 
user is following. 
The GET followers/ids request Returns a 
collection of user IDs for every user following the 
specified user. 
5 Browse notifications Read notifications By using Twitter APIs, Twitter allows to interact 
with its data ie tweets & several attributes about 
tweets. 
















Send direct messages to followers 
Message content could be text, photos/videos, GIF, 
URL and/or location. 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Retweet  Text message: depending on content of message. 
For example, could be offensive comments about 
disabilities, age, religious beliefs and sexual 
orientation 
Photos/videos: personal photo or video of children, 
credit card, military base …etc from camera photo 
album that may include additional hidden info such 
as location 
Location: send current location. 
 
Message content will be monitored to identify any 
disruptive, offensive message or personal 
information such as passwords or credit card 
numbers. A list of predefined black words or 
phrases could be created, then by the 
implementation of a keystroke logger and text 
analysis the message content will be scanned 
against that list such that if any undesirable/risky 
content is detected it is picked up and flagged.  
For multimedia content: facial detection and 
recognition techniques could be applied to 
determine persons in the file that might give rise to 
privacy related issues and user notified.  
To differentiate between photos and videos, the 
mimeType is used to check if the file path 
corresponds to an image or video. 
Location: check for GPS coordinates location data 
embedded in a photo. This information could be 
obtained by using an EXIF (Exchange Image File 
Format) viewer.   
URL: phishing detection engines will be used to 
check for its legitimacy 
Social networks analysis techniques could be used 
to determine relationships between social entities.  
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Further to that, attributes such as recipients, degree 
of relationship in the social network (if any) and 
type of account may escalate the risk level of this 
process. 
Publish a message or tweet.  
Message content is safe 
 
Retweet a message. 
Message has disruptive/offensive content 
 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or the user’s child photo 8 Reply 
Same as in process of “Tweet/ Message/ 
Retweet” except that the sender is in the 
follower/following list and reply is to a 
single message 
9 Edit profile 
Adding personal information such as 
location, birthday and phone number. 
Could be used in identity theft or for 
guessing user’s passwords 
The url filed of Users object returns the URL 
provided by the user in association with their 
profile. So as name and location fields return 
the name of the user, as they’ve defined it and the 
user-defined location for this account’s profile 
respectively. 
10 Like tweet 
Low risk. But content liked may escalate 




(To add additional 
verification to protect 
account. This could be 





12 Protect my tweets 
On: private account 
This could be returned by the GET 
account/settings request . The 
protected field of Users object, When true, 
indicates that this user has chosen to protect their Off: public account 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Tweets. 
13 
Receive direct messages 
from anyone 
On 
The account settings object 
has 
an allow_dms_from  fiel
d which 
indicates who can DM 
(direct message) a user, 
either in a private one-on-





Off   
14 Photo tagging 
On 
This could be returned by 
the GET 
account/settings 
request . The field 
geo_enabled of Users 
object, When true, indicates 
that the user has enabled the 






Let others find me by 
email address/ phone 
number 
On 
This could be returned by the GET 
account/settings request. If the field 











1 Read news feed 
Browsing latest posts from friends, 
suggested posts and pages you follow 
The Facebook SDK for Android is used to 
integrate an app with Facebook and enquire about 
its data thru APIs. The Graph API is the primary 
way to get data in and out of Facebook's social 
graph. The Android SDK has support for 
integrating with Facebook Graph API. With 
the GraphRequest and GraphResponse classes, 
one could make requests and get responses in 
JSON asynchronously. Moreover,  batch requests 
could be made with a single round-trip to the 
Facebook servers with GraphRequestBatch.  
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
The /{user-id}/feed Returns the feed of 
posts (including status updates) and links published 
by this person, or by others on this person's profile. 
There are other edges which provide filtered 
versions of this edge:  
 /{user-id}/posts shows only the posts that 
were published by this person. 
 /{user-id}/tagged shows only the posts that 








A user represents a person on Facebook. 
The /{user-id} node returns a single user and 
/{user-id}/accounts returns Facebook 





Use social network analysis to determine 
relationship degree with this mutual friend and 
notify user of  it.  
 The /{user-id}/friendlists reads a 
user's friend list on Facebook 
While all_mutual_friends Returns a list of 
all the Facebook friends that the session user and 
the request user have in common 
 
Decline request. 
3 Add friend  
Request a connection with People I may 
know 
TBC 
Request a connection through a mutual 
friend 
TBC 
4 Remove friend Remove the friend request TBC 
5 Read user profile 
Read the user profile if public TBC 
Read only mutual friends if private  TBC 
6 Read notifications Read notifications from friends TBC 
7 Login alerts ON. To be alerted (email/Facebook When logging in to Facebook, the site looks up the 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
notification) when someone logs into my 
account from an unrecognized device 
last location you logged in from (by geolocating 
the IP address), and compares it to a list of ‘known’ 
locations. If the location the user is logging in from 
is beyond a certain ‘distance threshold’ from the 
known locations, or not  
Off  
8 Third party authenticator 
Set up a third party app to generate 
Facebook security codes for login 
approvals/reset password. Med risk 
TBC 
9 Generate app password Type the name of the app TBC 
10 
Recognized devices/ 
where you logged in 
Approve  TBC 
Delete  
11 Who can see my stuff 
Select audience who can see future posts/ 
see people and lists you follow 
The Graph API does not provide any means to 
access the user’s privacy settings. However, the 
user object 
(see http://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference
/api/user/) allows you to access all the privacy-
related information, but does not let you access the 
user's privacy settings. One way to get around this 
is by pulling the privacy settings of objects they've 
posted previously and see what the most common 
setting is, and then guess from that what their 
defaults are. 
 
For processes 11-14, the options are: 
 
Public (everyone) 
12 Who can contact me 
Who can send friend request either 
everyone or friends of friends 
friends 
13 Who can look you up 
Using provided email or using provided 
phone number/ search engines.  
Friends of friends 
14 Timeline and tagging 
Who can add things to my timeline. 
Only me Who can see things on my timeline 
Who can follow me either public or friends 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
15 Post on wall 
Text 
/{user-id}/photos reads Photos the person 
is tagged in or has uploaded. While /{user-
id}/picture gets the person's profile picture. 
Message content could be text, photos/videos, GIF, 
URL and/or location. 
Text message: depending on content of message. 
For example, could be offensive comments about 
disabilities, age, religious beliefs and sexual 
orientation 
Photos/videos: personal photo or video of children, 
credit card, military base …etc from camera photo 
album that may include additional hidden info such 
as location 
Location: send current location 
 
Message content will be monitored to identify any 
disruptive, offensive message or personal 
information such as passwords or credit card 
numbers. A list of predefined black words or 
phrases could be created, then by the 
implementation of a keystroke logger and text 
analysis the message content will be scanned 
against that list such that if any undesirable/risky 
content is detected it is picked up and flagged.  
For multimedia content: facial detection and 
recognition techniques could be applied to 
determine persons in the file that might give rise to 
privacy related issues and user notified.  
To differentiate between photos and videos, the 
mimeType is used to check if the file path 
corresponds to an image or video 
Location: check for GPS coordinates location data 
embedded in a photo. This information could be 
obtained by using an EXIF (Exchange Image File 
Photos/videos 
Check in: expose current location 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Format) viewer.   
URL: phishing detection engines will be used to 
check for its legitimacy. 
Social networks analysis techniques could be used 
to determine relationships between social entities.  
However, the user will be notified of consequences 
if this post is shared publically. 
Add activity TBC 
Share post with 
Public 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 




Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s chil 
Only me 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s chil 
16 Like/love/wow/sad…etc. Select one of them 
/{user-id}/likes reads all pages this user 
liked 






Comment text will be monitored and scanned to 
identify any disruptive, offensive message or 
personal information and user will be alerted. 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s child 
Private account 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
account number or photo of user’s child 
18 Share Share post.  
Traffic analysis. User is alerted for consequences 
of sharing sensitive, disruptive or personal 
information with others.  
19 Search Facebook Search for profiles on Facebook TBC 
20 Tag friends Select whom to tag TBC 
21 Update profile 
Add personal information such as 
Birthdate, phone number, hobbies, favorite 
books, location …etc. 
The  Graph API 
call https://graph.facebook.com/bgolub?
fields=id,name,picture will only return the 
id, name, and picture in the defined profile. If null, 


















Send /forward/ reply 
message  
 
Message content could be text, photos/videos, GIF, 
URL and/or location. 
Text message: depending on content of message. 
For example, could be offensive comments about 
disabilities, age, religious beliefs and sexual 
orientation 
Photos/videos: personal photo or video of children, 
credit card, military base …etc from camera photo 
album that may include additional hidden info such 
as location 
Location: send current location. 
Message content will be monitored to identify any 
disruptive, offensive message or personal 
information such as passwords or credit card 
numbers. A list of predefined black words or 
phrases could be created, then by the 
implementation of a keystroke logger and text 
analysis the message content will be scanned 
against that list such that if any undesirable/risky 
content is detected it is picked up and flagged.  
For multimedia content: facial recognition 
techniques could be applied to determine persons 
in the file that might give rise to privacy related 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
issues and user notified.  
To differentiate between photos and videos, the 
mimeType is used to check if the file path 
corresponds to an image or video 
Location: check for GPS coordinates location data 
embedded in a photo. This information could be 
obtained by using an EXIF (Exchange Image File 
Format) viewer.   
URL: phishing detection engines will be used to 
check for its legitimacy 
Social networks analysis techniques could be used 




Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s child 
Non-contact 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s child 
To a group -- the user is alerted that group 
may contain non contacts as members 
Message content is safe 
Message has offensive/disruptive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as bank 
account number or photo of user’s child 
2 
Share a document or 




Whatapp does not have an API for developers. But 
one can query 
for ContactsContract.RawContacts.ACCOUN
T_TYPE with value com.whatsapp. 
The recipient of this sharing is checked to see if 
contact or not and the user alerted. 
Another way for programmatically  determining 
contacts in whatapp is as in 
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/35448250/how-
Non-contact 
A group -- the user is alerted that group 
may contain non contacts as members 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
to-get-whatsapp-contact-from-android  
3 Copy Copying a message. No risk TBC 
4 Create group 




Accept a group invitation 
(to become a group 
member) 
From a contact The contact number sending the invitation is 
checked against the contact list to determine if 
contact or not. From a non-contact 
6 Read messages 
From a contact TBC 
From a non-contact 
7 Delete Delete a message.  TBC 
8 Block contact No risk TBC 
9 Star a message Star a message to be stored as a favorite TBC 
10 Backup chats 
Last backup 
Local backups will run automatically every day at 
2am and save your database in a file on the phone 











1 Sign in 
Enter email address and password. 
Password could be weak, old or reused 
A separate password table 
could be created for all 
app accounts. These 
passwords will be hashed 
and salted. Upon entry of 
password, various 
password defined- rules 
set could be checked 
using vt-password 
(passay) library which is 
One or more password 
rule is violated 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
a password policy 
enforcement for JAVA. 
For example, HistoryRule 
is a rule for determining 
if a password matches 
one of any previous 
password a user has 
chosen. If no historical 
password reference has 
been set, then passwords 
will meet this rule. 
All password rules are 
met 






To programmatically determine user’s Gmail 
contacts , the GData java client library for Google 




Message/attachment content could contain 
anything from text, photos/videos, to URLs.  
For example, text message: depending on content 
of message. It could be offensive comments about 
disabilities, age, religious beliefs and sexual 
orientation.  
URL: could be of a phishing website 
Photos/videos: personal photo or video of children, 
credit card, military base …etc from camera or 
photo album that may include additional hidden 
info such as location. 
By the use of content filtering techniques, message 
content will be monitored to identify any 
disruptive, offensive message or personal 
information such as passwords or credit card 
numbers or  if asking for personal information. A 
list of predefined black words or phrases could be 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
created, then by the implementation of a keystroke 
logger and text analysis the message content will 
be scanned against that list such that if any 
undesirable/risky content is detected it is picked up 
and flagged.  
For multimedia content: facial recognition 
techniques could be applied to determine persons 
in the file that might give rise to privacy related 
issues and user notified.  
Social networks analysis techniques could be used 
to determine relationships between social entities. 
Further to that, if a URL is included then it is 
checked for URL blacklists of malicious websites 




To a contact (whether with or without attachment): 
Message content is safe 
Message has disruptive/offensive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as 






whether with or without attachment: 
Message content is safe 
Message has disruptive/offensive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as 
password, bank account number or user’s child 
photo 
No attachment 
To group With attachment 
Whether with or without attachment: 
Message content is safe 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Message has disruptive/offensive content 
Message has privacy related issues such as 
password, bank account number or user’s child 
photo 
No attachment  
Sending a chain email. 
Monitor content using a content filter that works 
against a list of words or phrases to identify such 
type of emails 
3 
Read an email (text only) 
no attachments 
From contact. 
Whether from a contact or non-contact, The above 
mentioned techniques (as in send email) are used. 
The sender’s email is checked for phishing and 
spoofing 
Message is safe 
From non-contact Message has some safety issues 
4 
Read an email with 
link/attachments 
From contact.  
Open/download with 
checking 
The above mentioned techniques (as in send email) 
are used. The user is notified that the email has an 
attachment that has to be checked before opening 
it. 











5 Reply  








 As a precaution that the user may spread malicious 
emails whether intentionally or unintentionally or 
reply to a phishing email, the message content is 
checked such that there is no exposure of private 
information especially if the receiver is a non-
contact. 




II. Application-related behaviors 





are used.  
If there is an attachment, then it is scanned for 







Make sure the forwarded email is not an offensive 
or disruptive message such as a chain/phishing 
email using the techniques mentioned above Not a contact.  
7 Delete 
Delete an email 
The Gmail API exposes the common Gmail labels 
on a message (like Starred and Unread), IMAP 
\Flagged maps to the Star in the web interface and 
"STARRED" in the API. The Important label 
(corresponding to the \Important mailbox in IMAP) 
should be visible in the in the API as well (system 
label called "IMPORTANT").If this is detected, 
then user is alerted 
Delete an email that was categorized as 
important. 
8 Read sent items No risk TBC 
9 Settings  
Download 
attachments 
On. When On, it allows auto download of 
attachments (high risk) The Gmail API could be used to determine settings 


















1 Remove location 
On. A location is 










The method IsProviderEnabled of the class 
LocationManager provides access to the 
system location services. If the user has enabled 
this provider (GPS_PROVIDER, 
NETWORK_PROVIDER) in the Settings menu, true 
is returned otherwise false is returned.  
Moreover, geotagging info of a photo can be read 
from the EXIF header of the image file itself Off 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
2 Back up Create a backup of photos/videos album 
Checking where 
they are stored in 
Google photos 
library i.e. Folder 
DCIM\camera 
(default storage) and 
check for 
lastModified 
date then compare it 
with today’s date 
using the class 
simpleDateForm
at 
A recent backup is found 
An outdated back up is 
found 
3 Share Sharing of photos with a contact/app. 
Monitor for personal photo or video of children, 
credit card, military base …etc from camera or 
photo album that may include additional hidden 
info such as location. Facial detection and 
recognition techniques could be applied to 
determine persons in the file that might give rise to 
privacy related issues and user notified.  
Social networks analysis techniques could be used 
to determine relationships between social entities. 
Photo is safe 
Photo has privacy related issues 
4 Delete Delete a copy Traffic analysis 
5 Add photo  
Adding a photo to the photo album. The 
risk level depends on content of photo  
Permissions and API calls tracing 
6 Create album Create an album of photos and naming it Traffic analysis 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 



















1 Your places 
Setting home address If device is stolen, this info could be used to 
determine user’s home and work address. User is 
notified of the consequences Setting work address 
2 Your timeline Add a photo to timeline 
Permissions and API calls tracing. Facial detection 
and recognition techniques are used to scan the 
photo and alert the user if privacy related issues are 
detected. 
Photo is safe 
Photo has privacy related issues 
3 Write a review Writing a review about a visited place Traffic analysis 
4 Delete 
Deleting a photo to a point of interest but 
not addresses or coordinates 
Traffic analysis 
5 Add a photo 
Adding a photo to a point of interest but 
not addresses or coordinates. Risk depends 
on photo content. 
Permissions and API calls tracing. Facial detection 
and recognition techniques are used to scan the 
photo and alert the user if privacy related issues are 
detected. 
Photo is safe 
Photo has privacy related issues 
6 Share link Share a location with contact/app 
Social network analysis is used to determine 
relationships degrees. 
7 Get directions 
Asking for directions to a certain 
destination 
Traffic analysis 
8 Search Search nearby places Traffic analysis 
9 Read user’s history Reading places user been to Traffic analysis 
10 Delete location history Deleting of location history Traffic analysis 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 









s 1 Read/watch/listen Reading, watching or listening to BBC Traffic analysis 
2 Weather Forecasting the weather Traffic analysis 
3 Search Searching for specific news Traffic analysis 
















Search for certain products by typing its 
name  
TBC 
Search for certain products either by 
camera or scan 
TBC 
2 Create an account Create an account on Amazon Traffic analysis 
3 Sign in 
Enter email, name and password. Password 
could be weak/old/reused 
A separate password table 
could be created for all app 
accounts. These passwords 
will be hashed and salted. 
Upon entry of password, 
various password defined- 
rules set could be checked 
using vt-password (passay) 
library which is a password 
policy enforcement for 
JAVA. For example, 
HistoryRule is a rule 
for determining if a 
password matches one of 
any previous password a 
user has chosen. If no 
historical password 
reference has been set, then 
passwords will meet this 
rule. 
One or more 
password rule is 
violated 




II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
4 Search orders Searching of past orders by time/type Traffic analysis 
5 View shopping list Privacy settings: public, shared or private Traffic analysis 
6 Delete list/ items from list 




Create shopping list (add 
items to shopping list) 
Drag and drop items to shopping list Traffic analysis 
8 Add/delete from cart Adding/removing items from cart Traffic analysis 
9 
Create/add/ delete wish 
list 
Creating a wish list of items, adding or 
deleting from it 
Traffic analysis 
10 Proceed to check out 
Enter shipping address TBC 
Add a security access code TBC 
Selecting shipping/ delivery options TBC 
Add a credit or debit card (scanning or 
entering details) 
Traffic analysis. The app itself is checked to see if 
it is updated or not. This could be done 
programmatically. Further to that if it is installed 
from official market app or not 
The PackageManager class supplies 
the getInstallerPackageName method that 
will return the package name of whatever installed 
the specified package. User will be notified of such 
information and alerted for consequences of 
entering such sensitive information. 
App is up to date and installed from official market 
Add a bank account 
Either app is out of date, not installed from official 
market or both 






















1 Search Searching for certain media Traffic analysis 
2 Search history Search previously watched videos Traffic analysis 
3 Watch 
Watching a video. Risk level depending on 
content of what is being watched Content of video is monitored. 
4 add to watch later Selecting a video for later viewing 
5 Like/dislike Selecting like or dislike for a certain file  
6 Add a comment 
Adding a comment to a certain video. Risk 
level depending on content of comment 




II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
No issues found 
Disruptive/offensive content 
Privacy related issues 
7 Upload Uploading a multimedia file.  Permissions and API call tracing 
8 Browse channels Browsing channels on YouTube Traffic analysis 
9 Subscribe 
Subscribing to a certain channel. Risk level 
depends on type of channel 
Suitability of channel could be determined by 
checking the About description of the channel. Or 
by using youtube analytics 
10 Unsubscribe Unsubscribing from a certain channel. Traffic analysis 
11 Trending Browse what is trending  
Traffic analysis 
12 Create a playlist Create a play list of favorite videos 














Read offers and 
rewards/read products 
and services 
Browsing offers, products and services 
offered by bank  
Traffic analysis.  
2 Fast balance 
Choose account, Read the current balance 
without logging 
Traffic analysis. User could be alerted that nobody 
is shoulder surfing or public wifi is used 
3 Find HSBC branch/ATM 
Locating the nearest branch/ATM using 
Google map after giving it permission. 
Traffic analysis 
4 Pay bill 
Follow the on screen instructions to move 
money from current bank account to 
another selected account (bill account).  
Traffic analysis. Checking if app is updated or not 
is done by the bank app itself. Type of internet 
connection (wifi or not)  could be determined thru 
connectivityManager..if wifi is detected, security 
of such wifi could be determined programmatically 
using android.net.wifi package. In particular, the 
ScanResult.capabilities string will contain either 
'WPA2', 'WPA' or 'WEP' if the hotspot is secured. 
User is alerted that he is attempting to perform a 
financial transaction. When selecting “confirm ” 
user should be notified as “are you sure??” 
 
No security issues found 
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II. Application-related behaviors 
Category App No. Process User behavior How to monitor 
Security issues found 
5 Make Transfer 
Follow the on screen instructions to move 
money from current bank account to 
another selected account.  
6 Paym 
Follow the on screen instructions to 
pay/transfer money from your account to 
the recipient’s account using his mobile 
phone number only. 
7 Secure message Browse messages sent from bank Traffic analysis 
8 Logout 
If not logout, it will automatically logout 
after 10 minutes of the app being idle, i.e. 
not used. Medium risk 
TBC 
9 Logon 
Using two factor authentication. Either two 
passwords or a password and a secure key 
code. Password could be old/weak/reused 
A separate password table 
could be created for all app 
accounts. These passwords 
will be hashed and salted. 
Upon entry of password, 
various password defined- 
rules set could be checked 
using vt-password (passay) 
library which is a password 
policy enforcement for 
JAVA. For example, 
HistoryRule is a rule for 
determining if a password 
matches one of any 
previous password a user 
has chosen. If no historical 
password reference has 
been set, then passwords 
will meet this rule. 
One or more 
password rule is 
violated 





Appendix D: Detailed Calculations of Software’s Sum of CVSS scores 
According to Methodology Proposed by (Wu and Wang 2011) 
 
 For Operating system: Android V. 4.4.4:   
Total number of vulnerabilities = 122.  
 
Name of weakness Number of vulnerabilities caused by this weakness 











CWE 119 4 
CWE 20 3 
CWE 388 1 
CWE 190 3 
CWE 254 1 
CWE 275 1 
CWE 19 4 
CWE 74 1 
CWE 89 1 
CWE 22 1 
CWE 362 1 
CWE 189 3 
CWE 476 1 
 
CWE 264 = 50 CWE 200 = 23 
CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 
CVE-2017-0807 10.0 CVE-2017-0823 5.0 
CVE-2017-0805 9.3 CVE-2017-0817 5.0 
CVE-2017-0770 9.3 CVE-2017-0816 4.3 
CVE-2017-0768 9.3 CVE-2017-0815 4.3 
CVE-2017-0767 9.3 CVE-2017-0785 3.3 
CVE-2017-0752 9.3 CVE-2017-0783 6.1 
CVE-2017-0745 9.3 CVE-2017-0779 4.3 
CVE-2017-0738 4.3 CVE-2017-0777 4.3 
CVE-2017-0737 6.8 CVE-2017-0668 4.3 
CVE-2017-0731 6.8 CVE-2017-0646 4.3 
CVE-2017-0726 4.3 CVE-2017-0602 4.3 
CVE-2017-0722 9.3 CVE-2017-0560 4.3 








CVE-2017-0703 9.3 CVE-2017-0559 4.3 
CVE-2017-0697 4.3 CVE-2017-0558 4.3 
CVE-2017-0694 4.3 CVE-2017-0547 4.3 
CVE-2017-0692 4.3 CVE-2017-0425 4.3 
CVE-2017-0690 4.3 CVE-2017-0420 4.3 
CVE-2017-0681 9.3 CVE-2017-0398 4.3 
CVE-2017-0671 9.3 CVE-2017-0397 4.3 
CVE-2017-0666 9.3 CVE-2017-0396 4.3 
CVE-2017-0665 9.3 CVE-2015-6644 4.3 
CVE-2017-0644 7.1 CVE-2015-5310 3.3 
CVE-2017-0641 7.1 CVSS SUM = 100.1 
CVE-2017-0600 7.1 CWE 284 = 19 
CVE-2017-0597 9.3 CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 
CVE-2017-0596 9.3 CVE-2017-0814 7.8 
CVE-2017-0595 9.3 CVE-2017-0809 9.3 
CVE-2017-0594 9.3 CVE-2017-0782 8.3 
CVE-2017-0554 6.8 CVE-2017-0781 8.3 
CVE-2017-0546 9.3 CVE-2017-0775 7.1 
CVE-2017-0544 9.3 CVE-2017-0774 7.1 
CVE-2017-0481 9.3 CVE-2017-0766 9.3 
CVE-2017-0480 9.3 CVE-2017-0764 9.3 
CVE-2017-0479 9.3 CVE-2017-0756 9.3 
CVE-2017-0475 9.3 CVE-2017-0714 9.3 
CVE-2017-0419 9.3 CVE-2017-0713 6.8 
CVE-2017-0418 9.3 CVE-2017-0663 6.8 
CVE-2017-0417 9.3 CVE-2017-0491 4.3 
CVE-2017-0416 9.3 CVE-2017-0489 4.3 
CVE-2017-0395 4.3 CVE-2017-0393 7.1 
CVE-2017-0385 9.3 CVE-2017-0392 7.1 
CVE-2017-0384 9.3 CVE-2017-0390 7.1 
CVE-2015-6645 7.1 CVE-2016-6770 4.3 
CVE-2015-6640 9.3 CVE-2016-6763 7.1 
CVE-2015-6637 9.3 CVSS SUM = 140.0 
CVE-2014-8610 3.3   
CVE-2014-8609 7.2   
CVE-2014-7921 10   
CVE-2014-7920 10   
CVE-2014-7911 7.2   





 For applications: 
a) Google Chrome for Android v. 39.0.2171.45 :  
Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
 
CWE 284 = 1 
CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 
CVE-2014-7905 5.0 




b) Google Email Application v. 4.2.2.0200 :  
Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
 
CWE 19 = 1 
CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 
CVE-2015-1574 5.0 
CVSS SUM = 5.0 
 
 
c) Symantec Mobile Security v. 1.0 :  
Total number of vulnerabilities = 1 
 
CWE 255 = 1 
CVE ID CVSS BASE SCORE V2 
CVE-2010-0113 4.3 
CVSS SUM = 4.3 
 
** Only one weakness 
found, thus considered as 
the representative 
weakness 
** Only one weakness 
found, thus considered as 
the representative 
weakness 
** Only one weakness 






 For Network Router CISCO AIRONET access point software ver. 8.1 (112.3):  
Total number of vulnerabilities = 3 
 
Name of weakness Number of vulnerabilities caused by this weakness 
CWE 119 1 
CWE 264 1 






CWE 119 = 1 CWE 264 = 1 CWE 20 = 1 
CVE ID CVSS BASE 
SCORE V2 
CVE ID CVSS BASE 
SCORE V2 
CVE ID CVSS BASE 
SCORE V2 
CVE-2016-6363 6.1 CVE-2016-6362 7.2 CVE-2016-6361 6.1 




** Only three 
weaknesses found, 
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